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Abstract	  
Service-­‐‑based   infrastructures   consist   of   several   software   resources   that   interact   to  
support  (critical)  business  services  of  organizations.  These  resources  are  packaged  as  
services,   which   are   well-­‐‑defined,   self-­‐‑contained,   standard-­‐‑based   and   protocol-­‐‑
independent  modules  providing  business  functionalities  that  are   independent  from  
the   state   or   context   of   other   services.   These   infrastructures   typically   support   the  
implementation  of  Service  Oriented  Architectures   (SOAs)  and  can  be  supported  by  
different   types  of  services  and  technologies,  although  Web  Services  are  usually   the  
implementation  of  choice.  
Although   software   services   should   behave   in   a   secure   manner,   they   are   often  
deployed  with  bugs  that  can  be  maliciously  exploited.  In  fact,  several  studies  show  
that,   in   general,   web   applications   and   services   present   dangerous   flaws.  
Furthermore,   the   characteristics   of   service-­‐‑based   environments   open   the   door   to  
security   challenges   that   must   be   handled   properly,   including   services   under   the  
control  of  multiple  providers  and  the  dynamism  of  interactions  and  compositions.  
To  prevent   security   vulnerabilities,   developers   should   apply   best   coding  practices,  
perform   security   inspections,   execute   penetration   tests,   etc.  However,  many   times,  
developers  focus  on  the  satisfying  user’s  functional  requirements  and  time-­‐‑to-­‐‑market  
constraints,  disregarding  security  aspects.  The  problem  is  that  software  services  are  
so   exposed   that   hackers   will   most   probably   uncover   any   existing   security  
vulnerability.  Under  this  scenario,  automated  vulnerability  detection  techniques  and  
tools   play   an   extremely   important   role   on   helping   deploying  more   secure   service-­‐‑
based   infrastructures,  as   they  provide  an  easy  and  low  cost  way  to  detect  software  
vulnerabilities.    
This   thesis   addresses   the   problem   of   automated   detection   of   software  
vulnerabilities   in   services   and   service-­‐‑based   infrastructures.   First,   the   thesis  
proposes   a   framework   defining   the   assumptions,   the   concepts,   and   the   generic  
approaches   that   lay   the   basis   for   the   development   of   innovative   vulnerability  
detection   techniques   and   tools.   In   practice,   the   framework   defines   a   reference  
service-­‐‑based   infrastructure   and   proposes   generic   approaches   for   designing  
vulnerability  detection  tools  for  web  services  and  for  service-­‐‑based  environments.  
The   thesis   also   presents   different   techniques   and   tools   to   detect   software  
vulnerabilities,   designed   following   the   approaches   in   the   proposed   framework.  
These   include   three   new   techniques   to   detect   vulnerabilities   in   individual   web  
services,   each   one   addressing   a   different   testing   scenario   and   based   on   a   different  
detection   approach,   namely:   improved   penetration   testing,   attack   signatures   and  
interface   monitoring,   and   runtime   anomaly   detection.   Built   on   top   of   such  
techniques,  it  is  also  proposed  an  integrated  approach  for  security  testing  of  service-­‐‑
based   infrastructures,   which   is   based   on   continuous   monitoring   to   automatically  
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discover   and   test   the   existing   services,   resources   and   interactions,   coping  with   the  
specificities  of  these  dynamic  and  complex  environments.  
Finally,   the   thesis   proposes   a   generic   approach   for   designing   benchmarks   that  
allow   assessing   and   comparing   vulnerability   detection   tools   for   service  
environments.   The   approach   specifies   the   components   and   the   steps   needed   to  
implement  concrete  benchmarks,  while   focusing  on   two  key  metrics:  precision  and  
recall.  It  has  been  used  to  define  two  benchmarks,  one  supported  by  a  predefined  set  
of   workload   services   and   the   other   based   on   a   set   of   services   provided   by   the  
benchmark   user.   These   benchmarks   have   been   used   to   run   several   case   studies   to  
assess  the  vulnerability  detection  techniques  proposed  in  the  thesis,  and  to  compare  
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Resumo	  
As  infraestruturas  baseadas  em  serviços  consistem  em  conjuntos  de  componentes  de  
software   que   interagem   entre   si,   utilizados   de   forma   a   suportar   os   processos   de  
negócio   (críticos)  das   organizações.  Estes   componentes,  designados   como   serviços,  
são  módulos  bem  definidos,  auto  contidos,  baseados  em  standards  e  independentes  
de   protocolos,   que   disponibilizam   funcionalidades   que   são   independentes   do  
contexto   ou   estado   de   outros   serviços.   Estas   infra-­‐‑estruturas   suportam   a  
implementação   de   Arquiteturas   Orientadas   a   Serviços   (SOAs),   e   podem   usar  
diferentes  tipos  de  serviços  e  tecnologias,  embora  os  serviços  web  sejam  a  forma  de  
implementação  mais  comum.  
Apesar   de   estes   serviços   possuírem   requisitos   de   confiabilidade,   vários   estudos  
demonstram  precisamente  o  contrário.  De  facto,  estes  estudos  mostram  que  muitos  
dos  serviços  e  aplicações  web  são  disponibilizados  com  falhas  graves  que  podem  ser  
exploradas   de   forma   maliciosa.   Para   além   disso,   as   características   inerentes   aos  
ambientes   baseados   em   serviços,   incluindo   serviços   sob   controlo   de   vários  
fornecedores   de   serviço   assim   como   dinamismo   na   interação   e   composição   de  
serviços,  abrem  a  porta  a  novos    desafios  de  segurança.    
De   forma   a   evitar   vulnerabilidades   de   segurança,   as   equipas   de   desenvolvimento  
devem  aplicar  boas  práticas  de  programação,   levar  a   cabo   inspeções  de   segurança,  
executar   testes  de  penetração,  entre  outros.  No  entanto,  muitas  vezes  estas  equipas  
focam   nos   aspectos   funcionais   e   na   apresentação   do   produto   dentro   do   tempo  
especificado,   desprezando   as   preocupações   de   segurança.   O   problema   é   que   estes  
serviços   estão   de   tal   modo   expostos   que   qualquer   brecha   existentes   acaba,   muito  
provavelmente,   por   ser   descoberta   por   potenciais   atacantes.   Nesse   sentido,   as  
técnicas   e   ferramentas   de   detecção   automática   de   vulnerabilidades   são  
extremamente   importantes   para   facilitar   a   disponibilização   de   infraestruturas  
baseadas  em  serviços  mais  seguras,  uma  vez  que  proporcionam  uma  forma  fácil  e  de  
baixo  custo  para  detectar  potenciais  vulnerabilidades.  
Esta  tese  ataca  o  problema  da  detecção  automática  de  vulnerabilidades  em  serviços  
e  infraestruturas  baseadas  em  serviços.  Primeiro,  a  tese  define  um  enquadramento  
que   inclui   os   pressupostos,   conceitos   e   abordagens   genéricas   para   o  
desenvolvimento   de   técnicas   inovadoras   para   detecção   de   vulnerabilidades.   Na  
prática,   este   enquadramento   define   uma   infraestrutura   baseada   em   serviços   de  
referência  e  propõe  abordagens  genéricas  para  desenhar  ferramentas  de  detecção  de  
vulnerabilidades  em  serviços  web  e  em  ambientes  baseados  em  serviços.  
Para  além  disso,  a   tese  apresenta  diferentes   técnicas  e   ferramentas  que  permitem  
detetar   vulnerabilidades   de   software,   desenhadas   seguindo   as   abordagens  
mencionadas  acima.  Assim,  foram  desenvolvidas  três  novas  técnicas  de  detecção  de  
vulnerabilidades   em   serviços   web,   cada   uma   delas   baseada   numa   abordagem  
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diferente   e   dirigida   a   um   cenário   de   teste   diferente,   nomeadamente:   testes   de  
penetração,   assinaturas   de   ataques   e   monitorização   de   interligações,   e   por   fim  
detecção   de   anomalias   em   tempo   de   execução.   Tirando   partido   destas   técnicas,   é  
ainda   proposta   uma   abordagem   integrada   para   testes   de   segurança   em  
infraestruturas  baseadas   em   serviços,   a   qual   é   baseada   em  monitorização   contínua  
para  descobrir  e  testar  os  serviços,  recursos  e  interacções  existentes,  lidando  com  as  
especificidades  destes  ambientes  dinâmicos  e  complexos.  
Por   fim,   esta   tese   propõe   uma   abordagem   genérica   para   desenhar   testes  
padronizados   que   permitam   avaliar   e   comparar   ferramentas   de   detecção   de  
vulnerabilidades  para  ambientes  baseados  em  serviços.  Esta  abordagem  especifica  
os   componentes   e  os  passos  necessários  para   a   implementação  de   testes   concretos,  
tendo   por   base   duas   métricas   chave:   precisão   e   recuperação.   Esta   abordagem   foi  
utilizada   para   definir   dois   testes   padronizados:   um   baseado   num   conjunto   pré-­‐‑
definido   de   serviços   e   outro   baseado   em   serviços   fornecidos   pelo   utilizador.   Estes  
testes   foram  aplicados   em  vários   casos  de   estudos,  permitindo  desse  modo  não   só  
avaliar  as  técnicas  de  detecção  de  vulnerabilidades  propostas  na  tese  (estabelecendo  
uma   comparação   com   outras   ferramentas   disponíveis   no   mercado),   mas   também  
validar  a  abordagem  genérica  para  desenho  de  testes  padronizados.  
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Serviços   de   Software;   infraestruturas   baseadas   em   serviços;   vulnerabilidades   de  
segurança;   detecção   de   vulnerabilidades;   testes;   avaliação   de   segurança;   testes  
padronizados.  
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Chapter	  1	  
Introduction	  
A   Service-­‐‑Based   Software   Infrastructure1  consists   of   several   software   resources  
working   together   to   support   the   information   infrastructure   of   one   or   more  
organizations   (Bennett   et   al.   2000).   These   software   resources   allow   the   interaction  
between  consumers  and  providers  and  are  packaged  as  services.  Software  services2  
must   be   autonomous   and   self-­‐‑contained,   coarse-­‐‑grained   and   loosely   coupled,   thus  
independent   from   the   state   or   context   of   other   services   (Papazoglou   and   Heuvel  
2007).  This  way  they  can  be  reused  to  implement  different  business  processes,  while  
the   reduced  dependencies   allow   replacing   and/or  modifying   a   service  without   the  
need  for  changing  other  components  of  the  infrastructure.  
In  a  dynamic  and  competitive  business  world,  organizations  need  to  adapt  quickly  
and   efficiently   to   new   challenges   and   opportunities.   Hence,   it   is   necessary   to  
simplify   the   Information   Technology   (IT)   infrastructure   and   improve   the  
interoperability   and   business   agility   of   the   organization.   Service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures  provide  the  ground  for  satisfying  such  demands,  being  typically  used  
to  support   the  well-­‐‑known  Service  Oriented  Architectures  (SOAs)3  (Erl  2005).   In  a  
SOA  context,  a  service  is  a  function  offered  by  a  provider  that  allows  consumers  to  
                                                                                                              
  
1 A Service-Based Software Infrastructure is an infrastructure based on the interaction of several 
software services with the objective of supporting the information infrastructure of one or more 
organizations (Bennett et al. 2000). 
2 A Software Service is a well-defined, self-contained and reusable component that implements a 
business functionality that is delivered to other applications through a standard-based interface in a 
protocol-independent environment (Papazoglou and Heuvel 2007).  
3 A Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a paradigm for organizing and utilizing distributed 
functionalities that may be under the control of different ownerships, following an architectural style 
whose main emphasis is on the loose coupling among interacting software agents or components 
(Perrey and Lycett 2003; MacKenzie et al. 2006). 
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achieve   some   desired   outcome,  with   both   of   these   roles   being   played   by   software  
agents  on  behalf  of  their  owners.  Service-­‐‑orientation  provides  means  for  separation  
of   concerns,   taking   advantage   of   the   characteristics   of   software   services   to   allow  
multiple   functionalities   without   adding   design   complexity   or   increasing  
communication  principles  (Papazoglou  and  Heuvel  2007),  and  is  nowadays  used  in  
a   wide   range   of   organizations   and   scenarios,   including   business-­‐‑critical   systems.  
Frequently,  services  are  connected   through  a  Enterprise  Service  Bus   (ESB)   (Keen  et  
al.   2004),   whose   purpose   is   to   connect   and   coordinate,   in   a   reliable   manner,   the  
interaction   among   services   across   extended   enterprises   (David   A.   Chappell   2009).  
Although  SOAs  can  be   implemented  using  different   types  of  software  services  and  
technologies,   Web   Services   are   usually   the   implementation   of   choice   (Singhal,  
Winograd,  and  Scarfone  2007).    
Web   Services   (WS) 4   are   thus   a   strategic   mean   for   data   exchange,   content  
distribution,   and   systems   integration.   Web   services   are   supported   by   a   complex  
software  infrastructure,  which  typically  includes  an  application  server,  the  operating  
system,   and   a   set   of   external   systems   (e.g.   other   services,   databases,   and   payment  
gateways).   In   practice,   a   web   service   provides   a   simple   interface   between   the  
consumers  and  the  provider,  based  on  the  exchange  of  standardized  messages  over  
the  network  using  the  HTTP  or  HTTPS  protocols  (D.  A  Chappell  and  Jewell  2002a).  
The   web   service   and   the   format   of   the   messages   to   be   exchanged   are   typically  
described  in  a  definitions  file.    
Nowadays,   there   are   two  main   classes  of  web   services:   SOAP  and  RESTful.   SOAP  
web  services  (D.  A  Chappell  and  Jewell  2002a)  are  session-­‐‑less  and  follow  the  XML-­‐‑
based   Simple   Object   Access   Protocol,   after   which   the   technology   was   originally  
named,   and   use   a  WSDL   (Web   Services   Definition   Language)   file   to   describe   the  
interface   and   the   format   of   the   messages   to   be   exchanged.   On   the   other   hand,  
RESTful   (REpresentational   State   Transfer)   web   services   reuse   the   HTTP   methods  
(e.g.  GET,  POST,  DELETE)  together  with  a  simplified  message  format,  and  a  WADL  
(Web  Application  Description  Language)  file  may  optionally  be  used  to  describe  the  
interface  (Richardson  and  Ruby  2007).  While  SOAP  web  services  are  interoperability  
oriented   thus   more   platform   independent,   RESTful   web   services   rely   on   a   much  
lighter   infrastructure,   being  much  more   suited   for   simpler   and   ad   hoc   integration  
scenarios  (Pautasso,  Zimmermann,  and  Leymann  2008).    
For   supporting   Business-­‐‑Critical   Systems,   SOAs   and   software   services   must   be  
dependable  and  secure.  However,  several  studies  show  that,   in  general,  web-­‐‑based  
applications  present  dangerous  faults  (OWASP  Foundation  2013;  Acunetix  2007)  and  
services  are  no  exception.  In  fact,  previous  works  demonstrate  that  web  services  are  
                                                                                                              
  
4 A Web Service (WS) is a self-describing software component designed to support machine-to-
machine interaction based on messages exchange, over a network and using the HTTP protocol 
together with Web-related standards (W3C 2004). 
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frequently   deployed   with   security   vulnerabilities   (Vieira,   Antunes,   and   Madeira  
2009;  Lowis  and  Accorsi  2009).  The  same  is  true  for  other  types  of  software  services,  
including  messaging  middleware,  for  which  several  robustness  and  critical  security  
related   problems   have   been   disclosed   in   the   past   (Laranjeiro,   Vieira,   and  Madeira  
2008)  
Security  Vulnerabilities   are   a  particular   type  of   software   fault   that   open   the  door  
for   attackers   to   unduly   access   a   system   or   network   (Christey   and   Martin   2006),  
leaving   space   for   the   system/data   exploitation   and/or   corruption.   Existing   studies  
show   that   injection   vulnerabilities   are   among   the   most   common   and   dangerous  
vulnerabilities   in   the  Web   (OWASP  Foundation   2013).   Injection   attacks   try   to   take  
advantage  of   improperly  coded  applications   to  execute   the  commands  specified  by  
the   attacker,   enabling,   for   instance,   access   to   critical   data   and   resources   (OWASP  
Foundation  2013).  These  types  of  vulnerabilities  are  particularly  relevant  in  software  
services   (Vieira,   Antunes,   and   Madeira   2009),   as   these   frequently   use   a   data  
persistence   solution   over   a   relational   (Ramakrishnan   and   Gehrke   2003)   or   a   XML  
database  (Meier  2003).  
Due  to  hard  time-­‐‑to-­‐‑market  requirements  and  other  limitations,  the  security  of  web  
applications   is   frequently   disregarded.   In   particular   during   the   evolution   of   such  
applications  (in  terms  of  features  and  complexity),  this  problem  tends  to  increase,  as  
security   is   not   one   of   the  main   concerns   in   the   development   lifecycle.   Even  when  
security   is   a   concern,   it   is   typically   addressed   from   the   network   and   operating  
system  points  of  view.   In   such  cases,   assessment   teams   rely  on  automated   tools   to  
help   finding   breaches   in   the   operating   system   and/or   the   network,   ignoring   that  
today'ʹs  priorities   are  different   (Curphey  et   al.   2002)   as,   being   the  publicly   exposed  
face  of  an  organization,  web  applications  and  services  became  the  preferred  targets  
for   hackers.   In   fact,   hackers   moved   their   focus   from   the   network   to   applications’  
code,   searching   for   vulnerabilities   by   exploiting   the   inputs   of   applications   with  
specially   tampered   values.   These   application   level   attacks   are   performed   through  
network  ports  that  are  used  for  regular  web  traffic  and  thus  cannot  be  mitigated  by  
traditional   security  mechanisms   such   as   firewalls   and   network   intrusion   detection  
systems  (Singhal,  Winograd,  and  Scarfone  2007).  
To  deploy  software  services  without  security  vulnerabilities  developers  must  follow  
a  defense-­‐‑in-­‐‑depth  approach  (Howard  and  Leblanc  2002;  Curphey  et  al.  2002).  This  
approach  assumes  that  any  security  precaution  can  fail  and  so,  security  depends  on  
several   layers   of   mechanisms   that   cover   the   failures   of   each   other.   Software  
engineering   teams   are   expected   to   apply   the   effort   needed   to   introduce   adequate  
security  precautions  in  a  way  that  minimizes  the  probability  of  successful  attacks.  In  
practice,  this  means  that  they  must  address  security  in  all  the  phases  of  the  software  
product’s   development   lifecycle   (ranging   from   requirements   elicitation   to   testing  
and  deployment),  which   includes   applying  best   coding  practices,   perform   security  
inspections,  execute  penetration  tests,  deploy  runtime  attack  detection  systems,  etc.  
(Antunes   and   Vieira   2012a).   However,   it   is   in   the   testing   phase   that   the   software  
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should  be  tested  and  verified   in  an  effort  not  only  to  assure  that   the  system  fulfills  
the   intended   functional   requirements,   but   also   to   detect   and   remove   any   existing  
security   vulnerabilities.   In   fact,   testing   represents   the   last   opportunity   to   prevent  
applications  from  being  deployed  with  security  flaws.  
This  work   focuses   on   the   testing  phase   of   the  development   lifecycle   (in  particular  
from  the  automated  security  testing  perspective)  and  proposes  techniques  and  tools  for  
the  detection  of   injection  vulnerabilities   in  service-­‐‑based  software   infrastructures.   In   short,  
the  motivation  is  threefold:  1)  many  times,  developers  focus  on  the  satisfying  user’s  
functional   requirements   and   time-­‐‑to-­‐‑market   constraints,   disregarding   security  
aspects;   2)   similarly   to   other   web   applications,   web   services   are   so   exposed   that  
hackers  will  most  probably  uncover  any  existing  security  vulnerability;  and  3)   in  a  
service-­‐‑based  scenario,   injection  attacks  are  the  most  dangerous  and  common  ones.  
Automated   vulnerability   detection   techniques   and   tools   thus   play   an   extremely  
important   role   on   helping   the   developers   to   produce   non-­‐‑vulnerable   code   while  
improving  productivity,  as  they  provide  an  easy  and  less  expensive  way  for  testing  
applications,   without   requiring   the   availability   of   human   resources   specifically  
specialized  in  computer  security.  
1.1 Detecting	  Vulnerabilities	  in	  Software	  Services	  
Many   different   techniques   for   the   detection   of   software   vulnerabilities   have   been  
proposed  in  the  past  (Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).  These  are  usually  divided  into  white-­‐‑
box   analysis,  which   consists   in   the   analysis   of   the   code   of   the   application  without  
executing   it,   and   black-­‐‑box   testing   that   analyzes   the   execution   of   the   application  
without   accessing   its   internals   (i.e.   based   on   the   outputs   of   the   application).  
Exceptionally,  other  techniques,  normally  referred  as  gray-­‐‑box,  may  combine  black-­‐‑
box  and  white-­‐‑box  characteristics.  All  these  approaches  can  be  applied  manually  or  
automatically  with  the  help  of  tools.    
White-­‐‑box   approaches   analyze  of   the  program   from  an   internal  point-­‐‑of-­‐‑view  and  
include  code  inspection,  reviews,  walkthroughs,  etc.  In  a  security  code  inspection  the  
programmer  delivers   the   code   to  his  peers  and   they   systematically   examine   it   in  a  
formal  meeting,   searching   for   security  vulnerabilities.  This   is   regarded  as   the  most  
effective   way   for   assuring   that   a   piece   of   software   has   a   minimum   number   of  
vulnerabilities   (Curphey   et   al.   2002),   but   it   is   usually   very   time   consuming   and  
expensive.   Less   expensive   alternatives   are   code   reviews   and   code   walkthroughs  
(Freedman   and   Weinberg   2000).   Code   reviews   are   a   simplified   version   of   code  
inspections   that are still formal, but do not require a formal review meeting.   Code  
walkthroughs  are  an  informal  approach  that  consists  of  manually  analyzing  the  code  
by   following   the   code   paths   as   determined   by   predefined   input   conditions.  
However,   these   techniques   still   bring   the   cost   of   having   more   than   one   expert  
manually  analyzing  the  code.  
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The  alternative  to  reduce  the  cost  of  white-­‐‑box  analysis  is  to  rely  on  automated  tools,  
such  as  static  code  analyzers.   In  fact,   the  use  of   these  tools   is  seen  as  an  easier  and  
faster  way  to  find  bugs  and  vulnerabilities.  Static  code  analysis  tools  vet  the  code  in  
an   attempt   to   identify   common   implementation-­‐‑level   faults   (Stuttard   and   Pinto  
2007).  The  analysis  performed  varies  depending  on  the  tool  sophistication.  The  main  
problem   is   that  exhaustive   source  code  analysis  may  be  difficult  and  may  not   find  
many   security   flaws  due   to   the   complexity   of   the   code   and   the   lack   of   a   dynamic  
(runtime)  view.    
Black-­‐‑box  approaches  analyze  the  execution  of  the  program  from  an  external  point-­‐‑
of-­‐‑view.   Testing   is   the   most   used   technique   for   verification   and   validation   of  
software  and  consists  in  executing  the  software  and  comparing  the  outcome  with  the  
expected   result   (Myers,   Sandler,   and   Badgett   2011).   There   are   several   levels   for  
applying   black-­‐‑box   testing,   ranging   from   unit   testing   to   integration   testing   and  
system   testing.   The   tests   specification   defines   the   coverage   criteria   and   should   be  
elaborated   before   development.   The   idea   is   that   the   test   specification   should   help  
developers  during  the  coding  process.  Furthermore,  by  designing  tests  a  priori,  it  is  
possible  to  avoid  biasing  the  tests  due  to  knowledge  about  the  code  developed.    
Robustness  testing  is  a  specific  form  of  black-­‐‑box  testing.  The  goal  is  to  characterize  
the   behavior   of   a   system   in   the  presence   of   erroneous   input   conditions   (Koopman  
and  DeVale  2000;  Vieira,  Laranjeiro,  and  Madeira  2007).  Penetration  testing,  by   its  
turn,   is   a   specialization   of   robustness   testing   and   consists   of   the   analysis   of   the  
program   execution   in   the   presence   of   malicious   inputs,   searching   for   potential  
vulnerabilities  (Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).  In  practice,  the  tester  needs  no  knowledge  
about   the   implementation  details   and  uses   fuzzing   techniques   to   test   the   inputs  of  
the   application   from   the  malicious   user’s   point   of   view   (Stuttard   and   Pinto   2007).  
The  problem  is   that   the  number  of   tests  can  reach  hundreds  or  even  thousands  for  
each   vulnerability   type,   representing   a   very   repetitive,   tedious   and,   essentially,  
expensive  task  if  performed  manually.  Penetration  testing  tools  allow  reducing  this  
cost   by   providing   the   required   support   for   searching   for   vulnerabilities   in   an  
automatic  way.  The  most  common  penetration  testing  tools  used  in  web  applications  
are  generally  referred  to  as  web  security  scanners  (or  web  vulnerability  scanners). 
Previous  research  and  practice  show  that  both  white-­‐‑box  and  black-­‐‑box  state  of  the  
art  vulnerability  detection  tools  have  a  very  limited  effectiveness  (Fonseca,  Vieira,  
and  Madeira   2007;  Wagner   et   al.   2005;   Teixeira,  Antunes,   and  Neves   2007).   In   the  
particular   context   of   web   services,   studies   show   that   static   code   analysis   and  
penetration   testing   tools   present   very   high   false   positive   rates,   which   reduces   the  
confidence   on   the   precision   of   the   vulnerabilities   detected   (Vieira,   Antunes,   and  
Madeira   2009;  Antunes   and  Vieira   2009a).   Those   studies   also  demonstrate   that   the  
coverage   of   penetration   testing   tools   is   very   low,   suggesting   that   many  
vulnerabilities  may  remain  undetected.  Another  key  observation  is  that,  even  when  
implementing   the   same   approach,   different   tools   frequently   report   distinct  
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vulnerabilities   for   the   same  piece  of   code,  generating  conflicting   results   that  again,  
reduce  the  confidence  in  the  output  of  those  tools.  
The   problem   is   that   penetration   testing   is   the   technique   most   used   by   web  
developers  to  detect  vulnerabilities  in  their  applications  (Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).  In  
the   context   of   software   services   and   infrastructures,   where   services   are   deployed,  
interconnected   and   updated   at   anytime,   being   often   composed   by   third-­‐‑party  
components,  penetration  testing  assumes  an  even  bigger  importance  as  many  times  
it  is  necessary  to  assess  the  security  of  services  that  are  under  the  control  of  external  
entities.   In  this  context,   the  effectiveness  problems  highlighted  before  clearly  create  
the   need   for   new   and   more   efficient   tools   that   allow   testing   services   in   different  
scenarios.  
As   a   black-­‐‑box   technique,   penetration   testing   has   no   visibility   on   the   internal  
behavior  of   the  tested  services.   In  fact,   it  can  only  observe  the  application  from  the  
point  of  view  of  an  external  user,  which  results  directly  into  two  major  restrictions:  
• The  vulnerability  detection  process  must  be  based  only  on  the  analysis  of  the  
output   of   the   web   service   (leading   to   a   lack   of   information   for   decision  
making).   This   limits   the   capabilities   of   the   tools,   as   most   times   the  
information   that   is   released   to   the   client   is   not   enough   to   effectively  detect  
vulnerabilities.   Also,   many   times   the   output   of   the   application   is  
preprocessed  to  avoid  the  leakage  of  information  about  the  system,  making  it  
almost  impossible  to  identify  any  vulnerability  (although  they  may  exist  and  
the  testing  tool  may  effectively  exploit  them).  
• It  is  impossible  for  the  tool  to  know  what  inputs  to  use  in  order  to  maximize  
the   number   of   web   service’s   code   paths   that   are   tested   (resulting   in  
inadequate  code  coverage).  Obviously,  if  some  paths  of  code  are  not  executed  
during   the   testing   process,   obviously   the   vulnerabilities   located   in   these  
pieces  of  code  will  not  be  detected.  
In   addition   to   these   restrictions,   the   specific   characteristics   of   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures   raise   new   challenges   for   security   testing.   First   of   all,   these  
infrastructures  are  dynamic  in  nature,  facing  (runtime)  changes  in  the  services  used  
and  in  the  way  they  interact.  Second,  they  usually  include  services  that  are  under  the  
control   of  multiple   providers,   creating   the   need   for  diverse   vulnerability  detection  
tools  that  can  cope  with  different  kinds  of  information  available  (e.g.  the  source  code  
may  be   available   or   not).   Finally,   the   security   (or   lack   of   it)   of   a   given   service   can  
impact   the   services   and   resources   of   the   infrastructure   with   which   it   interacts,  
creating  the  need  for  considering  the  interactions  with  resources  and  other  services.    
Another   major   challenge   is   the   ability   to   select   the   most   effective   vulnerability  
detection   tools   and   configurations   from   a   set   of   alternatives   available.   This   is  
particularly   relevant   as   different   tools  may   generate   different   (or   even   conflicting)  
results.   However,   existing   evaluations   are   limited   by   the   small   number   of   tools  
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assessed   and   by   the   representativeness   of   the   experiments   (Vieira,   Antunes,   and  
Madeira  2009;  Antunes  and  Vieira  2009a;  Fonseca,  Vieira,  and  Madeira  2007;  Wagner  
et   al.   2005),   thus   not   allowing   the   generalization   of   the   results.   This   way,   web  
services  developers  frequently  select   the  tools  based  on  common  sense,  which  may  
lead   to  wrong  decisions  and  ultimately   to  code  deployed  with  vulnerabilities,   thus  
calling  for  techniques  that  allows  assessing  and  comparing  such  tools  under  realistic  
conditions.  
In   summary,   taking   into   account   the   intrinsic   characteristics   of   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures,   the   importance   and   widely   usage   of   automated   vulnerability  
detection,  and  the  low  effectiveness  of  existing  tools,  this  thesis  focus  on  addressing  
the  following  needs:    
1. An   integrated   approach   able   to   continuously  monitor,   discover   and   testing  
the  services  in  the  service-­‐‑based  infrastructure,  coping  with  the  dynamicity  of  
these  environments;    
2. Effective  vulnerability  detection  techniques  and  tools  that  can  be  used  to  test  
different   services,   under   different   scenarios,   and   with   different   levels   of  
access  and  information  available;  
3. Adequate   benchmarking   approaches   that   allow   evaluating   and   comparing  
vulnerability  detection  tools,  thus  helping  providers  and  consumers  to  select  
the   most   effective   ones   and   guiding   the   design   and   development   of   new  
tools.  
1.2 Main	  Contributions	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
The   main   contribution   of   this   thesis   is   an   integrated   approach   that   allows  
continuously   discovering   the   services   and   resources   of   a   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructure,   and   supports   the   process   of   testing   those   services   for   injection  
vulnerabilities   with   improved   effectiveness   by   using   the   testing   technique   most  
adequate  to  each  scenario,  depending  on  the  type  of  service  to  be  tested  and  on  the  
information  that  is  available.  In  detail,  the  contributions  of  this  thesis  are:  
• The   definition   of   a   framework   for   the   detection   the   vulnerabilities   in  
service-­‐‑based   infrastructures,   defining   the   assumptions,   the   concepts,   and  
the  generic  approaches   that   lay   the  basis   for   the  development  of   innovative  
techniques   and   tools.   This   framework   includes   a   reference   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructure   and   generic   approaches   for   designing   vulnerability   detection  
tools  for  web  services  and  service-­‐‑based  environments.    
• The   proposal   of   a   generic   approach   for   designing   vulnerability   detection  
tools  for  web  services,  which  includes  the  definition  of  the  testing  procedure  
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and  of  the  tool  components.  Tools  designed  based  on  this  approach  should  be  
able   to   detect   a   broad   range   of   vulnerabilities,   with   priority   to   injection  
vulnerabilities,   the   most   dangerous   and   common   in   the   service-­‐‑based  
context.   Based   on   this   generic   approach,   three   new   techniques   to   detect  
vulnerabilities  in  web  services  are  proposed:  
o An   improved  penetration   testing  approach   to  detect  SQL  Injection  
vulnerabilities   [IPT-­‐‑WS]   (Antunes   and  Vieira   2009b).  The   approach  
uses   representative   workloads   to   exercise   the   web   services,  
implements   effective   attackloads,   and   applies   well-­‐‑defined   rules   to  
analyze   the   web   services   responses,   thus   improving   detection  
coverage  while   reducing   false  positives.  The   implemented  prototype  
has   shown   to   be,   in   several   cases,   more   effective   than   existing  
commercial  security  scanners.  
o An  approach  based  on  attack  signatures  and  interface  monitoring  to  
detect  injection  vulnerabilities  [Sign-­‐‑WS]  (Antunes  and  Vieira  2011).  
The   approach   overcomes   the   visibility   limitations   of   penetration  
testing   by   introducing   special   tokens   inside   the   injection   attacks  
(signatures)   and   then  monitoring   the   interfaces   of   the   service   under  
testing   looking   for   these   tokens   to   detect   vulnerabilities.   The  
implemented   prototype   is   able   to   largely   outperform   existing  
penetration   testing   tools   in   terms  of  vulnerability  detection  coverage  
and   false   positives.   Also,   comparing   to   IPT-­‐‑WS,   the   tool   is   able   to  
detect  more  vulnerabilities,  while  reducing  false  positives  to  zero.  
o A  runtime  anomaly  detection  approach  able  to  detect  SQL  Injection  
and   XPath   Injection   vulnerabilities   [RAD-­‐‑WS]   (Antunes   et   al.  
2009a).   The   approach   exercises   the   service   for   profiling   its   regular  
internal   behavior   (learning   phase)   and   then   attacks   the   service  
(attacking   phase),   reporting   a   vulnerability   when   some   deviation   is  
detected.   The   implemented   prototype   has   shown   to   be   able   to  
consistently   outperform   the   aforementioned   approaches   and   other  
existing  tools,  being  able  to  achieve  a  higher  detection  coverage,  while  
avoiding  false  positives.  
• The  proposal  of  an  integrated  approach  for  security  testing  of  service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures   [SOA-­‐‑Scanner]   (Antunes  and  Vieira  2013).  This  approach   is  
based   on   continuous   monitoring   to   automatically   discover   and   test   the  
existing   services,   resources   and   interactions,   coping  with   the  dynamicity   of  
these  environments.  This  includes:  
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o The  design  of  a  generic  architecture  based  on  three  key  generic  steps:  
architecture  description,  profiling  interactions,  and  testing  services.  It  
includes  the  design  of  the  main  components  of  the  approach,  namely:  
an   integrated   controller,   a   testing   service,   and   a   set   of   probes   to   be  
deployed   in   the   infrastructure.      It   also   includes   the   definition   of  
guidelines   on   how   to   integrate   different   vulnerability   detection  
techniques  and  tools  in  the  testing  service.  
o The   implementation   of   a   prototype   focused   on   web   services   and  
injection   vulnerabilities   (Antunes   and   Vieira   2013).   The   prototype  
uses  probes  that  are  deployed  in  the  infrastructure  for  monitoring  the  
interactions   among   the   services   and   resources   of   the   infrastructure  
and   then   applies   the   vulnerabilities   detection   technique   (or  
techniques)   most   adequate   considering   the   level   of   access   and  
information  available  about  each  web  service.  The  goal   is   to  achieve  
maximum  effectiveness,   both   in   terms  of  vulnerability   coverage  and  
false  positives.  
• The   proposal   of   a   generic   approach   for   designing   benchmarks   for  
vulnerability   detection   tools   for   services   (Antunes   and   Vieira   2010).   The  
approach   specifies   the   requirements   for   the   benchmark   components   (i.e.  
workload,   metrics   and   procedure)   and   the   steps   needed   to   implement  
concrete   benchmarks.   This   approach   focuses   on   two   key  metrics:   precision  
(the   ratio   of   correctly  detected  vulnerabilities   to   the  number  of   all   reported  
vulnerabilities)  and  recall  (the  ratio  of  correctly  detected  vulnerabilities  to  the  
number   of   known   vulnerabilities).   It   has   been   used   to   define   two   concrete  
benchmarks:  
o A  benchmark  based  on  a  predefined  workload  targeting  tools  able  
to   detect   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   in   web   services  
[VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd]   (Antunes   and   Vieira   2010).   This   benchmark   is  
based  on  a  well  defined  and   large   set  of  web   services  adapted   from  
standard  performance  benchmarks,  and  includes  both  vulnerable  and  
non-­‐‑vulnerable   versions   of   the   services.   The  main   limitation   of   this  
benchmark  is  that,  although  based  on  a  well-­‐‑defined  set  of  rules,  it  is  
not  fully  protected  against  "ʺgaming"ʺ  (i.e.  adaptations/tuning  that  allow  
producing   optimistic   or   biased   results).   In   fact,   as   the   set   of   web  
services   is   well   known,   vendors   can   easily   tune   their   tools   to  
maximum  effectiveness  in  the  context  of  the  benchmark,  while  failing  
in  different  scenarios.    
o A   benchmark   based   on   a   user-­‐‑provided   workload   (any   set   of  
services)   targeting   penetration   testing   tools   for   the   detection   of  
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injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  services  [PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud]  (Antunes  
and  Vieira   2012b).   This   benchmark   follows   an   alternative   approach,  
solving   the   “gaming”   problem   by   allowing   the   benchmark   user   to  
specify   the   workload   (i.e.   the   target   set   of   web   services   is   not  
predefined   and   is   unknown   to   the   tools’   providers)   that   best  
represents  his  specific  development  conditions,  providing  at  the  same  
time  more  realistic  results.  To  support  the  (user)   task  of  defining  the  
workload,   the   benchmark   includes   a   procedure   and   a   tool   to   help  
characterizing   the   injection   vulnerabilities   that   exist   in   the   web  
services  (and  that  serve  as  reference  for  the  metrics  calculation),  thus  
avoiding  the  need  for  conducting  such  analysis  manually.  
• The   execution   of   multiple   campaigns   to   experimentally   evaluate   and  
compare  vulnerability  detection   tools,   including   the   ones  proposed   in   this  
thesis  and  other  well-­‐‑known  and  widely  used  tools.  This  includes:  
o The   evaluation   of   existing   penetration   testing   tools   in   public   web  
services   (Vieira,   Antunes,   and   Madeira   2009).   This   allows  
understanding   the   most   frequent   vulnerabilities   and   also   the  
effectiveness   and   limitations  of   existing   tools   (and  what  needs   to  be  
improved).  The  results  highlight  the  limitations  of  penetration  testing  
as  different  tools  reported  different  vulnerabilities  and  presented  low  
detection  coverage   (less   than  20%  for   two  of   the  scanners),  and  high  
false  positives  rates  (35%  and  40%  in  two  cases).  
o The   use   of   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   to   evaluate   different   techniques   and  
tools,   including   the   tools   defined   in   this  work   (Antunes   and   Vieira  
2010).  Besides  helping  on  improving  the  proposed  methodologies,  the  
goal   is   to   validate   the   benchmarking   approach.   In   practice,   the  
benchmark   has   been   used   to   compare   several   tools,   including  
commercial   and   open-­‐‑source   penetration   testers   and   static   code  
analyzers.  The  results  showed  that  the  benchmark  allows  ranking  the  
different   tools   according   to   the   different   measures,   providing   the  
support   needed   for   the   users   to   select   the  most   effective   tool   under  
diverse   requirements.   Also,   results   demonstrated   that   the  
vulnerability  detection  approaches  proposed  in  this  work  consistently  
provide  better  results  than  other  state-­‐‑of-­‐‑the-­‐‑art  tools.  
• The  use   of   PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud   to   evaluate   different   penetration   testing   tools  
(Antunes   and   Vieira   2012b).   The   goal   is   to   show   that   the   proposed  
benchmarking  approach  can  be  used  to  assess  and  compare  this  type  of  tools  
in   the   specific   context   of   the   services   of   an   organization   (i.e.   under   specific  
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workload   conditions).   Comparing   to   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   benchmark,   similar  
results  were   obtained   as,   although   some   of   the   detailed  measures   differed,  
both  benchmarks  leaded  to  the  same  ranking  of  the  tools.  
o The  application  of  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  tool  in  a  case  study  based  on  a  
subset   of   the   jSeduite   SOA   (Antunes   and   Vieira   2013).   The   case  
study   consists   of   a   simplified   service   based   infrastructure   that   uses  
the  code  of  the  jSeduite  SOA  (Delerce-­‐‑Mauris  et  al.  2009).  This  allows  
demonstrating   all   the   different   testing   scenarios   and   the  
functionalities   of   the   integrated   tool   in   a   simple   infrastructure,  
validating  this  way  its  capabilities.  
Although  it  is  possible  to  use  some  of  the  techniques  proposed  in  this  thesis  beyond  
the   testing   phase   (i.e.   at   runtime),   such   usage   raises   problems   related   to   service  
degradation   and   failure   propagation   due   to   the   execution   of   testing   activities   on  
production  services.  To   tackle   these  problems,   there  are  other  works  on  techniques  
that  provide  partial  solutions,  such  as  sandboxing,  virtualization,  etc.  (Michelsen  and  
English  2012).  Although  this  is  a  very  important  challenge,  these  concerns  are  out  of  
the  scope  of  this  work  and  so,  they  will  not  to  be  addressed  in  this  thesis.    
1.3 Thesis	  Structure	  
This   first   chapter   introduced   the  problem  addressed  and   the  main  contributions  of  
the  thesis.  
Chapter  2  presents  background  on  web  services,   service  based   infrastructures,  and  
SOAs.   It   also   discusses   related   work   on   vulnerability   detection   techniques,   with  
focus  on  techniques  that  apply  to  web  applications  and  services,  as  well  as  on  tools  
for  monitoring  and  testing  service  based  infrastructures.  Finally,  it  discusses  existing  
works   on   assessment   and   comparison   of   vulnerability   detection   tools,   focusing  
particularly  on  benchmarking.    
Chapter   3   presents   the   framework   for   the   detection   of   vulnerabilities   in   Service-­‐‑
Based   Infrastructures.   The   chapter   starts   by   establishing   an   infrastructure   that   is  
used  as  reference  throughout  the  work  and  the  challenges  and  requirements  of  such  
kind   of   infrastructure.   Furthermore,   it   presents   a   generic   approach   for   designing  
vulnerability  detection  tools  and  the  generic  integrated  approach  for  testing  Service-­‐‑
Based  Infrastructures  for  vulnerabilities.      
Chapter   4   presents   the   vulnerability   detection   techniques   developed   based   on   the  
generic  approach  introduced  in  Chapter  3.  It  presents  IPT-­‐‑WS:  a  penetration  testing  
technique   able   to   detect   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   in   web   services,   Sign-­‐‑WS:   a  
technique  based  on   attack   signatures   and   interface  monitoring   for   the  detection  of  
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injection  vulnerabilities,  and  RAD-­‐‑WS:  a  runtime  anomaly  detection  technique  able  
to  detect  SQL  Injection  and  XPath  Injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  services.  
Chapter   5   presents   the   integrated   tool   for   security   testing   for   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures.  The   tool   implements   the  approach  proposed   in  Chapter  3  and  uses  
interface   monitoring   to   continuously   monitor   and   discover   the   services   and  
resources  of   the   infrastructure.  For   testing   the   services,   the  approach  makes  use  of  
the  vulnerability  detection  techniques  presented  in  Chapter  4.    
Chapter  6  presents  a  generic  methodology  for  designing  benchmarking  approaches  
to   evaluate   vulnerability   detection   tools   for   web   services.   It   also   presents   two  
instantiations   of   this   methodology:   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd,   a   benchmark   based   on   a  
predefined  workload   targeting   tools   able   to   detect   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   in  
web  services;  and  PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud,  a  benchmark  based  on   the  use  of  any  workload  
and  targeting  penetration  testing  tools  able  to  detect  injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  
services.    
Chapter  7  presents  the  case  studies  developed  to  show  the  practical  application  and  
to   evaluate   the   proposed   techniques   and   tools.   The   first   case   study   presents   an  
evaluation   of   commercial   web   security   scanners   using   public   web   services.   The  
second   demonstrates   the   use   of   the   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   benchmark   to   evaluate   and  
compare   a   large   set   of   vulnerability   detection   tools,   including   tools   implementing  
the   techniques   presented   in   Chapter   4.   The   third   case   study   demonstrates   the  
VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   benchmark   by   evaluating   and   comparing   four   penetration   testing  
tools.   The   final   case   study   demonstrates   the   capabilities   of   SOA-­‐‑Scanner   in   the  
detection  of  vulnerabilities  in  a  simple  service-­‐‑based  infrastructure.  
The  last  chapter  concludes  the  thesis  and  proposes  topics  for  future  research.  
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Chapter	  2	  
Background	  and	  Related	  Work	  
The  research  on  software  services  has  been  a  hot  topic  in  the  last  decade,  as  shown  
by   the   increasing  number  of  publications   in   this   area.  On   the  other  hand,   research  
related  to  security  concerns  dates  way  back  before   the  concept  of  software  services  
even   existed,   with   exploratory   research   on   defenses   against   malicious   faults,   i.e.  
security  threats,  starting  in  the  mid-­‐‑80s  (Dobson  and  Randell  1986).  The  conjunction  
of  both   concerns   is   a  key   topic   and,   although   research   in  web   security   and   threats  
has  also  been  a  major  topic  in  the  last  few  years,  in  most  cases  the  existing  works  do  
not   deal  with   the   specificities   of   services   environment   (Curphey   et   al.   2002;  W.  G.  
Halfond,  Viegas,  and  Orso  2006;  Bau  et  al.  2010;  Fonseca,  Vieira,  and  Madeira  2009).    
This   chapter   presents   background   on   software   services   and   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures,   software   security   threats,   and   concepts   and   the   best   practices  
regarding   the   software   development   process.   It   also   includes   an   overview   of   the  
most   relevant   related  work   on   vulnerability   detection   and   on   the   assessment   and  
benchmarking  of  existing  tools.  It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  some  of  the  works  
presented  are  relative  to  web  applications  in  general,  and  not  to  services.  However,  
although   few   works   have   focused   the   problem   of   security   and   vulnerability  
detection   in   the   web   services   environment,   the   works   presented   here   contain  
important  ideas  that  should  be  taken  into  account  when  researching  new  techniques.  
The   structure   of   this   chapter   is   as   follows.   The   next   section   introduces   the   basic  
concepts  on  software  services  and  service-­‐‑based  infrastructures.  Section  2.2  presents  
the   background   on   software   security,   including   security   threats   and   how   to   deal  
with   them.   Section   2.3   reviews   the   related   work   on   vulnerability   detection  
techniques,   while   Section   2.4   reviews   the   related   work   on   assessment   and  
benchmarking  approaches.  Section  2.5  concludes  the  chapter.  
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2.1 Software	  Services	  and	  Service-­‐Based	  Infrastructures	  
Service-­‐‑based   infrastructures   consist   of   several   software   resources   that   interact   to  
support  (critical)  business  services  of  organizations.  These  resources  are  packaged  as  
software   services,   which   allow   the   interaction   between   consumers   and   providers  
(via  the  exchange  of  messages  based  on  standards).  Essentially,  services  are  reusable  
components   that   represent   business   functionalities   delivered   in   an   efficient   way  
within  a  protocol-­‐‑independent  distributed  environment  and  through  a  standardized  
interface.  Also,  services  are  coarse-­‐‑grained  and  loosely  coupled  and  are  designed  to  
interact  without   the   need   for   dependencies   between   services,   supporting  multiple  
functionalities  without  adding  design  complexity  or  increasing  communication.    
Service-­‐‑based   infrastructures   typically   support   the   implementation   of   Service  
Oriented   Architectures   (SOAs),   which   are   no   more   than   a   paradigm   for   taking  
advantage   of   distributed   functionalities   that  may   be   under   the   control   of   different  
owners,   following   an   loosely   coupled   architectural   style   (Perrey   and   Lycett   2003;  
MacKenzie  et  al.  2006).  
“’You   don'ʹt   need  Web   services   to   build   SOA!’   These   are   words   you'ʹll   hear  many   say  
prior   to   explaining   service-­‐‑oriented   architecture.   However,   this   statement   is   typically  
followed  by   something   equivalent   to   ‘...but  using  Web  services   to  build  SOA  is  a  darn  
good  idea...’”  (Erl  2005).  
A  web  service   is  a  piece  of  business   logic  available  on  a  network  (usually  Internet)  
and   accessible   through   an   Internet   protocol   (such   as   HTTP   or   HTTPS)   by   the  
exchange  of  messages  according  to  the  definition  of  the  interface  of  the  service,  that  
is   usually   described   using   a   machine   readable   format   (D.   A   Chappell   and   Jewell  
2002b;   Sandoval,   Roussev,   and  Wallace   2009;   Christensen   et   al.   2001).  The   service  
provides   a   set   of   operations   and,   in   practice,   each   operation   is   a   method   with  
several   input  parameters.   In   each   interaction   the   consumer   (client)   sends  a   request  
message   to   the   provider   (server).   After   processing   the   request,   the   server   sends   a  
response  message   to   the   client  with   the   results.   To   facilitate   the   discovery   of  Web  
services,  brokers  are  usually  used.    
A  web   service   is   supported   by   a   complex   software   infrastructure,  which   typically  
includes   an   application   server,   the   operating   system   and   external   systems   such   as  
data  sources  (DBMS,  XML  databases,  etc.)  or  other  web  services.  Figure  2.1  presents  
a  simplified  view  of  the  typical  structure  of  a  web  services  system.  Web  services  can  
be   implemented   in   a   wide   variety   of   architectures   and   technologies   and   can  
interoperate  with   other   technologies   and   software   design   approaches,   allowing   an  
evolutionary   adoption   that   does   not   require   major   transformations   to   legacy  
applications  (Singhal,  Winograd,  and  Scarfone  2007).    
Actually,   this   interoperability   is  one  of   the  main   causes   for  web   services  adoption,  
which  was  also  fostered  by  the  advent  of  Service  Oriented  Architectures  (SOA).  As  
with   any   new   technology,   this   success   comes   with   a   level   of   increased   risk  
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(Lindstrom   2004).   In   fact,   “web   services   are   a   technology   that   can   be  used   to   implement  
Service   Oriented   Architectures   (SOA)   and   are   increasingly   becoming   the   SOA  
implementation  of  choice.  For  a  SOA  to  truly  meet  its  goals,  applications  developed  must  be  
secure  and  reliable.”  (Singhal,  Winograd,  and  Scarfone  2007).  
  
  
Figure  2.1  –  SOAP  Web  Services  Typical  Structure.  
A  registry  is  used  to  discover  the  services  and  then  the  interactions  are  performed  using  
SOAP  messages  that  follow  the  specification  in  the  WSDL  file.  
2.2 Software	  Security	  
Security,   “the   practice   of   building   software   to   be   secure   and   function   properly   under  
intentional   malicious   attacks”   (G.   McGraw   2006),   is   an   integrative   concept   that  
includes   four   key   properties   (Cachin   et   al.   2000):   confidentiality   (absence   of  
unauthorized   disclosure   of   a   service   or   piece   of   information),   authenticity  
(guarantees  that  a  service  or  piece  of  information  is  authentic),   integrity  (protection  
of   a   service   or   piece   of   information   against   illicit   and/or   undetected  modification),  
and   availability   (protection   against  possible  denials   of   service   caused  maliciously).  
To  achieve  these  properties,  several  security  mechanisms  have  been  developed  in  the  
past,   targeting   especially   subsystems   such   as   operating   systems,   database  
management   systems,   and   web   servers.   These   mechanisms   can   be   classified   as  
follows  (Cachin  et  al.  2000):    
• Secure  channels  and  envelops:  mechanisms  that  provide  communication  in  
a   secure   way   (e.g.   encryption,   TLS,   SSL).   The   information   is   transmitted  
thought  the  network  using  secure  channels  or  encapsulated  in  envelops.    
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• Authentication:  mechanisms  that  assure  that  the  data  accessed  by  the  users  is  
authentic.  (e.g.  HTTP  authentication,  IPSec)    
• Protection   and   authorization:   mechanisms   that   protect   resources   and   data  
from   unauthorized   access   and   guarantee   that   users   only   do  what   they   are  
authorized  to  do  (e.g.  login/password  checking,  privilege  management).    
• Auditing   and   intrusion   detection:   these   mechanisms   allow   a   posteriori  
analysis   of   the   accesses   to   resources   and   data,   allowing   the   detection   of  
unauthorized  accesses  or  anomalous  usage   (e.g.   auditing  systems,   intrusion  
detection  systems,  web  applications  firewalls).    
In  practice,   the   goal   of   security   is   to  protect   systems   and  data   from   intrusion.  The  
risk   of   intrusion   is   related   to   the   system   vulnerabilities   and   the   potential   security  
attacks.  The  system  vulnerabilities  are  an  internal  factor  related  to  the  set  of  security  
mechanisms   available   (or   not   available)   in   the   system,   the   correct   configuration   of  
those  mechanisms,  and  the  hidden  flaws  on  the  system  implementation.  Many  types  
of  vulnerabilities  and  taxonomies  to  classify  them  currently  exist  (Stuttard  and  Pinto  
2007).   Vulnerability   prevention   consists   on   guarantying   that   the   software   has   the  
minimum  number  of  vulnerabilities  possible.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  effectiveness  
of   the   security   mechanisms   depend   on   their   correct   configuration,   the   system  
administrator   must   correctly   configure   the   security   mechanisms   by   following  
administration   best   practices.   Vulnerability   removal   consists   on   reducing   the  
vulnerabilities  found  in  the  system.  For  example,  the  system  administrator  must  pay  
attention   to   the  new  security  patches   release  by  software  vendors  and   install   those  
patches   as   soon   as   possible.   Furthermore,   any   configuration  problems  detected   on  
the  security  mechanisms  must  be  immediately  corrected.    
Security  attacks  are  an  external  factor  that  mainly  depends  on  the  intentionality  and  
capability   of   humans   to   maliciously   break   into   the   system   tacking   advantage   of  
vulnerabilities.  In  fact,  the  success  of  a  security  attack  depends  on  the  vulnerabilities  
of   the   system  and  attacks  are  harmless   in  a   system  without  vulnerabilities.  On   the  
other   hand,   vulnerabilities   are   harmless   if   the   system   is   not   subject   of   security  
attacks.  The  prevention  against  security  attacks  includes  all  the  measures  needed  to  
minimize   or   eliminate   the   potential   attacks   against   the   system.   Attack   removal   is  
related   to   the   adoption  of  measures   to   stop   attacks   that   have  occurred  before   (e.g.  
firewalls,  security  patches).  
Secure   Software   behaves   correctly   in   the   presence   of   a   malicious   utilization  
(attacks),  even  though  software  failures  may  also  happen  when  the  software  is  used  
correctly  (Gary  McGraw  and  Potter  2004).  Thus,  many  times  software  development  
and  testing  are  only  concerned  with  what  happens  when  software  fails  and  not  with  
the   intentions.   This   is   where   the   difference   between   software   safety   and   software  
security   lies:   in   the   presence   of   an   intelligent   adversary   with   the   intention   of  
damaging  the  system.    
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 Threats	  and	  Vulnerabilities	  2.2.1
In   the   last   two   decades,   the  World  Wide  Web   radically   changed   the   way   people  
communicate  and  do  business.  Even  critical  infrastructures  like  water  supply,  power  
supply,   banking,   insurance,   stock   market,   retail,   communications,   defense,   etc.,  
nowadays  rely  on  networks,  on  the  web  and  on  the  applications  that  run  on  top  of  
these  distributed  environments.  The  problem  is  that,  as  the  importance  of  the  assets  
stored   and  managed  by  web   applications   increases,   so  does   the  natural   interest   of  
malicious  minds  in  exploiting  this  new  streak.    
Web  applications  are  so  widely  exposed  that  any  existing  security  vulnerability  will  
most  probably  be  uncovered  and  exploited  by  hackers.  Hence,   the   security  of  web  
applications   is  a  major  concern  and   is   receiving  more  and  more  attention   from  the  
research   community.   However,   in   spite   of   this   growing   awareness   of   security  
aspects   at   web   application   level,   there   is   an   increase   in   the   number   of   reported  
attacks  that  exploit  web  application  vulnerabilities  (Christey  and  Martin  2006;  Stock,  
Williams,  and  Wichers  2007).    
Hackers  are  nowadays  moving  their  focus  from  network  attacks  to  the  exploitation  
of   vulnerabilities   in   the   code   of   web   applications.   This   poorly   programmed   code  
represents   a  major   risk   and   this   is  why  we   leave  vulnerabilities   related   to   security  
standards  and  protocols  outside  of  the  scope  of  this  work.    
Attacks   that   target   vulnerabilities   related   to   the   code   of   the   web   applications   or  
services   take   advantage   of   improperly   implemented   code,   searching   for  
vulnerabilities   by   exployting   applications’   inputs   with   specially   tampered   values.  
These   values   try   to   take   advantage   of   existing   vulnerabilities,   representing   a  
considerable   danger   to   the   application’s   owner   (e.g.   by   giving   to   an   attacker  
privileges   to   read,   modify   or   destroy   reserved   resources).   This   is   also   very  
dangerous  because  traditional  security  mechanisms  like  network  firewalls,  intrusion  
detection   systems   (IDS),   and   encryption,   cannot   mitigate   attacks   targeting   web  
applications,   even   assuming   that   the   network   and   key   infrastructure   components  
such  as  web  servers  and  database  management  systems  (DBMS)  are  fully  secure.  The  
reason   is   that   these   attacks   are   performed   through   ports   that   are   used   for   regular  
web   traffic   (Singhal,   Winograd,   and   Scarfone   2007)   and   even   application   layer  
firewalls  cannot  protect  the  applications  as  that  requires  a  deep  understanding  of  the  
business  context  (OWASP  Foundation  2010).  
Published   studies   show   that,   in   general,   web   applications   present   dangerous  
security  flaws.  In  February  2007,  Acunetix  presented  the  results  produced  from  the  
scanning  of  3,200  websites  during  one  year  (Acunetix  2007).  According  to  the  results,  
70%  of  the  web  sites  scanned  presented  high  or  medium  risk  vulnerabilities.  Another  
interesting   point   is   that,   in   the   websites   having   high-­‐‑risk   vulnerabilities,   the   two  
most   common   vulnerabilities   were   SQL   Injection   (50%   of   the   websites   with   high  
vulnerabilities)   and   Cross   Site   Scripting   (42%   of   the   websites   with   high  
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vulnerabilities).  The  NTA'ʹs  Annual  Security  Report  2008  (NTA  Monitor  2008a)  states  
that   25%   of   companies   tested   contain   one   or   more   high-­‐‑risk   vulnerabilities.   This  
number  is  lower  than  the  32%  reported  in  2007  (NTA  Monitor  2007).  Nevertheless,  in  
some  sectors   (finance,  government,   legal,   retail   and  utilities)   the  overall  number  of  
vulnerabilities   found   has   increased.   The   NTA'ʹs   Annual  Web   Application   Security  
Report   2008   (NTA  Monitor   2008b),   focused   in  web  applications,   states   that   17%  of  
the  applications   tested  contained,  at   least,  one  high-­‐‑risk  vulnerability  and  that  78%  
of   the   applications   contained   medium   risk   vulnerabilities.   Although   these   results  
cannot   be   generalized   to   web   services   environment,   they   clearly   show   that   web  
software  is  being  deployed  without  proper  security  cautions.  
Web   services,   as   web   applications   in   general,   are   so   exposed   that   any   existent  
security  vulnerability  will  probably  be  uncovered  and  exploited,  becoming  the  entry  
point  for  attacks.  Several  studies  (e.g.  (Vieira,  Antunes,  and  Madeira  2009),  (Fogie  et  
al.  2007),  (Jensen  et  al.  2007))  show  that  a  large  number  of  Web  services  are  deployed  
with   security   flaws   that   range   from   code   vulnerabilities   (e.g.   code   injection  
vulnerabilities)  to  the  incorrect  use  of  security  standards  and  protocols.    
While   the  Open  Web  Application   Security   Project   (OWASP   Foundation)   (OWASP  
Foundation   2001)   presented   in   2007   the   ten  most   critical   web   application   security  
vulnerabilities   (Stock,   Williams,   and   Wichers   2007),   featuring   at   top   two  
vulnerabilities   the  same  as   in   the  Acunetix’s  mentioned  above  (although   in   inverse  
order   being   XSS   the  most   critical),   in   the  most   recent   report   (OWASP   Foundation  
2013)  XSS  is  ranked  only  in  third  place,  being  overtaken  by  injection  vulnerabilities  
in  the  top  of  the  list.  Additionally,  although  there  is  no  large  enough  study  to  draw  
definitive  conclusions,  the  results  of  the  study  presented  in  Section  7.1  suggest  that  
the  specificities  of  web  services  environments  lead  to  a  slightly  different  set  of  most  
relevant   vulnerabilities.   In   this   context,   the   following   bullets   present   examples   of  
relevant   types   of   vulnerabilities5  (see   (OWASP   Foundation   2001)   for   a   survey   on  
types  of  security  vulnerabilities):  
• SQL   Injection:   allow   user-­‐‑supplied   data   to   “alter   the   construction   of   backend  
SQL  statements”  (WASC  2008).  An  attacker  can  read  or  modify  database  data  
and,  in  some  cases,  execute  database  administration  operations  or  commands  
in  the  system  (Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).  Example  SQL  Injection  A  tautology-­‐‑
based  attack  is  a  specific  type  of  SQL  Injection  attack  that  tries  to  modify  one  
or  more  conditional  clauses  of  a  backend  SQL  query  in  such  way  that  it  will  
always  evaluate  to  true.  More  details  on  tautologies  and  other  types  of  SQL  
Injection  attacks  can  be  found  in  (W.  G.  Halfond,  Viegas,  and  Orso  2006).  
                                                                                                              
  
5 As services work without a direct attachment to web sites, XSS is not a priority in web services 
environment, thus it is not included in this list. 
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• XPath  Injection:   allow  user-­‐‑supplied  data   to  modify  an  XPath  query   to   “be  
parsed   in   a   way   differing   from   the   programmer'ʹs   intention”   (WASC   2008).  
Attackers  may  gain   access   to   information   in  XML  documents   (Stuttard   and  
Pinto  2007).          
• Code  Execution:  allow  manipulating  the  application  inputs  to  trigger  server-­‐‑
side   code   execution   (Stuttard   and   Pinto   2007).   An   attacker   can   exploit   this  
vulnerability  to  execute  malicious  code  in  the  server  machine.    
• Buffer  Overflow:  makes  it  possible  to  manipulate  inputs  in  such  a  way  that  
causes   buffer   allocation   problems,   including   overwriting   of   parts   of   the  
memory   (Stuttard   and   Pinto   2007).   An   attacker   can   exploit   this   causing  
Denial  of  Service  or,  in  worst  cases,  “alter  application  flow  and  force  unintended  
actions”  (WASC  2008).  
• Username/Password   Disclosure:   the   web   service   response   contains  
information  related  to  usernames  and/or  passwords.  An  attacker  can  use  this  
information  to  get  access  to  private  data  (Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).  
• Server  Path  Disclosure:  the  response  contains  a  fully  qualified  path  name  to  
the  root  of  the  server  storage  system.  An  attacker  can  use  this  information  to  
discover   the   server   file   system   structure   and   devise   other   security   attacks  
(Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).  
As  mentioned  before,  Injection  vulnerabilities  are  now  at  the  top  of  the  most  critical  
web   application   security   risks   (OWASP   Foundation   2013).   These   vulnerabilities  
“occur   when   untrusted   data   is   sent   to   an   interpreter   as   part   of   a   command   or   query”  
(OWASP   Foundation   2013).   This   represents   a   large   group   of   vulnerabilities   that  
includes   SQL   Injection,   XPath   Injection   and   Code   Execution   (listed   above),   LDAP  
injection  and  OS  Command  Injection,  among  others.  In  practice,  the  malicious  inputs  
of   the   attacker   can   cause   the   interpreter   to   execute   unintended   commands   or  
accessing/destroying  forbidden  data.  
 Secure	  Coding	  	  2.2.2
To  mitigate   the   threats   referred   in   the  previous   section   it   is  necessary   to  apply   the  
best  coding  practices  and  to  perform  specialized  security  testing  in  order  to  develop  
non-­‐‑vulnerable   code   (Stuttard   and   Pinto   2007).   Before   applying   vulnerability  
detection  techniques,  developers  should  follow  the  coding  practices  that  are  widely  
accepted  as  suitable  to  produce  web  applications’  code  without  vulnerabilities.    
To   develop   web   applications   without   security   vulnerabilities   a   defense-­‐‑in-­‐‑depth  
approach  is  necessary  (Howard  and  Leblanc  2002).  This  approach  assumes  that  each  
security   precaution   can   fail   and   so,   security   depends   on   several   layers   of  
mechanisms  that  cover  the  failures  of  each  other.  Developers  are  expected  to  apply  
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the   effort   needed   to   put   in   place   adequate   security   precautions   that  minimize   the  
probability  of  successful  attacks.    
The  web  applications  characteristics  suggest  two  distinct  lines  of  defense  that  can  be  
used  against  threats.  The  first  line  of  defense  consists  in  reducing  the  input  domain  
of   the   application   as   a  whole,   acting  directly   on   the  values  provided  by   the  users.  
This  is  frequently  called  input  validation  (OWASP  Foundation  2001)  and  consists  in  
forcing  the  input  parameters  of  an  application  to  be  within  the  correspondent  valid  
domain   or   to   interrupt   the   execution   when   a   value   outside   of   the   domain   is  
provided.   In   the   case  of  web  applications,   this   starts  with   the  normalization  of   the  
inputs   to   a   baseline   character   set   and   encoding.   Then,   filtering   strategies  must   be  
applied   over   the   normalized   inputs,   rejecting   the   ones   that   contain   values   outside  
the   valid   domain.   This   is   considered   to   be   a   good   practice   that   may   avoid  many  
problems   in  web  applications’   code.   Input  Validation   can  also  be  performed  using  
positive   pattern   matching   or   positive   validation.   In   this   case,   the   developers  
establish  input  validation  routines  that  identify  the  inputs  to  be  accepted,  contrarily  
to   the   previous   case.   This   technique   may   be   advantageous   in   some   cases   as  
developers  might  not  be  able  to  predict  every  type  of  attack  that  could  be  launched  
against  their  application,  but  should  be  able  to  specify  all  the  forms  of  legal  input.  
A  key  issue  is  that  input  validation  is  frequently  not  enough  as  the  data  domain  of  
an  input  parameter  may  allow  the  existence  of  vulnerabilities,  independently  of  the  
validation   performed.   For   instance,   in   the   case   of   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities,   a  
quote   is   the   character  used  as  a   string  delimiter   in  most  SQL  statements  and   so,   it  
can  be  used   to  perform  a  SQL   Injection  attack.  But,   in   some  cases   the  domain  of  a  
string  input  must  allow  the  presence  of  quotes.  This  way,  we  cannot  exclude  all  the  
values  that  contain  quotes.  This  means  that,  in  this  case,  additional  security  must  be  
delegated  to  the  database  statement  execution.  
This  additional  security  represents  the  second  line  of  defense  and  it  is  necessary  to  
complement   the   limitations  of  a  general   input  validation  strategy.   In  practice,  each  
type   of   attack   to   an   application   targets   a   specific   set   of   statements   of   code   of   the  
application   that   are   prone   to   specific   types   of   vulnerabilities.   The   second   line   of  
defense   focuses   on   protecting   these   lines,   for   instance   by   guaranteeing   that   the  
values  actually  used  lie  within  their  input  domain.  Let’s  take  the  specific  case  of  SQL  
Injection,  in  which  single  and  double  quote  characters  exist  in  the  majority  of  attacks.  
Thus,   some   programming   languages   provide   mechanisms   for   escaping   (Shema  
2010)   this   type   of   characters   in   such   way   that   they   can   be   used   within   an   SQL  
expression   rather   than   delimiting   values   in   the   statement.   However,   this   kind   of  
techniques  has  two  main  problems.  First,  it  can  be  circumvented  in  some  situations  
by  using  more  elaborated  injection  techniques  like  combining  quotes  (‘)  and  slashes  
(\).   Second,   the   introduction   of   characters   for   escaping   increases   the   length   of   the  
string   and   thus   can   cause  data   truncation  when   the   resulting   string   is   higher   than  
allowed  by  database.  
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Correctly  using  prepared  statements  (also  named  parameterized  queries)  is  the  most  
efficient  way  to  avoid  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  (Shema  2010).  When  a  prepared  
statement   is  created  (or  prepared)   its  structure   is  sent   to  the  database.  The  variable  
parts  of   the  query  are  marked  using  question  marks   (?)  or   labels.  Afterwards,  each  
time   that   the   query   needs   to   be   executed,   the   values   must   be   binded   to   the  
corresponding   variable   part.   No   matter   what   is   the   content   of   the   data,   the  
expression  will  always  be  used  as  a  value  (and  not  as  SQL  code).  Consequently,  it  is  
impossible  to  modify  the  structure  of  the  query.  To  help  ensuring  the  correct  usage  
of  the  data,  many  languages  allow  typed  bindings.    
It   is   important   to   emphasize   that   prepared   statements,   by   themselves,   cannot   fix  
insecure   statements.   It   is   necessary   to   assure   that   prepared   statements   are   used  
knowing  how   they   improve   security.  Otherwise,   using  prepared   statements   in   the  
same  way  that  regular  statements  are  used  (i.e.  building  the  SQL  queries  using  string  
concatenation),  and  not  using  correctly  the  placeholders  for  the  variable  part  of  the  
query,  will  result  in  similar  vulnerabilities  (Shema  2010).  
Another   important  concept   is  output  validation   (OWASP  Foundation  2001),  which  
refers   to   the  process  of  validating   the  output  of   a  process  before   it   is   sent   to   some  
recipient,   preventing   the   end   user   from   receiving   information   that   should   not   be  
received,   like   information   about   exception   inside   the   application   that   can   help  
conducting  other  attacks.  Another  example  is  searching  the  output  of  an  application  
for   critical   data   (e.g.   credit   card   numbers)   and   replacing   them   with   asterisks   (*)  
before  sending  to  the  recipient.  Output  encoding  is  a  type  of  output  validation  and  it  
is  a  mandatory  precaution  to  avoid  XSS  vulnerabilities  (Shema  2010).  If  the  data  sent  
to   the   browser   are   to   be   echoed   in   a  web  page,   then   that  data   should  be   correctly  
encoded   (depending   on   the   destination   in   the   page,   either   in   HTML   encoding   or  
percent   encoding).   This   way,   even   the   malicious   characters   used   in   XSS   attacks  
become  innocuous  while  preserving  its  meaning.  
 Security	  in	  the	  Development	  Process	  2.2.3
A  software  development  process   is  composed  of  multiple  phases  (Ghezzi,   Jazayeri,  
and   Mandrioli   2002).   To   improve   the   situation   regarding   software   security   it   is  
important   not   only   to   focus   on   secure   coding,   but   also   to   take   a   broader   view   by  
integrating  existing  approaches  and  tools  in  the  development  process,  i.e.  to  use  such  
approaches   and   tools   in   the   points   of   the   process   where   they   can   make   the  
difference.   Different   authors   divide   the   software   process   in   different   ways,   but  
usually  software  development  includes  the  following  phases  (which  can  be  repeated  
in   an   iterative  manner):   initialization,  design,   implementation,   testing,   deployment  





Figure  2.2  –  Simplified  version  of  a  Software  Product  lifecycle.  
The  security  concerns  must  be  present  during  the  complete  cycle,  but  with  special  focus  on  
implementation,  testing  and  deployment.  
The   process   starts   with   requirements   gathering   (including   security   requirements),  
followed   by   specification   and   design,   implementation   (coding),   testing   and  
deployment.   Decommission   takes   place   when   the   product   is   not   useful/used  
anymore.   Although   code   security   concerns   should   be   addressed   during   the   entire  
software   product   development   lifecycle,   as   highlighted   by   (G.   McGraw   2006)  
especial   focus   should   be   put   in   three   key   phases   (Howard   and   Leblanc   2002):  
implementation,   testing,   and   deployment.   The   next   points   summarize   the   main  
challenges  and  put  in  the  context  of  these  three  phases  the  concepts,  techniques  and  
tools  introduced  in  the  previous  section:  
• Implementation:   during   coding   we  must   use   best   practices   that   avoid   the  
most   critical   vulnerabilities   in   the   specific   application  domain.   Examples   of  
practices   include   input   and   output   validation,   the   escaping   of   malicious  
characters,   and   the   use   of   parameterized   commands   (Stuttard   and   Pinto  
2007).   Vulnerability   and   attack   injection   techniques   (Fonseca,   Vieira,   and  
Madeira  2009)  have  in  this  phase  a  very  important  job  in  the  evaluation  of  the  
best   security   testing   tools   to   use.   Also,   for   the   success   of   this   phase,   it   is  
essential  to  adequately  train  the  development  teams.  For  instance,  experience  
shows  that  the  main  reason  for  the  vulnerabilities  in  web  application’s  code  is  
related   to   training   and   education.   First,   there   is   a   lack   of   courses/topics  
regarding   secure   design,   secure   coding,   and   security   testing,   in   most  
computer  science  degrees  (Howard  and  Leblanc  2002).  Second,  security  is  not  
usually   among   the   developers’  main   skills   as   it   is   considered   a   boring   and  
uninteresting  topic  (from  the  development  point-­‐‑of-­‐‑view),  and  not  as  a  way  
to  develop  new  and  exciting  functionalities.    
• Testing:   as   introduced   in   Section   2.3.1,   there   are   many   security   testing  
techniques  available  for  the  identification  of  vulnerabilities  during  the  testing  
phase  (Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).  To  mitigate  vulnerabilities,  it  is  necessary  to  
Background  and  Related  Work  
   23  
have  well-­‐‑trained   teams   that   adequately   apply   those   techniques  during   the  
development   of   the   application.   The   problem   is   that   software   quality  
assurance   teams   typically   lack   the   knowledge   required   to   effectively   detect  
security  problems.  This  way,   it   is  necessary  to  devise  approaches  to  quickly  
and   effectively   train   security   assurance   teams   in   the   context   of   web  
applications  development,  by  combining  vulnerability  injection  with  relevant  
guidance  information  about  the  most  common  security  vulnerabilities.  Also,  
benchmarking   techniques   should   be   applied   to   assess,   compare,   and   select  
the  most  adequate  security  testing  tools  for  each  concrete  scenario.  
• Deployment:  at  runtime,  it  is  possible  to  include  in  the  environment  different  
attack  detection  mechanisms,  such  as  Intrusion  Detection  Systems  (IDS)  and  
Web   Application   Firewalls   (WAF),   among   others.   These   mechanisms   can  
operate  at  different   levels  and  use  different  detection  approaches.  The  main  
problems  preventing  their  use  are  related  to  the  performance  overheads  and  
to   the  false  positives   that  disrupt   the  normal  behavior  of   the  system.  In  this  
phase,   security  benchmarking  plays   a   fundamental   role   in  helping   to   select  
the   best   alternatives   (in   terms   of   servers,   security  mechanisms,   etc.)   to   use,  
according   to   specific   security   requirements.   Also,   vulnerability   and   attack  
injection   techniques   represent   in   this  phase  an  efficient  way   to  evaluate   the  
effectiveness  of  attack  detections  mechanism  to  be  installed.  
This  thesis  focuses  on  the  testing  phase  and  advances  the  state  of  the  art  in  this  area  
with   two   main   contributions.   First,   it   proposes   techniques   that   present   higher  
effectiveness   than   the   existing   ones.   Second,   it   proposes   an   innovative   integrated  
technique  for  testing  service-­‐‑based  infrastructures  for  security  vulnerabilities.  
2.3 Vulnerability	  Detection	  
To  minimize  security  issues,  developers  should  search  web  applications  and  services  
for   vulnerabilities,   activity   for   which   there   are   two   main   approaches:   white-­‐‑box  
analysis   and   black-­‐‑box   testing.   Other   techniques,   generically   named   as   gray-­‐‑box,  
combine   black-­‐‑box   testing   and   white-­‐‑box   testing   to   achieve   better   results.   The  
following   sections   introduce   these   approaches   and   present   some   of   the   existing  
techniques  and  tools.  
 Black-­‐box	  Testing	  2.3.1
Black-­‐‑box  testing  is  based  on  the  analysis  of  the  program  execution  from  an  external  
point-­‐‑of-­‐‑view   (Myers,  Sandler,   and  Badgett  2011).   In   short,   it   consists  of   exercising  
the  software  and  comparing  the  execution  outcome  with  the  expected  result.  Testing  
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is   the   most   used   technique   for   verification   and   validation   of   software.   There   are  
several  levels  for  applying  black-­‐‑box  testing,  ranging  from  unit  testing  to  integration  
testing  and  system  testing.  The  testing  approach  can  also  be  more  formalized  (based  
on   models   and   well   defined   tests   specifications)   or   less   formalized   (e.g.   when  
considering   informal   “smoke   testing”).   The   tests   specification   should   define   the  
coverage   criteria   (i.e.   the   criteria   that   guides   the   definition   of   the   tests   in   terms   of  
what  is  expected  to  be  covered)  and  should  be  elaborated  before  development.  The  
idea  is  that  the  test  specification  can  help  developers  during  the  coding  process  (e.g.  
tests  can  be  executed  during  development)  and  that,  by  designing  tests  a  priori,  it  is  
possible  to  avoid  biasing  the  tests  due  to  knowledge  about  the  code  developed.  
Test-­‐‑driven   development   (TDD)   (Beck   2003)   is   an   agile   software   development  
technique  based  on  predefined  test  cases   that  define  desired   improvements  or  new  
functions   (i.e.   automated   unit   tests   that   specify   code   requirements   and   that   are  
implemented   before  writing   the   code   itself).   TDD  begun   in   1999,   but   is   nowadays  
getting   a   lot   of   attention   from   software   engineers   (Newkirk   and   Vorontsov   2004).  
Development  is  conducted  in  short  iterations  in  which  the  code  necessary  to  pass  the  
tests   is   developed.   Code   refactoring   is   performed   to   accommodate   changes   and  
improve   code   quality.   Test-­‐‑driven   development   is   particularly   suitable   for   web  
services  as   these  are  based   in  well-­‐‑defined   interfaces   that  are  quite  appropriate   for  
unit   testing.   The   tests   specify   the   requirements   and   contain   assertions   that   can   be  
true  or   false.  Running   the   tests   allows  developers   to   quickly  validate   the   expected  
behavior  as  code  development  evolves.  A  large  number  of  unit   testing  frameworks  
are   available   for  developers   to   create   and  automatically   run   sets   of   test   cases,   e.g.,  
JUnit   (http://junit.org/),   CppUnit   (http://sourceforge.net/projects/cppunit/),   and  
JUnitEE  (http://www.junitee.org/).  
Robustness   testing   is   a   specific   form   of   black-­‐‑box   testing   (Myers,   Sandler,   and  
Badgett   2011).   The   goal   is   to   characterize   the   behavior   of   a   system   in   presence   of  
erroneous   input  conditions.  Although  it   is  not  directly  related  to  benchmarking  (as  
there   is   no   standard   procedure   meant   to   compare   different   systems/components  
concerning   robustness),   authors   usually   refer   to   robustness   testing   as   robustness  
benchmarking.   This   way,   as   proposed   by   (Mukherjee   and   Siewiorek   1997),   a  
robustness   benchmark   is   essentially   a   suite   of   robustness   tests   or   stimuli.   A  
robustness  benchmark   stimulates   the   system   in   a  way   that   triggers   internal   errors,  
and  in  that  way  exposes  both  programming  and  design  errors  in  the  error  detection  
or  recovery  mechanisms  (systems  can  be  differentiated  according   to   the  number  of  
errors   uncovered).   Web   services   robustness   testing   is   based   on   erroneous   call  
parameters   (Vieira,   Laranjeiro,   and  Madeira   2007).   The   robustness   tests   consist   of  
combinations   of   exceptional   and   acceptable   input   values   of   parameters   of   web  
services   operations   that   can   be   generated   by   applying   a   set   of   predefined   rules  
according  to  the  data  type  of  each  parameter.  
Penetration  testing,  a  specialization  of  robustness  testing,  consists  of  the  analysis  of  
the  program   execution   in   the  presence   of  malicious   inputs,   searching   for   potential  
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vulnerabilities   (Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).   In  this  approach  the  tester  does  not  know  
the   internals   of   the   web   application   and   it   uses   fuzzing   techniques   over   the   web  
HTTP   requests   (Stuttard   and   Pinto   2007).   The   tester   needs   no   knowledge   of   the  
implementation  details  and  tests  the  inputs  of  the  application  from  the  user’s  point  
of   view.   The   number   of   tests   can   reach   hundreds   or   even   thousands   for   each  
vulnerability  type.  Penetration  testing  tools  provide  an  automatic  way  to  search  for  
vulnerabilities   avoiding   the   repetitive   and   tedious   task  of  doing  hundreds  or   even  
thousands  of  tests  by  hand  for  each  vulnerability  type.  
Despite   the  use   of   automated   tools,   in  many   situations   it   is   not  possible   to   test   all  
possible   input   streams,   as   that  would   take   too  much   time.   So,   as   soon  as   software  
specifications   are   complete,   test   cases   should   be   designed   to   have   the   biggest  
coverage   and   representativeness   possible.   The   most   common   automated   security  
testing   tools   used   in   web   applications   are   generally   referred   to   as  web   security  
scanners   (or  web  vulnerability  scanners).  Web  security  scanners  are  often  regarded  
as   an   easy   way   to   test   applications   against   vulnerabilities.   These   scanners   have   a  
predefined  set  of  tests  cases  that  are  adapted  to  the  application  to  be  tested,  saving  
the   user   from  defining   all   the   tests   to   be   done.   In   practice,   the   user   only   needs   to  
configure   the  scanner  and   let   it   test   the  application.  Once   the   test   is   completed   the  
scanner  reports  existing  vulnerabilities  (if  any  detected).  Most  of  these  scanners  are  
commercial   tools,   but   there   are   also   some   free   application   scanners   often   with  
limited   use,   since   they   lack   most   of   the   functionalities   of   their   commercial  
counterparts.  
The   process   of   using   such   scanners   to   test   a   web   application   or   service   differs   in  
some  points  but  shares  three  main  stages  (Acunetix  2008a)  configuration,  crawling,  
and   scanning.   The   configuration   stage   includes   the   definition   of   the   Uniform  
Resource   Locator   (URL)   of   the   target  web   resource   and   the   setup   of   the   scanning  
parameters.  
The  crawling  stage  differs  from  web  applications  to  web  services.  In  the  case  of  web  
applications,   the   vulnerability   scanner   produces   a  map   of   the   internal   structure   of  
the  target  web  application.  This  stage  is  of  utmost  importance  as  failing  to  discover  
some   pages   of   the   application   prevents   their   testing   (in   the   subsequent   scanning  
stage).  The  scanner  calls  the  first  web  page  and  then  examines  its  code  searching  for  
links.   Each   link   found   is   requested   and   this   procedure   is   executed   over   and   over  
again,   until   no  more   links   or   pages   can   be   found.   In   the   case   of  web   services,   the  
scanner   analyses   the   file   that   specifies   the   interface   of   the   service   (e.g.   WSDL   or  
WADL)   in   order   to   discover   the   operations   of   the   service,   their   input/output  
parameters,  as  well  as  the  types  of  the  parameters.  
The  scanning  stage   is  where   the  automated  penetration   tests  are  performed.   In   the  
case  of  web  applications,  it  is  done  by  simulating  a  user  clicking  on  links  and  filling  
in   form   fields   (using   a   web   browser).   During   this   stage   thousands   of   tests   are  
executed.  Malformed  requests  are  also  sent  in  order  to  learn  the  error  responses.  The  
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requests  and   the   responses  are   recorded  and  analyzed  using  vulnerability  policies.  
The   responses   are   also   validated   using   data   collected   during   the   crawling   stage.  
During  this  stage  new  links  are  frequently  discovered  in  web  applications  and  when  
this  happens  they  are  added  to  the  result  of  the  crawler  in  order  to  be  also  scanned  
for  vulnerabilities.    
In  the  case  of  web  services,  the  operations  of  the  service  are  sequentially  tested.  For  
each   operation,   the   process   starts   by   executing   some   random   non-­‐‑malicious  
interactions   (workload)   to   exercise   the   service.   Afterwards,   the   scanner   issues  
sequentially  all   the  configured  attacks  to  the  operation  parameters  one  by  one.  The  
requests  and  the  responses  are  recorded  and  analyzed  using  algorithms  to  disclose  
vulnerabilities.   The   responses   are   also   validated   using   data   collected   during   the  
crawling  stage.  In  the  more  advanced  scanners,  multiple  attacks  can  be  coordinated  
to   find   other   vulnerabilities.   A   simple   example   is   the   use   of   one   attack   with   the  
string   “or 1=1 --”   and   another   with   “or 1=0 --”.   The   differences   in   the  
answers  may   lead   to   disclose   a   tautology   vulnerability   in   (W.  G.  Halfond,  Viegas,  
and  Orso  2006).  
After  the  scanning  stage  the  results  are  shown  to  the  user  and  they  may  be  saved  for  
later   analysis.   Most   scanners   also   show   some   generic   information   about   the  
vulnerabilities   discovered,   including   how   to   avoid   or   correct   them.   Besides   the  
graphical  user   interface,  most   scanners  also  have  a   command   line  application  with  
several  parameters  aimed  for  automation  by  using  batch  jobs.  
Two   very   popular   free   security   scanners   that   support   web   services   testing   are  
Foundstone  WSDigger  (Foundstone,  Inc.  2005)  and  WSFuzzer  (OWASP  Foundation  
2008).  WSDigger   is  a  free  open  source  tool  developed  by  Foundstone  that  executes  
automated  penetration  testing  in  web  services.  Only  one  version  of  this  software  was  
released  up  to  now  (in  December  2005).  The  tool  contains  sample  attack  plug-­‐‑ins  for  
SQL  Injection,  cross-­‐‑site  scripting  (XSS),  and  XPath  Injection,  but   it  was  released  as  
open-­‐‑source  to  encourage  users  to  develop  and  share  their  own  plug-­‐‑ins  and  its  test  
files   are   simple   to   edit   to   add   new   test   cases.  WSFuzzer   is   a   free   open   source  
program  that  mainly  targets  HTTP  based  SOAP  services.  This  tool  was  created  based  
on   real-­‐‑world  manual  SOAP  penetration   tests,  but  automating   them.  Nevertheless,  
the  tool  is  not  meant  to  replace  a  solid  manual  human  analysis.  One  issue  with  this  
tool   is   that   its   configuration   is   very   complex.   A   problem   of   both   WSDigger   and  
WSFuzzer   is   that,   in   fact,   they   do   not   detect   vulnerabilities:   they   attack   the   web  
service  under  testing  and  log  the  responses  leaving  to  the  user  the  task  of  examining  
those  logs  and  identify  the  vulnerabilities.  This  requires  the  user  to  be  an  “expert”  in  
security  and  to  spend  a  huge  amount  of  time  to  examine  all  the  results.  
As   for   commercial   scanners,   three   brands   lead   the   market:   HP   WebInspect   (HP  
2008),   IBM  Rational  AppScan  (IBM  2008),  and  Acunetix  Web  Vulnerability  Scanner  
(Acunetix  2008a).  
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HP  WebInspect   is  a   tool   that  “performs  web  application  security  testing  and  assessment  
for   today'ʹs   complex   web   applications,   built   on   emerging   Web   2.0   technologies.   HP  
WebInspect   delivers   fast   scanning   capabilities,   broad   security   assessment   coverage   and  
accurate   web   application   security   scanning   results”   (HP   2008).   This   tool   includes  
pioneering   assessment   technology,   including   simultaneous   crawl   and   audit   (SCA)  
and  concurrent  application  scanning.  It  is  a  broad  application  that  can  be  applied  for  
penetration  testing  in  web-­‐‑based  applications.  
IBM  Rational   AppScan   “is   a   leading   suite   of   automated  Web   application   security   and  
compliance  assessment  tools  that  scan  for  common  application  vulnerabilities”  (IBM  2008).  
This   tool   is   suitable   for  users   ranging   from  non-­‐‑security  experts   to  advanced  users  
that   can   develop   extensions   for   customized   scanning   environments.   IBM   Rational  
AppScan   can   be   used   for   penetration   testing   in   web   applications,   including   web  
services.  
Acunetix  Web  Vulnerability  Scanner  “is  an  automated  web  application  security  testing  
tool   that   audits   a   web   applications   by   checking   for   exploitable   hacking   vulnerabilities”  
(Acunetix  2008a).  Acunetix  WVS  can  be  used  to  execute  penetration   testing   in  web  
applications   or   web   services   and   is   quite   simple   to   use   and   configure.   The   tool  
includes   numerous   innovative   features,   for   instance   the   “AcuSensor   Technology”  
(Acunetix  2008b).  
Many  other  black-­‐‑box  tools  were  proposed  in  the  past.  Although  those  works  target  
web  applications,  and  not  web  services,  we  introduce  some  here  due  to  the  relevant  
innovations  they  bring.    
WAVES   (Y.-­‐‑W.   Huang   et   al.   2003)   is   a   black-­‐‑box   technique   for   testing   web  
applications   for   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities.   The   technique   is   based   in   a   reverse  
engineering   process   that   identifies   the   data   entry   points   of   the   application   and  
attacks   them   using   malicious   patterns.   An   algorithm   is   proposed   to   allow   “deep  
injection”  and  to  eliminate  false  negatives.  During  the  attack  phase,  the  responses  of  
the   application   to   the   attacks   are  monitored   and  machine   learning   techniques   are  
used  to  improve  the  attack  methodology.  The  problem  is  that  the  technique  can  only  
be   applied   to   web   applications   (not   to   web   services,   where   the   interface   is   well  
defined)  and  ignores  the  user  knowledge  about  the  application  being  tested.  
SecuBat   (Kals   et   al.   2006)   is   an   open-­‐‑source  web   vulnerability   scanner   that   uses   a  
black-­‐‑box  approach  to  crawl  and  scan  web  sites  for  the  presence  of  exploitable  SQL  
injection   and   XSS   vulnerabilities.   SecuBat   does   not   rely   on   a   database   of   known  
bugs.   Instead,   it   tries   to   exploit   the   distinctive   properties   of   application-­‐‑level  
vulnerabilities.  To   increase   the  confidence   in   the  correctness  of   the   results,   the   tool  
also  attempts  to  automatically  generate  proof-­‐‑of-­‐‑concept  exploits  in  certain  cases.    
A   black-­‐‑box   taint-­‐‑inference   technique   for   the   detection   of   injection   attacks   is  
proposed  in  (Sekar  2009).  The  technique  does  not  require  any  intrusive  source-­‐‑code  
or  binary  instrumentation  of  the  application  to  be  protected;  instead,  it  intercepts  the  
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inputs  and  outputs  of  the  application.  Then,  the  technique  infers  tainted  data  in  the  
intercepted  SQL  statements,   and  employs   syntax  and   taint-­‐‑aware  policies   to  detect  
the  unintended  use  of  tainted  data.  However,  false  positives  and  false  negatives  are  
possible   due   to   the   accuracy   limitations   of   the   taint-­‐‑inference   algorithm   and   taint-­‐‑
awareness  policies.     
In   (McAllister,   Kirda,   and  Kruegel   2008)   it   is   presented   an   automated   penetration  
testing  tool  that  can  find  reflected  and  stored  cross-­‐‑site  scripting  (XSS)  vulnerabilities  
in   web   applications.   The   presented   technique   improves   the   effectiveness   of   web  
vulnerability  scanners  by  leveraging  input  from  real  users  as  a  starting  point  for  its  
testing  activity.  The  technique  follows  an  entire  user’s  session  and  uses  recorded  real  
user  inputs  to  generate  test  cases  to  launch  fuzzing  attacks.  This  way,  the  technique  
increases  the  code  coverage  by  exploring  pages  that  are  not  reachable  for  other  tools.  
The   experiments   show   that   the   approach   is   able   to   test  more   thoroughly   the  web  
applications  and  identify  more  bugs  than  a  number  of  open-­‐‑source  and  commercial  
web  vulnerability  scanners.    
 White-­‐box	  Analysis	  2.3.2
White-­‐‑box   analysis   consists   in   the   examination   of   the   code   of   the   web   service  
without  executing  it  (Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007).  This  can  be  done  in  one  of  two  ways:  
manually   during   inspections   and   reviews   or   automatically   by   using   automated  
analysis  tools.    
Inspections,  initially  proposed  by  Michael  Fagan  in  the  mid  1970’s  (Fagan  1976),  are  
a   technique   that   consists   on   the   manual   analysis   of   documents,   including   source  
code,  searching  for  problems.  It  is  a  formal  technique  based  on  a  well-­‐‑defined  set  of  
steps  that  have  to  be  carefully  undertaken.  The  main  advantage  of  inspections  is  that  
they  allow  uncovering  problems  in  the  early  phases  of  development  (where  the  cost  
of  fixing  the  problem  is  lower).  
An  inspection  requires  several  experts,  each  one  having  a  well-­‐‑defined  role,  namely:  
author   (author   of   the   document   under   inspection),   moderator   (in   charge   of  
coordinating  the  inspection  process),  reader  (responsible  for  reading  and  presenting  
his   interpretation  of   the  document  during   the   inspection  meeting),   note  keeper   (in  
charge   of   taking   notes   during   the   inspection   meeting),   and   inspectors   (all   the  
members  of   the   team,   including  the  ones  mentioned  before).  During  the   inspection  
process,  this  team  has  to  perform  the  following  generic  steps:  
1) Planning:   starts  when   the  author  delivers   the  artifact   to  be   inspected   to   the  
moderator.  The  moderator  analyses  that  artifact  and  decides  if   it   is  ready  to  
undergo   the   inspection   process.   If   not,   then   the   artifact   is   immediately  
returned  to  the  author  for  improvement.  This  step  includes  also  selecting  the  
remaining  members  of  the  inspection  team.  
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2) Overview:   after   delivering   the   artifact   (and   other   artifacts   needed   to  
understand   it)   to   the   experts,   the   author   presents   in   detail   the   goal   and  
structure   of   the   artifact   to   be   inspected.   By   the   end   of   this   meeting   the  
inspection  team  must  be  familiar  with  the  job  to  be  performed.  
3) Preparation:   the   inspectors   analyze   individually   the   artifact   in   order   to  
prepare  themselves  for  the  inspection  meeting.  
4) Inspection   meeting:   in   this   meeting   the   reader   reads   and   explains   his  
interpretation   of   the   artifact   to   the   remaining   inspectors.   Discussion   is  
allowed   to   clarify   the   interpretation   and   to   disclose   existing   issues.   The  
outcome  of  the  inspection  meeting  is  a  list  of  issues  that  need  to  be  fixed  and  
one  of   three  verdicts:   accept   (the  document  does  not  present   any  problem),  
minor  corrections  (the  document  presents  minor  issues  that  need  to  be  fixed),  
and  re-­‐‑inspection  (the  document  presents  major   issues  that  need  to  be  fixed  
and  the  resulting  artifact  must  be  inspected).  
5) Revision:  the  author  modifies  the  artifact  following  the  recommendations  of  
the  inspection  team.  
6) Follow-­‐‑up:   the   moderator   checks   if   all   the   problems   detected   by   the  
inspectors   were   adequately   fixed.   The   moderator   may   decide   to   conduct  
another  inspection  meeting  if  there  were  considerable  changes  in  the  artifact  
or  if  the  changes  made  by  the  author  differ  from  the  recommendations  of  the  
experts.  
A   code   inspection   is   the  process   by  which   a   programmer  delivers   the   code   to   his  
peers  and  they  systematically  examine  it,  searching  for  programming  mistakes  that  
can  introduce  bugs.  A  security  inspection  is  an  inspection  that  is  specially  targeted  to  
find  security  vulnerabilities.   Inspections  are   the  most  effective  way  of  making  sure  
that  a  service  has  a  minimum  number  of  vulnerabilities  (Curphey  et  al.  2002)  and  are  
a  crucial  procedure  when  developing  software  to  critical  systems.  Nevertheless,  they  
are  usually  very   long,  expensive  and  require   inspectors   to  have  a  deep  knowledge  
on  web  security.  
A   less   expensive   alternative   to   code   inspections   is   code   reviews   (Freedman   and  
Weinberg  2000).  Code  reviews  are  a  simplified  version  of  code  inspections  that  can  
be   considered   when   analyzing   less   critical   services.   Reviews   are   also   a   manual  
approach,   but   they   do   not   include   the   formal   inspection   meeting.   The   reviewers  
perform  the  code  review  individually  and  the  moderator  is  in  charge  of  filtering  and  
merging  the  outcomes  from  the  several  experts.   In  what  concerns  the  roles  and  the  
remaining   steps   reviews   are   very   similar   to   inspections.   Although   also   a   very  
effective  approach,  it  is  still  quite  expensive.  
Code  walkthroughs   are   an   informal   approach   that   consists   of  manually   analyzing  
the  code  by  following  the  code  paths  as  determined  by  predefined  input  conditions  
Chapter  2  
  30  
(Freedman  and  Weinberg  2000).  In  practice,  the  developer,  in  conjunction  with  other  
experts,   simulate   the  code  execution,   in  a  way  similar   to  debugging.  Although   less  
formal,   walkthroughs   are   also   effective   on   detecting   security   issues,   as   far   as   the  
input   conditions   are   adequately   chosen.   However,   they   still   impose   the   cost   of  
having  more  than  one  expert  manually  analyzing  the  code.  
The  solution  to  reduce  the  cost  of  white-­‐‑box  analysis   is   to  rely  on  automated  tools,  
such  as  static  code  analyzers.  In  fact,  the  use  of  automated  code  analysis  tools  is  seen  
as  an  easy  and  fast  way  for  finding  bugs  and  vulnerabilities  in  web  applications.    
Static  code  analysis   tools  vet   software   code,   either   in   source  or  binary   form,   in  an  
attempt   to   identify   common   implementation-­‐‑level   bugs   (Stuttard   and   Pinto   2007).  
The   analysis   performed  by   existing   tools   varies   depending   on   their   sophistication,  
ranging   from   tools   that   consider   only   individual   statements   and   declarations   to  
others  that  consider  dependencies  between  lines  of  code.  Among  other  usages  (e.g.  
model   checking   and  data   flow  analysis),   these   tools  provide   an   automatic  way   for  
highlighting   possible   coding   errors.   The   main   problem   of   this   approach   is   that  
exhaustive   source   code   analysis   may   be   difficult   and   cannot   find   many   security  
flaws  due  to   the  complexity  of   the  code  and  the   lack  of  a  dynamic   (runtime)  view.  
The  following  paragraphs  briefly  introduce  some  of  the  most  used  and  well-­‐‑known  
static  code  analyzers,  including  both  commercial  and  free  tools.    
FindBugs  is  an  open  source  tool  that  “uses  static  analysis  to  look  for  bugs  in  Java  code”  
(University  of  Maryland  2009).  Findbugs  is  composed  of  various  detectors  each  one  
specialized  in  a  specific  pattern  of  bugs.    The  detectors  use  heuristics  to  search  in  the  
bytecode   of   Java   applications   for   these   patterns   and   classify   it   according   to  
categories  and  priorities.  Some  of  the  highest  levels  of  priorities  are  usually,  among  
other  problems,  security  issues.    
Yasca  (Yet  Another  Source  Code  Analyzer)  is  a  “framework  for  conducting  source  code  
analyses”  (Scovetta  2008)  in  a  wide  range  of  programming  languages,  including  Java.  
Yasca   is   a   free   tool   that   includes   two   components:   the   first   is   a   framework   for  
conducting   source   code   analyses   and   the   second   is   an   implementation   of   that  
framework   that   allows   integration  with   other   static   code   analyzers   (e.g.   FindBugs,  
PMD,  and  Jlint).  
Fortify  360   is   a   suite  of   tools   for  vulnerability  detection   commercialized  by  Fortify  
Software   (Fortify   Software   2008).   The   module   Fortify   Source   Code   Analyzer  
performs   static   code   analysis.   According   to   Fortify,   it   is   able   to   identify   the   root-­‐‑
cause   of   the   potentially   exploitable   security   vulnerabilities   in   source   code.   It  
supports   scanning   of   a   wide   variety   of   programming   languages,   platforms,   and  
integrated  development  environments.  
IntelliJ  IDEA  is  a  commercial  and  powerful  IDE  for  Java  development  that  includes  
“inspection   gadgets”   plug-­‐‑ins   with   automated   code   inspection   functionalities  
(JetBrains   2009).   IntelliJ   IDEA   is   able   to   detect   security   issues   in   java   source   code.  
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These   functionalities   are   available   also   in   a   community   edition   that   is   distributed  
free  and  open  source  since  2009.  
Pixy  is  a  free  and  open  source  program  that  performs  automatic  static  code  analysis  
of  PHP  4  source  code,  aimed  at  the  detection  of  XSS  and  SQL  injection  vulnerabilities  
(Jovanovic,  Kruegel,   and  Kirda   2006).  As   referred   in   Pixy’s  webpage,   “Pixy   takes   a  
PHP   program   as   input,   and   creates   a   report   that   lists   possible   vulnerable   points   in   the  
program,  together  with  additional  information  for  understanding  the  vulnerability”.  
Other   approaches   proposed   by   researchers   target   the   detection   of   security  
vulnerabilities   in  web   applications   using   static   analysis.   The   following   paragraphs  
present  the  most  relevant  works  on  this  topic.  
A   static   code   analysis   tool   for   checking   type   correctness   of   SQL  queries   generated  
dynamically   is   proposed   in   (G.  Wassermann   et   al.   2007).   This   approach   does   not  
target   the   detection   of   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities,   but   can   be   used   to   prevent  
attacks   that   take   advantage   of   type  mismatches   in   a   dynamically   generated   query  
string  to  crash  the  underlying  database.     This   technique  is  able  to  detect  one  of   the  
root   causes   of   many   vulnerabilities   in   code,   which   is   improper   type   checking   of  
input.   Nevertheless,   this   technique   leaves   undetected   the   SQL   injection  
vulnerabilities  that  lead  to  syntactically  and  type  correct  queries.  
In   (Y.   W.   Huang   et   al.   2004)   is   presented   an   approach   for   the   detection   of  
vulnerabilities   related   to   input   validation.   This   approach   relies   on   developer-­‐‑
provided  annotations,  which   limits   the  practical   applicability  of   the   approach,   and  
assumes   that   preconditions   for   all   sensitive   functions   can   be   accurately   expressed  
ahead  of  time,  which  is  not  always  the  case.  
Wassermann  and  Su  (G.  Wassermann  and  Su  2004)  proposed  an  approach  that  uses  
static   analysis   combined  with   automated   reasoning   to   verify   that   the   SQL   queries  
generated   in   the   application   layer   do   not   contain   tautologies.   The  methodology   is  
extremely  limited  because  it  only  detects  and  prevents  tautologies,  which  is  only  one  
of  the  many  types  of  SQL  Injection  attacks  that  can  be  conducted.    
Livshits  and  Lam  (Livshits  and  Lam  2005)  proposed  a   static  analysis   technique   for  
detecting   application   vulnerabilities   that   stem   from  unchecked   input,   such   as   SQL  
injections   and   cross-­‐‑site   scripting.   The   proposed   approach   is   based   on   a   scalable  
points-­‐‑to   analysis   and   uses   context   sensitivity   combined   with   improved   object  
naming  to  detect  vulnerabilities  and  keep  the  number  of  false  positives  low.  In  this  
approach,   vulnerability   signatures   are   described   using   PQL   (Martin,   Livshits,   and  
Lam  2005),  and  a  static  analyzer  is  generated  from  the  vulnerability  description.  The  
experimental  evaluation  showed  that  the  analyzer  detects  instances  of  the  specified  
vulnerability  in  the  code  but  also  showed  that  it  produces  a  considerable  number  of  
false  positives.    
A   technique   to   statically   detect   SQL   injection   vulnerabilities   in   PHP   scripts   is  
presented   in   (Xie   and   Aiken   2006).   The   analysis   applies   a   custom   three-­‐‑tier  
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architecture   to   capture   information   at   decreasing   levels   of   granularity   at   the  
intrablock,   intraprocedural,  and   interprocedural   level.  This  architecture  enables   the  
technique  to  handle  dynamic  features  of  scripting  languages  that  are  not  adequately  
addressed  by  other  techniques.  The  tool  was  used  on  six  popular  open  source  PHP  
code  bases,  finding  105  previously  unknown  security  vulnerabilities  that,  according  
to   the   authors,   may   be   remotely   exploitable.   However,   the   technique   presents  
multiple   limitations,  as   it  cannot  correctly  handle  recursive  function  calls,  alias  and  
multi-­‐‑dimensional  arrays.  
 Gray-­‐box	  Testing	  2.3.3
The  main   limitation   of   black-­‐‑box   approaches   is   that   the   vulnerability   detection   is  
restricted   by   the   output   of   the   application.  On   the   other   hand,  white-­‐‑box   analysis  
does   not   take   into   account   the   runtime   view   of   the   code.   Gray-­‐‑box   approaches  
combine  black-­‐‑box  and  white-­‐‑box  techniques  in  order  to  overcome  their  limitations  
and  can  be  used  for  both  vulnerability  and  attack  detection.  
Dynamic  program  analysis   consists   of   the   analysis   of   the   behavior   of   the   software  
while   executing   it   (Stuttard   and   Pinto   2007).   The   idea   is   that   by   analyzing   the  
internal   behavior   of   the   code   in   the   presence   of   realistic   inputs   it   is   possible   to  
identify   bugs   and   vulnerabilities.  Obviously,   the   effectiveness   of   dynamic   analysis  
depends  strongly  on  the  input  values  (similarly  to  testing),  but  it  takes  advantage  of  
the   observation   of   the   source   code   (similarly   to   static   analysis).   For   improving   the  
effectiveness   of   dynamic   program   analysis,   the   program   must   be   executed   with  
sufficient   test   inputs.   Code   coverage   analyzers   help   guaranteeing   an   adequate  
coverage  of  the  source  code  (Doliner  2006)(Atlassian  2010).  
“Acunetix   AcuSensor   Technology”   (Acunetix   2008b)   is   a   technique   introduced   by  
Acunetix   that  combines  black-­‐‑box  scanning  with   feedback  obtained  during   the   test  
execution.   This   feedback   is   provided   by   sensors   previous   placed,   using   code  
instrumentation,   inside   the   source   code   or   bytecode.  Acunetix   states   that   by  using  
this   technique   it   is   possible   to   find   more   vulnerabilities,   to   indicate   in   the   code  
exactly   where   they   are,   and   to   report   less   false   positives.   This   technology   is   only  
available  to  web  applications,  specifically  .NET  and  PHP  web  applications.  In  case  of  
.NET  this  technology  can  be  injected  in  the  bytecode.  
Two   techniques   that   combine   static   and   dynamic   analysis   have   been   proposed   to  
perform   automated   test   generation   to   find   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities.  
SQLUnitGen,   presented   in   (Shin,  Williams,   and   Xie   2006),   is   a   tool   that   combines  
static  analysis  with  unit  testing  to  detect  SQL  injection  vulnerabilities.  The  tool  uses  a  
third-­‐‑party   test   case   generator   and   then   modifies   the   test   cases   to   introduce   SQL  
injection  attacks.  These  concrete  attacks  are  obtained  by  using  static  analysis  to  trace  
the   flow  of  user   input  values   to   the  point  of  query  generation.   Sania,  presented   in  
(Kosuga  et  al.  2007),  is  a  testing  framework  to  detect  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  in  
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web   applications   during   development   and   debugging   phases.   Sania   intercepts   the  
SQL  queries  between  a  web  application  and  a  database  and  constructs  parse  trees  of  
these  queries.  Terminal  leafs  of  parse  trees  typically  represent  vulnerable  spots.  The  
technique   then   generates   attacks   according   to   the   syntax   and   semantics   of   these  
potentially  vulnerable  spots.  Finally,  Sania  compares   the  parse   trees  of   the  original  
SQL  query  and  with   the  ones   resulting  after   an  attack   to  assess   the   safety  of   these  
spots.   The   differences   between   the   parse   trees   are   considered   vulnerabilities,  
originating  a  warning.  
While   other   works   focused   on   identifying   vulnerabilities   related   to   the   use   of  
external   inputs  without   sanitizations,   the  work  presented   in   (Balzarotti   et   al.   2008)  
introduces   an   approach   that   combines   static   and   dynamic   analysis   to   analyze   the  
correctness  of  sanitization  processes  in  web  applications.  First,  a  technique  based  on  
static  analysis  models  the  modifications  that  the  inputs  suffer  along  the  code  paths.  
This  approach  uses  a  conservative  model  of  string  operations,  which  might   lead  to  
false  positives.  Then,  a  second  technique  based  on  dynamic  analysis  works  bottom-­‐‑
up   from  the  sinks  and  reconstructs   the  code  used  by   the  application   to  modify   the  
inputs.   The   code   is   then   executed,   using   a   large   set   of   malicious   input   values   to  
identify  exploitable  flaws  in  the  sanitization  process.  
Runtime  anomaly  detection  tools  can  also  be  used  for  vulnerability  detection.  One  of  
those   tools   is  AMNESIA   (Analysis   and  Monitoring   for  NEutralizing   SQL-­‐‑Injection  
Attacks)  (W.  G.  J.  Halfond  and  Orso  2005)  that  combines  static  analysis  and  runtime  
monitoring   to   detect   and   avoid   SQL   injection   attacks.   Static   analysis   is   used   to  
analyze   the   source   code   of   a   given   web   application   building   a   model   of   the  
legitimate   queries   that   such   application   can   generate.   At   runtime,   AMNESIA  
monitors   all   dynamically   generated   queries   and   checks   them   for   compliance  with  
the  statically  generated  model.  When  a  query  that  violates  the  model  is  detected  it  is  
classified  as  an  attack  and  is  prevented  from  accessing  the  database.  The  problem  is  
that   the   model   built   during   the   static   code   analysis   may   be   incomplete   and  
unrealistic   because   it   lacks   a   dynamic   view   of   the   runtime   behavior   of   the  
application.  
2.4 Assessment	  and	  Benchmarking	  	  
A   key   aspect   when   applying   automated   approaches   is   to   select   the   ones   that   are  
most  effective  from  the  (frequently)  large  set  of  alternatives  available.  This  way,  we  
need  always  to  consider  techniques  to  perform  assessment  and  benchmarking.  This  
section   introduces   the   key   concepts,   techniques   and   tools   related   to   assessing   and  
benchmarking  the  security  of  computer  systems,  components,  and  tools.  The  topics  
discussed   are:   workload   generation,   vulnerability   and   attack   injection,   security  
benchmarking,   runtime   assessing   and  monitoring   and   assessment   of   vulnerability  
detection  tools.    
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 Workload	  Generation	  2.4.1
One  component   stands  out  when   testing  a   system:   the  workload.  The  workload  or  
the   test   data   represents   the   work   that   the   system   must   perform   during   the  
experiments.   In   the  specific   case  of   services,   the  workload   is  no  more   than  a   set  of  
non-­‐‑malicious   requests   that   are   used   to   exercise   the   service   under   study   to  
understand   its   behavior.   Besides   just   generating   requests,   it   is   important   to  
understand   the   proprieties   of   the  workload,   including   its   representativeness   (how  
close  are  the  characteristics  of  the  workload  to  the  real  work  the  system  will  execute  
in   the   field)   and   its   code   coverage   (how  much  of   the   code   the  workload   is   able   to  
exercise).  This  way,   executing   the  workload  may  also  be  useful   to  obtain   feedback  
about   the   its  own  properties,   for   instance  by  gathering   information  about   the  code  
coverage  of  the  tests  using  a  tool  like  Cobertura  (Doliner  2006).  
Several   approaches   are   available   for  workload   generation.  A   survey   on   automatic  
test   data   generation   techniques   is   presented   in   (Edvardsson   1999).   Examples   of  
possible   approaches   include   the   obvious   random   workload   generation   and   the  
generation   of   the  workload   based   in   the   automated   analysis   of   the   service   source  
code  (obviously,  the  source  code  is  needed).  In  (Santiago  et  al.  2006)  state  charts  are  
used   for   automated   test   case   generation.   Another   approach   is   to   generate   the  
workload  using  the  characterization  of  real  load  patterns  through  the  application  of  
Markov  Chains  (De  Barros  et  al.  2007).  
 Vulnerability	  and	  Attack	  Injection	  2.4.2
The  use  of  fault  injection  techniques  to  assess  security  is  a  particular  case  of  software  
fault   injection,   focused  on  the  software   faults   that  represent  security  vulnerabilities  
or  may  cause  the  system  to  fail  in  avoiding  a  security  problem  (Fonseca,  Vieira,  and  
Madeira  2007).  Security  vulnerabilities  are  in  fact  a  particular  case  of  software  faults,  
which   require   adapted   injection   approaches.   This   way,   in   the   same   way   fault  
injection   techniques   are   essential   to   evaluate   the   effectiveness   of   fault   tolerant  
mechanisms,   also   vulnerability   and   attack   injection   is   highly   valuable   to   evaluate  
security  mechanisms  such  as  vulnerability  and  attack  detectors.  
Vulnerability   injection   avoids   the   need   for   having   vulnerable   software,   although  
there   are   vulnerability   representativeness   issues   to   be   considered   (i.e.   artificially  
injected   vulnerabilities   may   not   be   as   representative   as   real   vulnerabilities).   The  
vulnerability   injection   mechanism   is   normally   paired   with   an   automated   attack  
component,  i.e.  an  attack  injector  that  exploits  injected  vulnerabilities.  This  way,  the  
process   usually   includes   two   major   steps:   first,   an   analysis   of   the   target   system'ʹs  
source   is   performed   so   that   locations   where   vulnerabilities   can   be   injected   are  
identified;  then,  a  vulnerability  is  injected  by  performing  some  code  or  configuration  
mutation.    
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In   (De  Barros  et  al.   2007)   the  vulnerabilities  of   six  web  applications  were  analyzed  
using  field  data  based  from  655  security  fixes.  Results  show  that  only  a  small  subset  
of   12   generic   software   faults   is   responsible   for   all   the   security   problems.   In   fact,  
considerable  differences  are  observed  when  comparing   the  distribution  of   the   fault  
types  related  to  security  with  studies  on  common  software  faults.  
A  procedure  inspired  on  the  fault  injection  technique  (that  has  been  used  for  decades  
in  the  dependability  area)  targeting  security  vulnerabilities  is  proposed  in  (Fonseca,  
Vieira,  and  Madeira  2009).  In  this  work,  the  "ʺsecurity  vulnerability"ʺ  plus  the  "ʺattack"ʺ  
represent  the  space  of  the  "ʺfaults"ʺ  that  can  be  injected  in  a  web  application;  and  the  
"ʺintrusion"ʺ   is   the   "ʺerror"ʺ   (Echtle  and  Leu  1992;  Fonseca,  Vieira,   and  Madeira  2009).  
To   emulate   real   world   web   vulnerabilities   with   accuracy   the   work   relies   on   the  
results   obtained   in   the   field   study   on   real   security   vulnerabilities   (Fonseca,  Vieira,  
and  Madeira  2007).    
Conceptually,  attack  injection  is  based  on  the  injection  of  realistic  vulnerabilities  that  
are   automatically   attacked,   and   finally   the   result   of   the   attack   is   evaluated.   As  
proposed  in  (Fonseca,  Vieira,  and  Madeira  2009),  a  tool  able  to  perform  vulnerability  
and   attack   injection   is   a   key   instrument   that   can   be   used   in   several   relevant  
scenarios,  namely:  evaluate  security   tools   like  vulnerability  detectors,   train  security  
teams,  evaluate  security  teams,  and  estimate  the  total  number  of  vulnerabilities  still  
present  in  the  code,  among  others.  
 Security	  Benchmarking	  2.4.3
Comparing  different  alternatives  in  terms  of  security  is  a  difficult  problem  faced  by  
many   developers   and   system   administrators.   Security   benchmarking   allows  
assessing   and   comparing   the   security   of   systems   and/or   components,   supporting  
informed   decisions  while   designing,   developing,   and   deploying   complex   software  
systems  and  tools.    
Several  security  evaluation  methods  have  been  proposed  in  the  past  (Commission  of  
the   European   Communities   1993;   Infrastructure   and   Profile   2002;   Qiu   et   al.   1985;  
Sandia   National   Laboratories   2012).   The   Orange   Book   (Qiu   et   al.   1985)   and   the  
Common   Criteria   for   Information   Technology   Security   Evaluation   (Infrastructure  
and  Profile   2002)   define   a   set   of   generic   rules   that   allow  developers   to   specify   the  
security   attributes   of   their   products   and   evaluators   to   verify   if   products   actually  
meet   their   claims.   Another   example   is   the   red   team   strategy   (Sandia   National  
Laboratories   2012),   which   consists   of   a   group   of   experts   trying   to   hack   its   own  
computer  systems  to  evaluate  security.    
The   work   presented   in   (Maxion   and   Tan   2000)   addresses   the   problem   of  
determining,   in   a   thorough   and   consistent   way,   the   reliability   and   accuracy   of  
anomaly  detectors.   This  work   addresses   some  key   aspects   that  must   be   taken   into  
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consideration   when   benchmarking   the   performance   of   anomaly   detection   in   the  
cyber-­‐‑domain.  
The   set   of   security   configuration   benchmarks   created   by   the   Center   for   Internet  
Security  (CIS)  is  a  very  interesting  initiative  (“Center  for  Internet  Security”  2012).  CIS  
is   a   non-­‐‑profit   organization   formed   by   several  well-­‐‑known   academic,   commercial,  
and   governmental   entities   that   has   created   a   series   of   security   configuration  
documents  for  several  commercial  and  open  source  systems.  These  documents  focus  
on  the  practical  aspects  of  the  configuration  of  these  systems  and  state  the  concrete  
values  each  configuration  option  should  have  in  order  to  enhance  overall  security  of  
real   installations.   Although   CIS   refers   to   these   documents   as   benchmarks   they  
mainly  reflect  best  practices  and  are  not  explicitly  designed  for  systems  assessment  
or  comparison.  
Vieira  &  Madeira  proposed  a  practical  way  to  characterize  the  security  mechanisms  
in   database   systems   (Vieira   and   Madeira   2005).   In   this   approach   database  
management   systems   (DBMS)   are   classified   according   to   a   set   of   security   classes  
ranging  from  Class  0  to  Class  5  (from  the  worst  to  the  best).  Systems  are  classified  in  
a  given  class  according  to  the  security  requirements  satisfied.  
In  (A.A.  Neto  and  Vieira  2008)  the  authors  analyze  the  security  best  practices  behind  
the   many   configuration   options   available   in   several   well-­‐‑known   DBMS.   These  
security  best  practices  are  then  generalized  and  used  to  define  a  set  of  configuration  
tests  that  can  be  used  to  compare  different  database  installations.  A  benchmark  that  
allows   database   administrators   to   assess   and   compare   database   configurations   is  
presented   in   (A.A.   Neto   and   Vieira   2009).   The   benchmark   provides   a   trust-­‐‑based  
security  metric,   named  minimum   untrustworthiness,   that   expresses   the  minimum  
level  of  distrust  the  DBA  should  have  in  a  given  configuration  regarding  its  ability  to  
prevent  attacks.    
The  use  of  trust-­‐‑based  metrics  as  an  alternative  to  security  measurement  is  discussed  
in   (Afonso   Araújo   Neto   and   Vieira   2010).   Araújo   &   Vieira   also   proposed   a  
trustworthiness   benchmark   based   on   the   systematic   collection   of   evidences   of   the  
use   (or   lack   of   it)   of   secure   coding   practices   (collected   using   static   analysis  
techniques),  which  can  be  used  to  select  one  among  several  web  applications,  from  a  
security  point-­‐‑of-­‐‑view.  
 Runtime	  Monitoring	  and	  Testing	  2.4.4
A  monitoring  system  can  be  used  for  different  purposes.  For  example,  it  can  be  used  
to   check   if   certain   service   is   working   correctly,   to   check   if   the   availability   of   the  
service   fulfills   the   requirements   defined   in   a   Service   Level   Agreement   (SLA),   to  
check   the   compositions   of   the   services,   to   get   information   about   the   architecture,  
among  other  objectives.    
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Several   techniques   based   on   monitoring   and   model   checking   at   runtime   are  
discussed   in   (Calinescu   2011).   In   this   work   it   is   advocated   the   need   for   using   a  
collection   of   “@runtime”   techniques   for   the   development,   operation   and  
management  of  software  capable  of  self  adaptation  and  high  integrity.  Additionally,  
there   is   also   an   increasing   interest   in   incremental   model   checking   techniques,   as  
shown   in   (Pistore  et  al.  2004)   that  presents   techniques  based  on  “Planning  as  Model  
Checking”   to   automatically   compose   web   services   and   synthesize   monitoring  
components.  
Petri   nets   are   also   used   together   with   a   simple   monitoring   system   to   model   the  
external   behavior   of   the   software   in   (Grosclaude   2004).   The   components   are  
associated  to  a  local  controller  that  scrutinizes  its  messages  and  compares  them  with  
the   specified   behavior.   As   the   components   interact,   information   about   errors   and  
time   constraints   violations   are   collected   and  analyzed   to   infer   indicators   about   the  
state  of  components.      
In  (B.  Wassermann  and  Emmerich  2011),   is  described  a  monitoring  system  for  Web  
Service   compositions   called   Monere.   It   instruments   some   components   across   the  
layers   of   a   service   composition   and   exploits   the   structure   of   BPEL   workflows   to  
obtain   structural   cross-­‐‑domain  dependency  graphs.   In   (Baresi,  Ghezzi,   and  Guinea  
2004),   the   authors   propose   approaches   to   monitor   dynamic   service   compositions  
with  respect  to  contracts  expressed  via  assertions  on  services.  In  (Gao  et  al.  2000)  is  
included   a   support   for   monitoring   of   software   components   in   component-­‐‑based  
programs.   In   (Zubin67   2010),   it   is   presented   a   module   for   monitoring   services   in  
Service  Oriented  Architectures,   focusing  on   the  Enterprise   Service  Bus   (ESB)   level,  
allowing  collecting  data  in  a  easy  way  even  if  the  services  are  executed  on  different  
servers.    
A  tool  for  testing  SOAs  is  proposed  in  (Ceccarelli,  Vieira,  and  Bondavalli  2011a).  It  is  
supported   by   a   discovery   algorithm   that   is   able   to   trace   the   SOA   evolution   by  
automatically   discovering   the   services   that   compose   the   architecture   and   the  
connections   among   them.   This   approach   is   then   used   in   the   context   of   a   testing  
service  for  SOA  validation  (Ceccarelli,  Vieira,  and  Bondavalli  2011b)  that  is  basically  
a   composite   service   able   to   monitor   SOA   evolution   and   test   the   various   services  
according   to   specific   testing   policies.   The   work   proposes   the   use   of   copies   of   the  
services   to   avoid   service   degradation   and   error   propagation   caused   by   the   testing  
activity.  This  algorithm  is  based  on  a  collaborative  approach  where  providers  need  
to  share  information  they  have  on  their  part  of  a  SOA.  
In   (Bertolino  et  al.   2006;  Bertolino  et  al.   2009)   the  authors  present  a  way   for  online  
testing  for  Web  Services,  more  specifically    interoperability  testing,  where  the  service  
invocations  are  redirected  to  stubs,  suggesting  the  correctness  of  a  service  against  its  
specification.   The   problem   with   the   proposed   approach   is   that   services   that   are  
already  active  in  SOA  do  not  take  part  in  the  testing  process.  For  runtime  testing,  the  
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system  under  production  should  be  protected  from  undesired  side  effects,  which  is  
also  not  considered  in  this  work.    
 Assessment	  of	  Vulnerability	  Detection	  Tools	  2.4.5
Regardless   of   the   importance   they   have,   automated   approaches   for   vulnerabilities  
detection  are   frequently  unable   to  produce  accurate  results.   In  consequence  of   this,  
many  works   have   been   published   proposing  methodologies   to   evaluate   tools   and  
presenting  results  of  tools  evaluations.  Following  are  presented  the  most  significant  
published  studies.  
In   what   concerns   to   web   security   scanners,   previous   research   suggests   that   their  
effectiveness   in   the   detection   of   vulnerabilities   varies   a   lot,   being   often  
unsatisfactory.   In   (Fonseca,   Vieira,   and  Madeira   2007)   it   is   proposed   a  method   to  
evaluate  and  benchmark  automatic  web  vulnerability  scanners  in  web  application’s  
environment  using  vulnerability  injection  techniques.  Software  faults  are  injected  in  
the  application  code  and  the  tool  under  evaluation  is  executed,  showing  its  strengths  
and  weaknesses   concerning  coverage  of  vulnerability  detection  and   false  positives.  
The   study   focused   on   the   SQL   Injection   and   Cross   Site   Scripting   (XSS)   types   of  
vulnerabilities.   Three   leading   commercial   scanning   tools   were   evaluated   and   the  
results   showed   that   in   general   the   coverage   is   low   and   the   percentage   of   false  
positives  is  very  high  (ranging  from  20%  to  77%).    
Another  evaluation  of  web  vulnerability  scanners  is  presented  in  (Doupé,  Cova,  and  
Vigna  2010).  Both  commercial  and  open-­‐‑source  scanners  were  evaluated,  in  a  total  of  
11  scanners.  To  test  the  tools  the  authors  introduced  different  types  of  vulnerabilities  
in  a  realistic  web  application,  challenging  the  crawling  capabilities  of  the  tools.  The  
main  findings  of  the  study  were  that  the  crawling  process  is  critical  to  the  success  of  
the   scanning   process   and   that   many   classes   of   vulnerabilities   are   completely  
overlooked  by  these  tools.    
In   (Teixeira,   Antunes,   and   Neves   2007)   is   proposed   a   preliminary   version   of   a  
benchmark  to  compare  the  effectiveness  of  static  analysis  tools  effectiveness.  This  is  
based   on   a   study   conducted  using   code   analysis   tools   freely   available   on   Internet.  
The   benchmark   uses   an   application   developed   by   the   authors   containing  
vulnerabilities  manually   introduced.  The   tools   are   run  over   the   application   to   find  
the  existing  vulnerabilities.  The  experiment  has  shown  that  each  tool  is  able  to  find  
only   few   classes   of   vulnerabilities.   Using   these   results   work   was   developed   to  
aggregate   the   results   of   the  benchmarked   tools   originating   a  new   tool  with  higher  
coverage  and  less  false  positives.  However,  the  work  targets  types  of  vulnerabilities  
that   are   not   the   focus   of   this   Ph.D.  work   and   the   fact   that   the   application   used   to  
evaluate  the  tools  is  synthetic  hurts  the  representativeness  of  the  evaluation.  
In  (Wagner  et  al.  2005)  authors  evaluated  three  bug  finding  tools  and  compared  their  
effectiveness   with   a   review   team   inspection.   The   tools   achieved   higher   efficiency  
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than  the  review  team  in  detecting  software  bugs  (the  study  did  not  consider  security  
issues)   in   five   industrial   Java-­‐‑based   applications,   but   all   the   tools   presented   false  
positive  rates  higher  than  30%.  The  work  focuses  on  application  code  defects  that  are  
also  outside  the  focus  of  this  thesis.  
In   (Bau   et   al.   2010)   the   authors   evaluated   8   automated   black-­‐‑box   leading   tools   it  
terms  of  the  class  of  vulnerabilities  tested,  their  effectiveness,  and  the  relation  of  the  
target  vulnerabilities  to  vulnerabilities  found  in  the  field.  The  study  was  conducted  
using   a   vulnerable   web   application   and   previous   versions   of   widely   used   web  
applications   containing   known   vulnerabilities.   The   results   showed   that   “stored”  
forms  of  Cross  Site  Scripting  (XSS)  and  SQL  Injection  (SQLI)  vulnerabilities  are  not  
currently  found  by  many  tools.  
Another   important   technique   to   evaluate   vulnerability   detection   tools   is  
vulnerability   injection.   In   the   same  way   fault   injection   is   an   approach   that   can   be  
used   to   validate   specific   fault   handling   and   fault   detection  mechanisms   (Carreira,  
Madeira,  and  Silva  1998),  vulnerability  injection  is  a  powerful  tool  that  can  be  used  
to   assess   the   effectiveness  of  vulnerability  detection  and  attack  detection   tools   and  
methodologies.  In  (Fonseca,  Vieira,  and  Madeira  2009)  is  proposed  a  methodology  to  
inject  vulnerabilities  and  attacks  in  web  applications.  The  methodology  can  be  used  
to  evaluate  both  defensive  mechanisms  and  vulnerability  detection  mechanisms.  As  
mentioned   in   Section   2.4.2,   to   provide   realistic   vulnerabilities   the   methodology   is  
based   on   a   field   study   that   included   a   large   number   of   vulnerabilities   in   web  
applications.   During   the   experimental   evaluation   the   methodology   was   used   to  
evaluate   the   coverage  and   false  positives  of   an   intrusion  detection   system   for  SQL  
injection  and  two  web  vulnerability  scanners.  The  problem  is  that  the  methodology  
applies  only   to  web  applications  and  does  not   take   into  account   the  specificities  of  
the  web  services  environment.  Additionally,  the  tool  presented  is  specific  for  LAMP  
(Linux,   Apache,   MySQL,   and   PHP)   web   applications   and   requires   access   to   the  
application  source  code  to  perform  vulnerability  injection.  
Although   the   works   presented   until   now   tried   to   assess   the   effectiveness   of  
vulnerability  detection  tools,  none  has  proposed  a  standard  approach  that  allows  the  
comparison   of   tools   and   so   developers   urge   the   definition   of   practical   approaches  
that   help   them   comparing   alternative   tools   concerning   their   ability   to   detect  
vulnerabilities.   As   performance   benchmarks   have   contributed   to   improve   the  
performance   of   systems,   we   believe   that   the   use   of   a   benchmarking   approach   on  
automated   vulnerability   detection   tools   is   for   improving   the   state   of   the   art   on  




This  chapter  presented  background  on  services  and  service-­‐‑based  infrastructure  and  
discussed  the  state  of  the  art  in  terms  of  vulnerability  detection  tools  and  assessment  
and  benchmarking  techniques.  
The   basic   characteristics   of   service-­‐‑based   environment   were   introduced   and   the  
security  threats  faced  in  such  environments  clearly  show  the  need  for  new  means  to  
help   developers   and   researchers   improving   security.   The   framework   proposed   in  
Chapter  3  is  a  possible  answer  towards  advancing  the  state  of  the  art  in  this  area.  
A  key  aspect   is   that,  although  a   large  number  of  vulnerability  detection   tools  were  
introduced,  very  few  aim  to  tackle  the  specific  problem  of  vulnerabilities  in  service-­‐‑
based  environment.  This   shows   the  need   for   an   integrated  approach  able   to   tackle  
these  specific  requirements  as  proposed  in  Chapter  5.  
The   findings   regarding   works   on   assessing   and   benchmarking   the   value   of  
vulnerability  detection  tools  show  that  in  many  cases  the  existing  tools  present  very  
low  effectiveness.  The  low  effectiveness  of  the  tools  presented  show  the  need  for  the  
development  of  more  efficient  tools,  as  the  ones  presented  in  Chapter  4.      
Finally,  most  of  these  studies  do  not  fit  the  model  of  a  standard  way  to  evaluate  and  
compare  vulnerability  detection  tools,  as  they  mostly  consist  of  ad-­‐‑hoc  experiments  
design  for  the  specific  tools  under  scrutiny.  Additionally,  most  of  studies  presented  
above  are  focused  specifically  in  web  applications  and  the  results  obtained  cannot  be  
easily  generalized,  especially  if  we  take  into  account  the  specificities  of  web  services  
environments.   This   highlights   clearly   the   need   for   benchmarking   approaches  
focusing   vulnerability   detection   tools   for   web   services,   as   the   one   presented   in  
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Chapter	  3	  
Framework	  for	  the	  Detection	  of	  
Vulnerabilities	  in	  Service-­‐Based	  
Infrastructures	  
In  order  to  support  business-­‐‑critical  scenarios,  Service-­‐‑Based  Infrastructures  must  be  
secure   and   reliable   (Singhal,  Winograd,   and   Scarfone   2007).  However,   studies   and  
reports  show  that  both  web  applications  and  services  are  many  times  deployed  with  
security   vulnerabilities   (Vieira,   Antunes,   and   Madeira   2009;   NTA   Monitor   2011a;  
OWASP   Foundation   2013).   Studies   also   show   that,   although   penetration   testing   is  
considered  to  be  the  vulnerability  detection  technique  most  used  by  web  developers  
(Stuttard  and  Pinto  2007),   it  has   limited  effectiveness,  reporting  very  high  numbers  
of   false   positives,  while   leaving  many   vulnerabilities   undetected   (Vieira,   Antunes,  
and   Madeira   2009;   Fonseca,   Vieira,   and   Madeira   2007;   Doupé,   Cova,   and   Vigna  
2010).  Furthermore,   the  specific  characteristics  of  service-­‐‑based  infrastructures  raise  
new   security   requirements,   not   addressed   by   existing   tools.   First,   these  
infrastructures  are  dynamic  in  nature,  facing  changes  in  the  services  used  and  in  the  
way   they   interact.   Second,   these   infrastructures   usually   include   services   that   are  
under   the   control   of   multiple   providers.   Finally,   it   is   necessary   to   consider  
interactions  with  resources  and  other  services.    
Such   requirements   create   the   need   for   innovative   techniques   that   help   developers  
improving   the   current   situation.   In   this   chapter   we   define   a   framework6   that  
provides   the   context   for   the   work   on   detecting   vulnerabilities   in   service-­‐‑based  
                                                                                                              
  
6 In the context of this work, we define a framework as being a set of assumptions, concepts, and 
practices that represent a way of viewing and addressing a problem. 
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infrastructures   presented   in   the   thesis.   The   framework   is   composed   of   three   key  
parts,  as  introduced  in  the  next  paragraphs.    
To   help   understanding   the   research   challenges   and   to   clarify   the   types   of  
infrastructures   targeted,  we   defined   a   reference   service-­‐‑based   infrastructure.   This  
infrastructure,   portraying   the   typical   characteristics   of   web   services,   guided   the  
work   conducted   and   influenced   the   solutions   proposed.   In   practice,   the   reference  
infrastructure   defines   the   security   challenges   to   be   addressed,   including   both   the  
traditional   security   requirements   and   the   ones   that   are   raised   by   service-­‐‑based  
orientation.  
The   services   considered   in   the   reference   infrastructure   are  divided   in   three   testing  
scenarios   with   specific   characteristics.   Addressing   these   testing   scenarios   calls   for  
techniques  that  take  into  account  the  different  access  conditions  to  the  services  under  
testing.   Furthermore,   a   generic   procedure   that   supports   the   design   of   standardized  
and   modular   tools   and   that   guarantees   exhaustive   and   effective   detection   of  
vulnerabilities   is   needed.   The   idea   is   that   the   different   components   should  
implement   specific   features  of   the   tool,   in  a  decoupled  manner,  allowing   for  easily  
designing   and   later   improving   the   tool.  This  way,  we  propose   a  generic  approach  
for   designing   vulnerability   detection   tools   for   web   services.   This   approach  
includes   the   definition   of   the   testing   procedure   and   of   the  main   components   that  
should  be  implemented  by  the  tool.    
To  orchestrate  and  integrate  the  tools  developed  following  such  design  approach,  in  
a   way   that   allows   detecting   vulnerabilities   in   service-­‐‑based   infrastructures   in  
general,   we   propose   a   generic   integrated   approach   that   encompasses   aspects   like  
how   to   create   and   manage   a   description   of   the   underlying   architecture,   how   to  
define  what  should  be  done  gather  information  about  the  infrastructure,  and  how  to  
run  the  tests  using  the  tools  that  best  suit  each  service.  
The   outline   of   this   chapter   is   as   follows.   The   next   section   presents   the   reference  
infrastructure,   discussing   the   characteristics   of   web   services,   the   main   security  
challenges,   and   the   testing   scenarios   considered.   Section   3.2   presents   the   generic  
approach  for  designing  vulnerability  detection  tools  for  web  services,   including  the  
components   and   the   testing   procedure   that   a   tool   should   implement.   Section   3.3  
presents   the   integrated   approach   for   detecting   vulnerabilities   in   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures.  Finally,  Section  3.4  concludes  the  chapter.  
3.1 Reference	  Service-­‐Based	  Infrastructure	  
Service-­‐‑based   Infrastructures   and   SOAs   represent   the   response   for   the   need   to  
simplify   the   IT   infrastructure   of   organization,   improving   at   the   same   time  
interoperability   and   increasing   the   business   agility,   Although   they   can   be  
implemented   in   multiple   different   ways,   there   is   a   consensus   about   their   basic  
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design   principles   (Erl   2005;   Papazoglou   and  Heuvel   2007),  which   are   summarized  
next.  
It   is  widely  accepted   that   the   functionalities   implemented  by   the  system  should  be  
available   in   the   form  of  services   that  allow  the   interaction  between  consumers  and  
providers.   Services   are   reusable   components   that   efficiently   deliver   business  
functionalities   within   a   protocol-­‐‑independent   distributed   environment   through   a  
standardized   interface.   Services   must   also   be   autonomous   and   self-­‐‑contained,  
coarse-­‐‑grained   and   loosely   coupled.   In   order   to   help   the   implementation   of   these  
principles,   the   services  are   frequently  connected   through  a   service  bus  component,  
designated  as  Enterprise  Service  Bus  (ESB)  (Keen  et  al.  2004).    
A   detailed   representation   of   the   concepts   and   components   around   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures   could   become   too   complex   to   be   analyzed,   thus   rendering   such  
representation   useless.   This   way,   it   is   necessary   to   make   some   representation  
simplifications  in  order  to  focus  on  the  key  parts  of  these  infrastructures  that  are  the  
subject   of   this   thesis.   Also,   as   it   is   not   possible   to   address   all   the   existing  
technologies,  we  need  to  reduce  the  diversity  of  technologies  addressed.  Finally,  it  is  
necessary  to  make  some  assumptions  in  order  to  help  directing  the  development  of  
techniques   and   tools.   To   accomplish   such   needs,   we   established   a   reference  
infrastructure  that  includes  the  key  concepts  and  components  that  should  be  kept  in  
mind   to   understand   the   present   work.   Figure   3.1   portrays   this   reference  
infrastructure.  
The  figure  shows  a  simplified  example  of  a  service-­‐‑based  environment,  with  a  small  
number  of  Services   (Sx)  and  Resources  (Rx).  The  example   includes  a  Provider  (P0),  
with   a   gray   ellipse   that   represents   the   parts   of   the   system  under   his   total   control.  
This   provider   offers   two   services   (S0.5   and   S0.6)   to   the   exterior,   while   other  
resources  (R0.7  and  R0.8)  are  for  internal  access  only.  While  the  service  S0.6  is  fully  
under  control,   the  service  S0.5   is  not.   In   fact,   the   former  uses  only  the  services  and  
resources  owned  by  the  provider  to  complete  its  business  functionality,  but  the  latter  
(S0.5)  uses  some  resources  that  are  outside  the  control  of  the  provider  (R3  and  S4).    
The   services   and   resources   outside   the   gray   ellipse   are   not   controlled   by  P0,   thus  
being   distributed   throughout   the   Internet.  Although   they   are   not   under   control   of  
P0,   they  are  known  and  within-­‐‑reach,  which  means  that  P0   is  able   to   invoke  them.  
The   example   also   includes   a   consumer   (C),   which   represents   the   users   of   the  
infrastructure   that   can   be   persons,   organizations   or   even   other   systems.   In   this  
specific  case,  C   is  a  consumer  that  uses  services  S1,  S2,  S0.5  and  S0.6.  The  cloud  (?)  
represents  parts  of  the  system  about  which  P0  has  no  information,  but  that  may  be  




Figure  3.1  –  Reference  Service-­‐‑Based  Infrastructure.    
Simplified  representation  of  the  most  important  concepts  and  components  on  service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures  needed  to  better  understand  the  present  work.  
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  this  is  a  simplified  representation  of  a  service-­‐‑based  
infrastructure,   and   thus   there   are   some   key   observations   that   should   to   be  made.  
First,   service-­‐‑based   infrastructures   are   frequently   much   more   complex   than   the  
represented  one.  However,  in  order  to  maintain  the  analysis  feasible,  we  decided  to  
keep   the   representation   as   simple   and   clear   as   possible.   Second,   no   service   bus   is  
represented,  which  does  not  mean  that  the  services  are  connected  in  a  point-­‐‑to-­‐‑point  
basis.  We   opted   by   not   representing   a   service   bus   because   it   is   not   an   important  
point  for  our  work  (we  just  need  to  know  the  interfaces  of  services  and  that  they  may  
be  inter-­‐‑connected).  Finally,  service-­‐‑based  environments  are  dynamic,  meaning  that  
they  can  change  over  time,  which  we  opted  not  to  represent  in  the  figure  but  that  is  
important   for   our   work,   as   it   makes   testing   a   continuous   and   difficult   process,  
requiring  tools  to  cope  with  such  evolution.    
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 Specific	  Characteristics	  of	  Web	  Services	  3.1.1
A   Web   Service   delivers   some   business   functionality   in   a   protocol-­‐‑independent  
distributed  environment  through  a  standardized  interface,  which  allows  the  service  
to   be   used   independently   from   the   implementation.   There   are   several   specificities  
that  distinguish  web  services  from  other  web  applications.  These  should  be  kept  in  
mind   by   researchers   and   developers   when   talking   about   detecting   security  
vulnerabilities,  and  include:  
• Web   services   are   reusable   components   that   deliver   business   functionalities  
in   an   efficient  way  within   a   protocol-­‐‑independent   distributed   environment  
through  a  standardized   interface.  The  reusability  allows   them  to  be  applied  
in   different   business   processes   while   their   standardized   interface   enables  
access   to   be   independent   from   implementation   specificities.   This   way,   any  
problem  in  a  web  service  may  affect  the  organization  in  multiple  ways.  
• Web  services  have  a  well-­‐‑defined  interface.  This  is  mostly  a  positive  aspect,  
as   it   avoids   the   need   for   a   crawling/learning   phase   (required   by   some  
vulnerability   detection   approaches   to   learn   the   interface   of   a   web  
application),  but  makes  it  easier  to  mask  information  about  internal  problems  
of   the   application   (internal   errors,   exceptions   raised,   etc.).   This   can   be   a  
limiting  factor,  as  it  reduces  the  available  information  (e.g.  compared  to  what  
testing  tools  can  extract  from  the  service’  responses  during  crawling).    
• Web   services   may   include   several   operations,   as   defined   in   the   service  
interface.  Each  operation  includes  several  input  and  output  parameters,  that  
have  a  data  type.  The  data  types  may  be  simple  or  complex.  Besides  the  data  
type,   each   input  parameter  may  have  a  domain   that  may  be  defined   in   the  
interface   or   not.   When   defined   in   the   interface,   the   input   domain   allows  
improving  the  interoperability  of  the  service.  
• Web   services   must   be   autonomous   and   self-­‐‑contained,   coarse-­‐‑grained   and  
loosely   coupled,   allowing  multiple   functionalities   without   adding   design  
complexity   or   increasing   communication.   In   fact,   web   services   should  
represent   an   effective   way   for   reducing   the   complexity   and   overhead   that  
comes   with   custom-­‐‑coded   interfaces   allowing   at   the   same   time   efficiently  
managing  changes  and  evolution.  
• The   interoperability   and   reduced   dependency   among   services   not   only  
facilitates   their   replacement   or   modification   (without   requiring   changes   in  
other   parts   of   the   system),   but   also   requires   vulnerability   detection   to   be  
effective   (i.e.   conducted   in   reduced   times   in   order   to   not   delay   the  




• In  many  situations,  the  user  that  needs  to  test  the  security  of  a  web  service  is  
not   its   owner,   thus   cannot   access   its   internals   (a   requisite   for   some  
vulnerability   detection   techniques).   A   common   example   of   this   scenario   is  
when   a   consumer   has   to   select   a   service   from   a   multitude   of   alternatives  
provided  by  third  parties.    
Although  the  characteristics  above  are  common  to  services  implemented  in  different  
kinds  of  technology,  there  is  one  key  technology-­‐‑dependent  difference:  RESTful  web  
services  do  not  always  have  a  well  defined  and  machine  readable  description,  while  
SOAP   web   services   do.   In   fact,   although   WADL   constitutes   a   clearly   structured,  
detailed  and  extensible   format   to  describe  web  applications,   it  does  not  seem  to  be  
widely  adopted  by  developers,  probably  due  to  its  perceived  complexity  (Kopecky,  
Gomadam,  and  Vitvar   2008).  This  way,   in  most   cases  RESTful   service  descriptions  
remain   as   unstructured   text   (Kopecky,   Gomadam,   and   Vitvar   2008).   On   the   other  
hand,  SOAP  web  services  are  required  to  have  a  WSDL  file  describing  its  interface,  
increasing  interoperability  and  fostering  adoption.  
 Challenges	  in	  Service-­‐Based	  Infrastructures	  3.1.2
Although  the  problem  of  security  testing  of  software  services  has  been  addressed  in  
the  past  (see  Section  2.3),  most  of  the  existing  works  focus  on  testing  a  single  service  
at   a   time,   disregarding   key   characteristics   of   service-­‐‑based   environments.   In   fact,  
several   challenges   are   raised   when   considering   security   testing   in   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures  and  SOAs:  
• It  is  necessary  to  consider  interactions  between  services  and  other  resources  
or  services.  Thus,  besides   testing  each  service  offline  and   individually   from  
each   other,   testing   tool   should   take   into   account   the   overall   architecture   of  
the   infrastructure.   In  practice   it,   is   necessary   to   test   all   the   interfaces   of   the  
services,   including   the   ones   between   a   service   and   the   resources   and   other  
services   used   (contrarily   to   black-­‐‑box   techniques   that   focus   only   on   the  
interface  between  the  service  and  the  external  user).  
• Service-­‐‑based   infrastructures  are  usually  built  using  services   that  are  under  
the  control  of  multiple  providers,  creating  the  need  for  testing  tools  that  can  
cope   with   different   levels   of   available   information   and   different   levels   of  
access  (e.g.  the  source  code  may  be  available  or  not).    
• The  services  under  control  of  an  organization  may  invoke  services  that  were  
developed   internally   or   externally   by   a   third   party.   Service   consumers   are  
not   necessarily   end-­‐‑user   applications,   but   can   also   be   portals,   internal   or  
external   systems,   or   composite   services,  making   use   of   other   services.   This  
creates   the   need   for   tools   that   cope   with   different   levels   of   access   and  
information  to  the  services.  
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• SOAs  are  dynamic  in  nature,  facing  changes  related  to  services  being  added,  
removed  or  updated  (i.e.  new  versions  are  deployed),  as  well  as  related  to  the  
way   services   interact   with   each   other.   This   brings   the   need   for   automated  
approaches   able   to   continuously  monitor   and   test   the  whole   architecture   in  
an  automated  way.    
• Frequently,  the  third-­‐‑party  services  to  be  invoked  are  only  known  at  runtime  
using   directory   services   (or   brokers).   These   brokers   allow   the   consumer   to  
find   the   services   that   fulfill   some   kind   of   criteria   or   set   of   functionalities.  
However,   it   is   the   consumer’s   responsibility   to   check   whether   the   offered  
service  meets  the  desired  security  requirements.  This  creates  a  need  for  tools  
that  detect  changes  at  runtime  and  discover  new  services  to  be  tested.  
 Web	  Services	  Testing	  Scenarios	  3.1.3
Knowing   both   the   specificities   of   web   services   and   the   challenges   of   detecting  
software  vulnerabilities   in   service-­‐‑based   infrastructures   in  general,  we   can   identify  
distinct   testing   scenarios   representing   the   information   and   level   of   access   that   the  
user   can   have   to   each   service.   In   the   context   of   this   work   three   scenarios   are  
envisaged:    
1) Services  under  control:  a  service  is  under  control  and  also  the  resources  that  it  
uses   are   known,   like   in   the   case   of   S3   in   Figure   3.1.   This   service   uses   only  
services   and   resources   owned   by   the   provider   P0   to   complete   its   business  
functionality.   It   is   possible   to   use   all   kinds   of   vulnerability   detection  
techniques,   including   the   ones   that   require   access   to   the   source   code   (e.g.  
static  analysis).    
2) Services  partially  under   control:   a   service   is   under   control   but   some   of   the  
resources   that   it   uses   are   not,   like   in   the   case   of   S2   in   Figure   3.1   (it   uses  
resource   R2   that   is   not   under   control).   In   practice,   this   service   requires  
services  and/or  resources  that  are  not  owned  by  the  provider  P0  to  complete  
its   business   functionality.   In   this   case,   it  may   not   be   possible   to   access   the  
source   code   (e.g.   in   the   case   of   legacy   systems   or   systems   based   in   off-­‐‑the-­‐‑
shelf   components).  However,   all   the   interfaces   between   the   service   and   the  
external   environment   are   known,   which   allows   one   to   obtain   relevant  
information   about   input   domains   and   about   the   use   of   external   resources.  
This   allows   using   techniques   that   take   advantage   of   such   information   (e.g.  
techniques  based  on  interface  monitoring).  
3) Services  within  reach:  a  service  is  within  reach  but  not  under  control,  like  in  
the  case  of  S1  in  Figure  3.1.  This  means  that  provider  P0  is  able  to  invoke  this  
service,  but  not  to  control  it  (e.g.  has  no  access  or  detailed  information  about  
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the   service).  As   it   is   not  possible   to   access   the   internals   of   the   service,   only  
black-­‐‑box   testing   techniques   can   be   used.   This   scenario   also   represents   the  
typical  point-­‐‑of-­‐‑view  of  the  consumer.  
The  cloud  identified  with  a  question  mark  (?)  represents  services  and  resources  that  
are  unknown  to  provider  P0,  but  may  be  used  by  other  within-­‐‑reach  services,  like  in  
the   case   of   S1   in   Figure   3.1.   The   provider   has   no   access   to   the   internals   of  within  
reach   services   and,   consequently,   he   has   no   information   about   the   unknown  
services.  
As  mentioned  before,   these  scenarios  call   for  a  solution  based  on  effective  tools   for  
vulnerability   detection   that   are   supported   by   innovative   techniques   that   take   into  
account   the   different   access   conditions   to   the   services   under   testing.   In   order   to  
tackle   the   characteristics   of   service-­‐‑based   infrastructure,   these   techniques   may   be  
integrated  into  an  iterative  testing  process  that  monitors,  discovers  and  tests  services  
at   runtime.  However,   applying   this  kind  of   approach  after  deployment   raises  new  
problems,  including  the  impact  of  the  testing  in  services  that  are  running,  and  failure  
propagation,  for  which  different  works  proposed  and  studied  alternative  supporting  
techniques  such  as  sandboxing,  virtualization,  etc.  For   instance,  past  works  tried  to  
overcome   this  difficulty  by   testing  copies  of   services,   avoiding   service  degradation  
and   error   propagation   caused   by   the   testing   activity   (Ceccarelli,   Vieira,   and  
Bondavalli  2011b).  Another  approach  is  virtualizing  the  services  under  testing  as  in  
(Michelsen   and   English   2012).   Although   this   is   a   very   important   challenge,   these  
concerns   are   out   of   the   scope   of   this   work   and   thus,   we   rely   on   other   works   to  
provide  the  required  support  for  the  testing  process.    
3.2 Designing	  Vulnerability	  Detection	  Tools	  for	  Web	  
Services	  
Research   and   practice   shows   that   state-­‐‑of-­‐‑the-­‐‑art   scanners   frequently   present   low  
effectiveness  both  in  terms  of  vulnerability  coverage  and  false  positive  rates  (Vieira,  
Antunes,  and  Madeira  2009;  Fonseca,  Vieira,  and  Madeira  2007).  The  main  problem  
is   that  most  of   these   tools   try   to  be  as  generic  as  possible   (to  detect  many   types  of  
vulnerabilities),  but  are  typically  very  limited  in  terms  of  the  detection  approaches  
they  implement  for  each  vulnerability  type  and  do  not  take  advantage  of  the  specific  
access  conditions  to  the  target  services.  
Building  effective  tools  demands  for  innovative  techniques  that  take  into  account  the  
different  access  conditions  to  the  services  under  testing  (i.e.  that  consider  the  testing  
scenarios   presented   in   Section   3.1.3).   For   example,   if   one   has   access   to   the   web  
service   interfaces   (e.g.  Scenario  2),   including   interfaces  with  external   resources   like  
other   services   or   databases,   then   an   improved   technique   based   on   interface  
Framework  for  the  Detection  of  Vulnerabilities  in  Service-­‐‑Based  Infrastructures  
   49  
monitoring  may  be  used  in  detriment  of  traditional  penetration  testing.  Furthermore,  
we   argue   that   vulnerability   detection   tools   should   implement   a   procedure   that  
supports   the   design   of   standardized   and   modular   tools,   based   on   multiple  
components   implementing   specific   features   in   a   decoupled  manner,   thus   allowing  
for  easily  designing  and  later  improving  the  tool.  
This   section   proposes   a   generic   approach   for   designing   vulnerability   detection  
tools   for   web   services.   The   approach   defines   the   components   and   the   testing  
procedure   that   a   tool   should   implement.   The   components   include   a   workload  
emulator  (responsible  for  generating  and  executing  a  set  of  requests   to  exercise   the  
web  service),  an  attack  emulator  (in  charge  of  generating  and  injecting  requests  that  
simulate   attacks),   a   service  monitor   (in   charge   of   instrumenting   the   service   under  
testing,   if   needed,   and   collecting   relevant   information   to   support   vulnerabilities  
identification),   and  a  vulnerability  detector   (responsible   for  analyzing   the   collected  
information   and   identify   vulnerabilities,   and   for   running   the   testing   procedure).  
Figure  3.2  depicts  these  components,  and  the  relation  among  them  and  with  a  web  
service  under  testing.    
As   it   is   possible   to   observe,   the  workload   emulator   and   the   attack   emulator  work  
together   to   create   and   submit   attacks,   the   vulnerability   detector   uses   knowledge  
about   the   attacks   and   information   collected   from   the   web   service   to   identify  
vulnerabilities,  and  the  service  monitor  is  in  charge  of  instrumenting  the  web  service  
and  collecting  information  to  feed  the  vulnerability  detector  (the  type  of  information  
collected   depends   on   the   vulnerabilities   being   detected   and   on   the   detection  
technique   used).   The   vulnerability   detector   is   also   in   charge   of   implementing   the  
testing  procedure  by  coordinating  the  remaining  components.  
Due  to  the  high  diversity  of  web  services  technologies,  types  of  vulnerabilities,  and  
vulnerability  detection  approaches,  designing  an  effective  tool  requires  focusing  on  a  
well-­‐‑defined  domain.  In  fact,  the  division  of  the  spectrum  into  well-­‐‑defined  areas  is  
necessary   to   better   support  decisions  during   the  definition  of   the   components   and  
procedure.  In  this  context,  the  definition  of  the  tool  domain  includes  selecting:    
• The   class   of  web   services   (e.g.   SOAP,   REST),  which   allows   understanding  
the  characteristics  of  the  services  that  will  be  tested.  
• The   types   of   vulnerabilities   (e.g.   SQL   Injection,   XPath   Injection,   file  
execution)  that  should  be  detected  by  the  tool.  
• The   vulnerability   detection   approach   (e.g.   penetration   testing,   anomaly  





WE Workload Emulator 
    User input  
 WG Workload generator 
 WI Workload injector 
 WG Ext. External workload generator 
AE Attack Emulator 
 AG Attack generator 
 AI Attack injector 
 AG Ext. External attack generator 
VD Vulnerability detection module 
  TD Testing driver 
 VI Vulnerability identifier 
R Vulnerabilities detected 
SM Service monitor 
 IC Information collector  
 SI Service instrumentation 
 IM Information manager 
SP Service Provider 
 WS Web Service under test 
R0 XML database 
 R1  Payment gateway 
 R2 Database 
 R3 FTP server 
--- Optional elements or connections 
Figure  3.2  –  Design  of  a  web  service  vulnerability  detection  tool.  
Generic  interactions  between  the  modules  and  also  with  the  web  service.  Some  of  the  
presented  modules  are  optional,  as  it  will  be  possible  to  observe  in  other  related  figures.  
The   next   subsections   detail   the   proposed   components.   The   testing   procedure   is  
discussed  together  with  the  vulnerability  detector  component.  Note  that  the  goal  of  
this  section  is  not  to  design  a  specific  tool  (that  is  done  in  Chapter  4),  but  to  define  an  
approach   that   can   be   used   to   design   tools   for   detecting   vulnerabilities   in   web  
services.  
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 Workload	  Emulator	  3.2.1
The  workload   emulator   (WE)   component   is   in   charge   of   generating   a   set   of   valid  
requests.  These  requests  will  be  used  by   the  attack   injector   to  generate  attacks,  but  
can  also  be  executed  in  the  absence  of  attacks  to  exercise  each  operation  of  the  web  
service  under  testing  and  thus  understanding  its  typical  behavior.  The  WE  includes  
two  elements:  a  workload  generator  and  a  workload  injector.  
The  workload  generator  (WG)  starts  by  obtaining  the  required  definitions  about  the  
web   service   under   testing.   As  mentioned   before,   we   assume   that   the   web   service  
interface   is   described   in   a   descriptor   file   (e.g.  WSDL,  WADL)   (D.  A  Chappell   and  
Jewell  2002;  Richardson  and  Ruby  2007),  which  should  be  processed  to  obtain  the  list  
of   operations,   parameters   (including   return   values),   and   associated   data   types.  
However,   as   in   most   cases   the   valid   values   for   each   parameter   (i.e.   the   domain  
restrictions  of   the  parameter)   are  not   available   in   that   file   and  associated   schemas,  
the   user   should   be   allowed   to   provide   additional   information   about   the   valid  
domains  for  each  parameter  (including  for  parameters  based  on  complex  data  types,  
which  are  composed  by  a   set  of   individual  parameters).  Note   that,   for  web  service  
operations  with   several   input   parameters,   the   valid  domain   for   a   given  parameter  
may   be  dependent   on   the   value   specified   for   another   parameter   (e.g.   for   a   service  
that  has  the  parameters  “country”  and  “city”,  the  domain  of  the  city  depends  on  the  
country,  which  must  also  be  specified).    
A  workload  (set  of  valid  web  service  calls)  should  then  be  generated  to  exercise  each  
operation  of   the  web  service  under   testing.  As   it   is  not  possible   to  define  a  generic  
workload   that   fits   all  web   services,   a   specific  workload   is   needed   for   each   service  
under  testing.  A  vulnerability  detector  may  provide  more  than  one  way  to  generate  
the  workload,   thus  offering  to  the  user   the  option  of  selecting  the  one  that  best   fits  
his   requirements.   Usually,   three   alternatives   are   available   for   implementing   the  
workload  generation:  
• Use   a   user-­‐‑defined   workload   generator:   in   this   case   the   user   of   the   tool  
should   implement  a  generation   component  based  on   the  knowledge  he  has  
about   the   service   being   tested.   The   workload   emulator   should   provide   an  
easy  way  for  integrating  this  generation  component,  which  needs  to  interact  
with  the  workload  injector  (in  charge  of  submitting  the  workload  requests  to  
the  services  under  testing)  and  with  the  attack  generator  (that  creates  attacks  
based   on   the   workload   requests   in   an   educated   manner,   as   described   in  
Section  3.2.2).    
• Use   the   functions   of   an   existing   vulnerability   scanner:   consists   of  
supporting   the   integration   of   external   tools   in   a   similar   way   to   the   user-­‐‑
defined  workload.  A  key  aspect   is   that   in   this   case  we  are  not   interested   in  
the  attack  generation  and  vulnerability  detection  capabilities  of  such  tool  (this  
will   be   addressed   later   in   the   design   of   the   attack   injector   and   of   the  
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vulnerability   detector),   but   only   on   interface   identification   and   workload  
generation  features.  Also  note  that  selecting  an  existing  vulnerability  scanner  
to  provide  this  feature  may  not  be  an  easy  task  as,  depending  on  the  type  of  
vulnerabilities  to  detect  and  on  the  detection  approach  to  implement,  existing  
scanners   may   be   limited   in   the   support   they   provide   (thus   such   selection  
process  is  of  utmost  importance).  
• Include  a  workload  generator  module  in  the  tool:  several  approaches  can  be  
used   for   generating   web   service   requests,   including   (see   Section   2.4.1   for  
details  on  these  approaches):  deterministic  generation  (e.g.  based  on  constant  
values,   step   functions,  values   shuffling,   etc.),   stochastic  methods   (e.g.  based  
on   uniformly   distributed   random   values,   random   values   added   by   a   step  
function,   and   Gaussian,   Poisson,   or   exponential   distributions),   and   hybrid  
approaches  (a  combination  of  multiple  approaches).  As  the  goal  is  to  generate  
(valid)  requests  that  adequately  exercise  the  services  under  testing  (i.e.  allow  
achieving  a  high  coverage  of  the  code  under  testing),  this  process  should  take  
into   account   the   web   service   definitions   mentioned   above.   It   is   also   of  
extreme   importance   to   design   a   workload   generator   that   satisfies   the  
requirements   in   terms   of   the   target   vulnerabilities   and   of   the   detection  
approach  being  implemented.  
The  workload  injector  (WI)  component  takes  the  workload  generated  and  submits  it  
to  the  web  service.  This  is  an  optional  element,  as  some  approaches  may  not  require  
the  execution  of  a  workload.  For  example,  classical  penetration  testing  is  based  only  
on   the   execution   of   the   penetration   tests.   On   the   other   hand,   anomaly   detection  
approaches   require   a   training   phase,   thus   a   workload   execution   is   required.   A  
feature   that   may   be   added   to   the   workload   injector   is   code   coverage   analysis  
(Doliner   2006;   Atlassian   2010).   The   idea   is   that   in   the   cases  where   source   code   or  
bytecode   is   available,   code   coverage   can   be   used   to   drive   the   generation   of   the  
workload   requests.   To   obtain   such   a   code   coverage   value   a   tool   that   analyzes   the  
execution  profile   of   the  web   service  during   the   execution   of   the  workload  may  be  
used   (e.g.   Cobertura   (Doliner   2006),   Clover(Atlassian   2010),   etc.).   As   the  
completeness  of  code  coverage  is  always  relative  to  a  specific  population  of  possible  
test   cases,   many   metrics   are   available,   including   Line   coverage,   Branch   coverage,  
Path  coverage,  Loop  coverage,  among  others  (Kaner  1996).  The  calculated  coverage  
value  should  be  used  to  decide  if  more  requests  are  needed  to  increase  coverage.  In  
such   case,   the   injector   component   should   ask   the   generator   component   to   create  
additional  requests.  
 Attack	  Emulator	  3.2.2
The  attack  emulator  (AE)  component  is  in  charge  of  automatically  generating  attacks  
and  of   submitting   them  to   the  web  services  under   testing.  For   this,   it   includes   two  
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elements:   an   attack   generator,   in   charge   of   creating   attacks,   and   an   attack   injector,  
responsible  for  submitting  those  attacks.  
Two  alternatives  can  be  considered  for  implementing  the  attack  generator  (AG):    
• Use   the   functions   of   an   external   vulnerability   scanner:   this   consists   of  
supporting  the  integration  of  external  generators  in  a  similar  way  to  what  is  
done   for   the   workload   generation   (see   previous   subsection).   As   before,  
selecting   an   adequate   external   attack   generator   may   be   difficult,   because  
existing   tools   may   not   implement   the   testing   strategies   required   to  
successfully  implementing  a  given  vulnerability  detection  approach.    
• Include   an   attack   generator   module   in   the   tool:   this   module   takes   the  
workload   and   replaces   valid   values   by   malicious   ones   following   a   set   of  
mutation  rules  (see  Table  3.1  for  examples  of  typical  mutation  rules  for  SQL  
Injection  and  XPath  Injection).  Obviously,   the  mutation  rules  depend  on  the  
type   of   vulnerabilities   to   detect   and   should   be   as   complete   as   possible   in  
order   to   achieve   high   detection   coverage.   This   way,   defining   the   set   of  
mutation   rules   is   a   complex   task   that   should   consider   multiple   sources   of  
information,   including   information   on   how   existing   tools  work,   knowledge  
on  previous  successful  attack  attempts  in  the  field,  and  scientific  references.  
Table  3.1  –  Examples  of  SQL/XPath  Injection  attack  types.  
The  attack  generator  module  should  use  this  type  of  rules  to  mutate  the  workload  elements  
into  attacks.  
SQL/XPath  Injection  mutation  rules  
" or 1=1 -- 
" or 1=1 or ""=" 
' or (EXISTS) 
' or uname like '% 
' or userid like '% 
' or username like '% 
' UNION ALL SELECT 
' UNION SELECT 
char%2839%29%2b%28SELECT 
&quot; or 1=1 or &quot;&quot;=&quot; 
&apos; or &apos;&apos;=&apos; 
Although   the   process   of   generating   the   attacks   may   depend   on   the   vulnerability  
detection   technique,  we  propose   a  generic  procedure  whose  goal   is   to   support   the  
design  of  generation  approaches  capable  of  creating  comprehensive  sets  of  attacks.  
As  shown  in  Figure  3.3,  such  procedure  includes  several  phases,  where  each  phase  
focuses  on  generating  malicious  calls  that  target  a  given  operation  of  the  web  service  
and  includes  a  set  of  steps.  Each  step  targets  a  specific  parameter  of   the  operation,  
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and  comprises  several  attack  sets.  An  attack  set  includes  the  attacks  to  be  performed  
over   a   given   parameter,   which   are   generated   by   applying   the   mutation   rules  
mentioned  before.  Obviously,   the  same  mutation  rule  may  be  applied  one  or  more  
times  over   the   same   input  parameter   in  order   to   increase   the   code  coverage  of   the  
tests   (as   the   requests   of   the  workload  may   use   different   values   for   the   remaining  
parameters).    
The  attack  injector  (AI)  component  is  in  charge  of  submitting  the  generated  attacks  
to   the  web   service   under   testing.   If   an   external   attack   generator   is   used,   then   the  
injector  should  provide  the  required  integration  interfaces.  Similarly  to  the  workload  
injector,   the   attack   injector   may   also   support   coverage   analysis   features,   whose  
output  can  be  used  to  drive  the  generation  of  additional  attacks.  
Operation	  1 Operation	  2 Operation	  N...
Parameter	  1 Parameter	  2 Parameter	  N...





Figure  3.3  –  Generic  process  for  generating  the  attacks.  
Workload  elements  are  used  to  generate  attacks  based  on  attack  mutation  rules.  Only  one  
parameter  is  attacked  at  a  time.  
 Service	  Monitor	  3.2.3
To  identify  vulnerabilities  we  need  to  collect  as  much  information  as  possible  about  
the  behavior  of  the  web  services  under  testing  (this  information  is  later  used  by  the  
vulnerability  detector  component).  Obviously,  the  information  that  can  be  collected  
depends  on  the  access  conditions  to  the  target  web  services.  In  fact,  as  explained  in  
Section  3.1,  these  environments  are  based  on  services  that  can  be  under  the  control  of  
multiple   providers,   and   the   users   of   the   testing   tool   may   have   different   types   of  
access  to  the  services  to  be  tested  (i.e.  services  may  be  within  reach,  partially  under  
control,  or  under  control).  
Each  vulnerability  detection   technique  has   its   specific   requirements   in   terms  of   the  
information   needed,   but   the  most   basic   information   are   the  web   services   requests  
and  corresponding  responses  (to  both  workload  requests  and  attacks).  In  the  case  of  
more   advanced   approaches,   additional   information  may   be   related   to   the   internal  
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functioning   of   the  web   service,   to   the  web   services   interfaces   (including   interfaces  
with  external  resources  like  other  services  and  databases),  etc.  This  way,  the  service  
monitor   should   be   able   to   instrument   the   target   services   in   a   way   that   allows  
collecting  the  required  information,  in  the  less  intrusive  way  possible.  Depending  on  
the  type  of  information  needed  and  on  the  level  of  access  to  the  internals  of  the  web  
service,  there  are  multiple  options  to  monitor  web  services.  Some  examples  are:  
• Network  packet  sniffing:   consists  of   reading  each  packet   as   it   flows  across  
the   network.   Packet   sniffers   usually   work   by   setting   the   network   interface  
into  a  mode  in  which  it  captures  all   traffic  (Fuentes  and  Kar  2005).  Multiple  
tools   and   libraries   are   available   to   perform   packet   sniffing,   for   instance  
Tcpdump  &  Libcap  (Fuentes  and  Kar  2005);  
• Use  a  proxy:  a  proxy  is  a  relay  for  requests.  The  clients  send  the  requests  to  
the   proxy,   which   then   forwards   them   to   the   destination   server,   whose  
response  is  also  sent  to  the  proxy  before  being  forward  to  the  client.  During  
this  process,  the  proxy  is  able  to  read  and  modify  the  requests  and  responses.  
An  example  of  a  HTTP  proxy  implemented  in  Java  is  LittleProxy  (LittleShoot  
2010);  
• Driver   instrumentation:   when   the   interface   to   be   monitored   is   accessed  
through   a   driver   (e.g.   Java   applications   use   JDBC   drivers   to   access   the  
database   server),   this   driver   can   be   instrumented   to   include   monitoring  
facilities.   In   most   cases,   this   can   be   achieved   using   Aspect-­‐‑Oriented  
Programming  (AOP)  (Kiczales  et  al.  2002).    
Obviously,   the   driver   instrumentation   technique   is   more   intrusive   than   the   other  
two,   but   the  modifications   can   be   easily   done   outside   the   core   of   the   applications  
being   tested.   In   fact,   it   is   possible   to   create   an   instrumented   version   of   a   specific  
driver   that   can   then   be   used   by   different   applications.   Nevertheless,   one  must   be  
extremely  careful   in  order  not   to   introduce  bugs   in  the   instrumented  driver  during  
this   process.   On   the   other   hand,   although   network   packet   sniffing   is   the   least  
intrusive,   it   is   the   most   difficult   to   implement:   it   needs   to   filter   the   packets   and  
reconstruct   the   information   that   to   be   monitored.   Finally,   using   proxies   is   less  
intrusive  than  applying  driver  instrumentation,  and  less  complex  to  implement  than  
network   packet   sniffing.   However,   it   still   requires   the   development   of   different  
proxies  for  different  technologies.  
The   service   monitor   (SM)   component   may   be   composed   of   three   components:  
service  instrumentation  (SI),  an  optional  component  in  charge  of  instrumenting  the  
service   under   testing,   as   needed;   information   collector   (IC),   responsible   for  
collecting   the   information   during   the   execution   of   the   tests;   and   information  
manager  (IM),  responsible  for  storing  the  collected  information  in  a  database  and  for  
providing  that  information  to  the  vulnerability  detector  component  when  required.    
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 Vulnerability	  Detector	  3.2.4
The   vulnerability   detector   (VD)   is   in   charge   of   processing   and   correlating   the  
information  collected  to  detect  vulnerabilities.  This  component  is  probably  the  most  
critical  one  and  should  be  able  to  identify  as  much  vulnerabilities  as  possible  (based  
on   the   available   information),   while   minimizing   the   number   of   false   positives  
reported.  As  mentioned  before,  in  addition  to  the  traditional  analysis  of  requests  and  
responses   (applied   in   classical   penetration   testing),   vulnerability   detection   can   be  
based   on  more   elaborated   approaches   such   as   interface  monitoring   (Antunes   and  
Vieira  2011),  anomaly  detection  (Antunes  et  al.  2009a),  etc.   (what   is   important   is   to  
apply  techniques  that  adequately  take  advantage  of  the  available   information).  The  
vulnerability  detector  is  also  the  component  responsible  for  managing  all  the  tests  by  
implementing   the   testing   procedure,   which   is   achieved   by   orchestrating   the  
components   presented   before.   This   way,   two   elements   should   be   included   in   the  
detector:  the  vulnerability  identifier  (VI)  and  the  testing  driver  (TD).  We  propose  to  
keep  these  two  elements  inside  the  same  component  as  the  testing  procedure  and  the  
vulnerability   detection   approach   greatly   influence   each   other   and   are   highly  
dependent  on  the  vulnerability  detection  technique  being  implemented.  
A  key  aspect  is  that  the  testing  procedure  should  be  as  standard  as  possible  in  order  
to  guarantee  exhaustive  testing  and  high  vulnerability  detection  coverage.  Although  
such  procedure  depends  on  the  specificities  of  the  detection  technique,  in  Figure  3.4  
we   present   an   overview   of   the   generic   approach   we   propose.   As   shown,   the  
procedure   includes   four   phases:   1)   web   service   instrumentation,   2)   workload  
execution,  3)  attack,  and  4)  vulnerability  detection.  





  Information used in vulnerability detection 
----  Optional elements or connections 
Figure  3.4  –  Proposed  generic  testing  procedure.  
Procedure  and  flow  of  information  used  in  the  detection  phase.  Different  information  is  used  
by  different  techniques.  
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In   the  web  service  instrumentation  phase   the  service  monitor  component   is  asked  
to   instrument   the   web   service   under   testing   in   a   way   that   allows   gathering   the  
required  information.  Obviously,  as  service  instrumentation  may  not  be  required  in  
some   techniques,   this   phase   is   optional.   For   example,   in   the   case   of   classical  
penetration   testing,   the   only   information   needed   is   web   service   requests   and  
responses,   whose   collection   does   not   require   any   particular   instrumentation   (this  
information   is   automatically   provided   by   the  workload   injector   and   by   the   attack  
injector).  
The  workload  execution  phase  consists  of  generating  and  submitting  the  workload  
requests.  This  phase   is   also  optional   as   running  a  workload  may  not  be  needed   in  
some  cases.  For  example,  classical  penetration  testing  does  not  require  the  execution  
of   the   workload,   but   only   the   injection   of   the   attacks.   On   the   other   hand,   more  
advanced   techniques   need   to   learn   the   behavior   of   the   applications   during   the  
workload   execution   for   later   detecting   vulnerabilities   to   attacks   that   otherwise  
would   not   be   detectable   (e.g.   blind   injection   attacks   (W.   G.   Halfond,   Viegas,   and  
Orso   2006)).   In   practice,   the   workload   execution   phase   consists   of   using   the  
workload   generator   component   for   generating   requests   and   the  workload   injector  
component  for  submitting  them.  The  goal  is  to  allow  the  service  monitor  component  
to  gather  information  on  the  behavior  of  the  web  service  in  the  absence  of  attacks.  
During  the  attack  phase  the  attacks  are  generated  and  submitted  to  the  web  service.  
In   practice,   it   consists   of   using   the   attacks   generator   component   for   generating  
attacks  and  the  attacks  injector  component  for  submitting  those  attacks.  During  this  
process,   the   service   monitor   gathers   information   about   the   behavior   of   the   web  
service.   This   information,   combined   with   the   one   collected   during   the   workload  
execution  phase,   should   then  be  used  during   the  vulnerability  detection  phase   to  
identify  vulnerabilities.  
3.3 Integrated	  Approach	  for	  Vulnerability	  Detection	  
Although  the  problem  of  testing  services  for  security  has  been  addressed  in  the  past  
(see  Chapter  2),  most  of  the  existing  works  disregard  key  characteristics  of  service-­‐‑
based   environments.   In   fact,   as   discussed   in   Section   3.1,   several   challenges   are  
raised  when   considering   security   testing   in   this   context   (that   are  not   addressed  by  
traditional   techniques):  SOAs  are  dynamic   in  nature,   facing  changes   in   the  services  
used  and  in  the  way  they  interact;  services  are  usually  under  the  control  of  multiple  
providers,  thus  the  users  of  the  testing  tool  may  have  different  types  of  access  to  the  
services  to  be  tested;  and,  the  service  under  testing  may  interact  with  other  services  
and   resources,   thus   testing   only   the   interface   between   the   external   users   and   the  
service  is  not  sufficient.    
To  address   these  problems,   this  section  proposes  a  generic   integrated  approach  for  
testing  service-­‐‑based  infrastructures  for  vulnerabilities  (an  instance  of  this  approach  
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is  presented  in  Chapter  5,  including  implementation  details).  Designed  in  a  modular  
manner,   the   approach   can   be   easily   implemented   to   support   multiple   types   of  
software   services   and   security   vulnerabilities.   In   practice,   continuous   interface  
monitoring  copes  with  the  dynamicity  of  these  environments  allowing  automatically  
discovering   the  existing   services,   resources  and   interactions.  This  allows  creating  a  
map   of   the   architecture,   which   is   required   for   extensively   testing   the   overall  
infrastructure.  The  approach  considers   the  use  of  different   testing  approaches   (that  
should  be  developed  following  the  approach  proposed  in  Section  3.2),  depending  on  
the   level   of   access   to   each   service   (i.e.   considering   the   scenarios  defined   in  Section  
3.1.3).    
The  proposed  approach   is  depicted   in  Figure  3.5,  being  based   in   three  key  generic  
steps:   1)  Architecture  Description,   3)  Profiling   Interactions   and  3)  Testing  Services.  












Figure  3.5  –  Generic  steps  of  the  vulnerability  detection  approach.  
Sequence  of  high  level  steps  that  may  be  implemented  in  different  ways  and  using  very  
different  technologies.  
The  process  starts  with  a  preliminary  architecture  description  (phase  1:  Architecture  
Description).   In   this   phase,   the   user  must   provide   information   about,   at   least,   the  
services   that  act  as  entry  points   for  accessing   the  system  (these  are   typically  under  
control  services  that  are  available  to  be  used  from  an  user  point-­‐‑of-­‐‑view).  However,  
when  possible,   he  must   also   provide   information   about   other   known   services   and  
resources,  as  well  as   the   relations  between   them  (Service-­‐‑to-­‐‑Service  and  Service-­‐‑to-­‐‑
Resource).  Also,  if  viable,  the  user  should  provide  additional  information  about  the  
valid   domains   for   each   parameter,   including   domain   dependencies   among  
parameters   and   the   definition   of   parameters   based   on   complex   data   types  
(composed  by  a  set  of  individual  parameters).  Note  that,  for  service  operations  with  
several  input  parameters,  the  valid  domain  for  a  given  parameter  may  be  dependent  
on   the   value   specified   for   another   parameter.   This   information   is   important   to  
Framework  for  the  Detection  of  Vulnerabilities  in  Service-­‐‑Based  Infrastructures  
   59  
improve   the   quality   of   the   generated  workloads   and   if   not   provided  may   lead   to  
workloads  that  are  not  able  to  exercise  effectively  the  code  of  the  services  (i.e.  have  
low  code  coverage).  
After   the   input   of   base   information   about   the   services   and   resources   and   their  
locations,   automated   pre-­‐‑processing   should   be   performed   to   discover   gather  
information.   During   the   process,   the   user   may   be   asked   for   complementary  
information  for  services  (e.g.  to  define  which  services  are  under  control,  or  not)  and  
for   resources   (e.g.   to   specify   the   type  of   the   existing   resources).   The  Architecture   is  
thus  a  key  element  to  support  the  vulnerability  testing  process.  In  practice,  it  consists  
of  a  data   structure  capable  of  persistently   store   information  mapping   the  complete  
infrastructure,   and   can   be   implemented   in  many  different  ways,   such   as  metadata  
database,   xml   files,   properties   files,   or   some   proprietary   binary   format   (e.g.   Java  
object   serialization   format   (Gosling   et   al.   2005)).   A   key   aspect   is   that   it   should   be  
continuously  updated  as  the  service-­‐‑based  infrastructure  evolves.    
Using   the  definitions  obtained   in   the  previous  phase,  a   set  of  profiling   interactions  
should  be  generated  and  executed  (phase  2:  Profiling  Interactions).  The  importance  
of   these   interactions   is   twofold.   First,   they   allow   discovering   new   resources   and  
services.   Second,   they   are  used   to   gather   information   for   the   training  phase   of   the  
vulnerability   detection   techniques   that   require   such   training.   In   practice,   profiling  
interactions   consist   of   running   a   set   of   workloads,   one   for   each   of   the   services  
already  mapped  in  the  architecture.    
A   workload   is   a   set   of   invocations   to   the   service   that   simulate   valid   and   non-­‐‑
malicious  usage.  As  mentioned  in  Section  0,  these  invocations  must  be  generated  for  
each  service   in   the   infrastructure,  as   it   is  not  possible   to  define  a  generic  workload  
that  fits  all  services.  Due  to  the  automated  nature  of  the  process,  a  practical  option  is  
to  use  a   random  workload  generator.  Obviously,   the  main  problem  of   the   random  
workload   generation   approach   is   that   the   representativeness   of   the   interactions   is  
not   guaranteed.   However,   defining   correctly   the   input   domains   of   each   service  
allows   generating  more   targeted  workloads   that  may   improve   the   effectiveness   of  
this   phase.   Nevertheless,   easily   integrating   components   that   implement   other  
workload  generation  approaches,  including  real  applications,  should  be  possible.    
The   workloads   are   progressively   submitted   to   the   services,   exercising   the  
infrastructure.   For   each   new   service   discovered   the   respective   workload   must   be  
created.   In   the   case   of   services   that   are   totally   or   partially   under   control,   probes  
should  be  deployed  for  interface  monitoring  before  submitting  the  workload.  These  
probes  will  monitor   the   interface  activity   to  detect   interactions  with  other   (still  not  
mapped)   resources   and   services.   Similarly   to   the   case   of   the   monitor   component  
presented  in  Section  3.2.3,  there  are  multiple  alternatives  to  implement  these  probes,  
including:  network  packet  sniffing,  use  of  proxies  and  driver  instrumentation.    
The  profiling  process  is  finished  when  no  more  services  are  discovered.  Afterwards,  
in   the   testing   phase   (phase   3:   Testing   Services),   the   process   proceeds   to   test   the  
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services   in   order   to   detect   vulnerabilities.   This   should   take   advantage   of  multiple  
vulnerability   detection   techniques,   implemented   following   the   generic   design  
proposed   in   Section   3.2.   As   different   techniques   require   different   types   of  
information   to   implement   the   vulnerability   detection   process   (i.e.   several   testing  
scenarios  exist,  as  discussed  in  Section  3.1.3),  during  this  phase  the  knowledge  about  
the   types   of   access   and   information   provided   by   the   user   is   used   to   rank   the  
applicable   detection   techniques   and   selected   the   ones   to   apply   to   each   service.  
Depending  on  the  configuration,  one  or  more  of  the  highest  ranked  techniques  may  
be   used.   In   other   words,   each   service   should   be   tested   using   the   most   effective  
techniques  according  to  its  testing  scenario.  An  important  aspect  is  that  when  more  
than   one   technique   is   used   to   detect   vulnerabilities,   it   is   necessary   to   deal   with  
contradictory  results,  which  may  appear  as  different  tools  frequently  report  distinct  
vulnerabilities   for   the  same  piece  of  code,   including  tools   that   implement   the  same  
detection  approach  (Vieira,  Antunes,  and  Madeira  2009;  Antunes  and  Vieira  2009a).  
Although  unlikely,  new  services  may  be   found  during   the   testing  process   (most  of  
the   services   are   discovered   during   profiling   phase).   These   services   should   be  
included  in  the  architecture  to  be  also  profiled  and  tested.  Most  probably  these  will  
be  within-­‐‑reach,  as  services  under  control  have  a  high  probability  of  being  detected  
during   the  profiling  phase.  The   testing  process   should   finish  when  all   the   services  
are  tested.    
To  use  this  approach  at  runtime,  besides  the  aforementioned  difficulties  of  dealing  
with  tests  in  services  that  are  running  (e.g.  due  to  failure  propagation),  it  is  necessary  
to  return  periodically  to  the  profiling  phase  to  deal  with  updates  in  the  services  and  
new   services   being   used.   It   is   also   necessary   to   detect   services   that   are  
decommissioned  or  are  not  used  anymore  in  the  infrastructure  (the  deployed  probes  
should  help  identifying  services  that  are  not  used  anymore).    
3.4 Conclusion	  
This   chapter   established   the   framework   for   the   detection   of   software   security  
vulnerabilities  in  service-­‐‑based  infrastructures.  It  presented  the  specificities  of  these  
environments   and   discussed   the   challenges   that   motivate   us   to   propose   such   a  
vulnerability  detection  framework.  This   framework  answers   to   the  requirements  of  
testing  such  infrastructures  and  is  based  on  two  key  ideas.    
The   first   is   a   standardized   and   consistent   approach   to   design   vulnerability  
detection   tools   targeting  web   services.   This   includes   the   architecture   of   such   tool,  
the  generic  approach,  and  a  set  of  well-­‐‑defined  components.  The  approach  provides  
an   integrated   support   for   developing   innovative   and   more   effective   tools   whose  
modularity   allows   iterative   improvements   simply   by   upgrading   each   module   by  
improved  versions  of  themselves.  
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The  second  idea  is  an  integrated  approach  that  is  able  to  continuously  monitor  and  
test  the  infrastructure,  discovering  services  and  resources  in  an  automated  way  and  
testing   them   for   security   vulnerabilities.   This   integrated   approach   uses   tools  
designed   using   the   proposed   approach   for   vulnerability   detection   (although   it   is  
possible  to  use  other  tools,  by  writing  the  required  interface  adapters).  This  way,  has  
the   tools   are   improved   or   new   tools   are   added,   the   effectiveness   of   the   integrated  
approach  also  increases.  
The  proposed   framework   is   generic   and   concrete   instantiations   of   the   components  
are  presented  ahead  in  this  thesis.  Chapter  4  presents  three  different  techniques  for  
detecting  injection  vulnerabilities  in  SOAP  web  services,  designed  using  the  generic  
approach  proposed   in   Section   3.2.   These   techniques   are   later   used   in  Chapter   5   to  
develop  an  instantiation  of  the  integrated  approach  proposed  in  Section  3.3,  focusing  
on   infrastructures   supported  by  SOAP  web   services   and   targeting   the  detection  of  
injection  vulnerabilities.  
An   aspect   that   should   be   emphasized   is   that   using   different   techniques   for  
vulnerability  detection  raises  several  questions  about  how  effective  these  techniques  
are  and  how  can  we  select  the  best  techniques  for  each  scenario.  This  introduces  the  
need   for   techniques   to   assess   and   compare  vulnerability  detection   tools.  This  way,  
Chapter   6   addresses   this   problem   by   proposing   benchmarking   approaches   for  
automated  vulnerability  detection  tools.   In   the  same  way  performance  benchmarks  
have   contributed   to   improve   the   performance   of   systems,  we   believe   that   this   can  
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Chapter	  4	  
Techniques	  for	  Detecting	  
Injection	  Vulnerabilities	  in	  Web	  
Services	  
Vulnerability   detection   tools   are   a   key   instrument   for   development   teams   to   test  
their   services,   but   research   and   practice   show   that   state-­‐‑of-­‐‑the-­‐‑art   vulnerability  
detection   tools   frequently   present   low   effectiveness   both   in   terms   of   vulnerability  
coverage   and   false   positive   rates.   This   low   effectiveness   shows   the   need   for  
innovative   techniques   that   take   into   account   the  different   access   conditions   to   the  
services   under   testing.   Furthermore,   as   presented   in   Chapter   3,   vulnerability  
detection  techniques  should  implement  a  generic  procedure  that  supports  the  design  
of   standardized   and   modular   tools   and   that   provide   improved   efficiency.   By  
implementing  a  tool  based  on  multiple  components  (each  with  a  specific  purpose)  in  
a  decoupled  manner  it  is  easier  to  later  improve  the  tools.  
With   the   high  diversity   of  web   services,   types   of   vulnerabilities,   and   vulnerability  
detection  approaches  available,  designing  effective   techniques  requires   focusing  on  
well-­‐‑defined  domains.   In   fact,   the  division  of   the   spectrum   into  well-­‐‑defined  areas  
allows   making   the   right   decisions   regarding   the   definition   and   design   of   the  
components  and  procedure.  As  mentioned  previously,  in  this  context  the  definition  
of   the  technique  domain   includes   selecting   the   class  of  web  services,   the,   types  of  
vulnerabilities,  and  the  vulnerability  detection  approaches  (see  Section  3.2).  
This   chapter   presents   the   design   of   three   vulnerability   detection   techniques   that  
implement   the  generic  approach  and  components   presented   in   the   in   Section   3.2.  
Regarding   the   domain   of   these   techniques,   the   class   of   web   services   targeted   is  
SOAP   web   services,   while   the   type   of   vulnerabilities   to   be   detected   are   in   the  
Injection  class.  The  vulnerability  detection  approach,  however,  varies  from  technique  
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to   technique.   It   is   important   to   highlight   that   each   technique   is   presented  
individually   and   that   the   integrated   approach  will   be   discussed   in  Chapter   5.   The  
experimental   evaluation   of   tools   that   implement   the   proposed   techniques   is  
presented  and  discussed  together  with  the  case  studies  in  Chapter  7.  
Due   to   the   importance   of   penetration   testing   in   service-­‐‑based   environments,  
particularly   for   the   case   of   services  within   reach   (see   testing   scenario   3   in   Section  
3.1.3)  and  the  clear  limitations  of  existing  tools  (Vieira,  Antunes,  and  Madeira  2009),  
we   first   present   an   improved   penetration   testing   technique.   The   limitation   of   this  
technique  is  that,  although  the  testing  approach  is  based  on  the  execution  of  the  code  
and   on   extensive   workloads   and   attacks,   the   vulnerability   detection   process   still  
consists  on  the  analysis  of  the  web  services  responses,  which  limits  the  visibility  on  
the  internal  behavior  of  the  service.  
To   overcome   the   penetration   testing   limitations,   we   then   present   an   alternative  
technique   that   implements   a   detection   approach   based   on   attack   signatures   and  
interface   monitoring   (Antunes   and   Vieira   2011).   The   approach   goes   further   by  
monitoring  the   interfaces  between  the  web  service  and  the  resources,  which  allows  
using   additional   information   about   the   use   of   the   resources   related   to   the  
vulnerabilities,  achieving  higher  effectiveness.    This  tool  is  particularly  useful  for  the  
case  of  services  partially  under  control  (see  testing  scenario  2  in  Section  3.1.3).  
The   last   technique   proposed   aims   at   achieving   better   results   by   analyzing   the  
internal  behavior  of   the  web  service.  Vulnerability  detection   is  based  on  a   runtime  
anomaly  detection  approach,  which  exercises  the  web  service  for  profiling  its  regular  
internal   behavior   (learning   phase)   and   then   attacks   the   service   (attacking   phase),  
reporting   a   vulnerability   when   some   deviation   is   detected.   Comparing   with   the  
aforementioned   approaches,   it   is   able   to   achieve   better   results   due   to   the   added  
knowledge  about  the  internal  behavior  of  the  application.  This  tool  can  only  be  used  
in  the  case  of  services  under  control  (see  testing  scenario  1  in  Section  3.1.3).  
The   outline   of   this   chapter   is   as   follows.   The   next   section   presents   the   improved  
penetration   testing   technique,   in   particular   the   generic   components   (some   of   them  
used  in  the  other  techniques)  and  procedure  and  the  specific  vulnerability  detection  
mechanism.   Section   4.2   presents   the   attack   signatures   and   interface   monitoring  
technique,  emphasizing   the  new  modules   (compared   to   the   technique  presented   in  
Section   4.1)   and   the   vulnerability   detection   approach.   Section   4.3   presents   the  
technique   based   on   runtime   anomaly   detection,   focusing   on   the   innovative  
components  and  on   the  specific  process   for  vulnerability  detection.  Finally,  Section  
4.4  concludes  the  chapter.  
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4.1 Improved	  Penetration	  Testing	  [IPT-­‐WS]	  
Penetration   testing   is   nowadays   the   technique   most   used   by   web   developers   to  
detect   vulnerabilities   in   their   applications   and   services.   It   consists   of   stressing   the  
application  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  attacker  using  a  black-­‐‑box  approach,  trying  
to   penetrate   it   by   issuing   a   huge   amount   of   tampered   interactions   (Stuttard   and  
Pinto   2007).   This   technique   assumes   particular   relevance   in   the   web   services  
environment,   as   many   times   clients   and   providers   need   to   test   services   without  
having   access   to   the   source   code   (e.g.   when   testing   third-­‐‑party   services),   which  
prevents  the  use  of  more  effective  techniques  that  require  that  access.    
The   technique   proposed   in   this   section   targets   the   detection   of   injection  
vulnerabilities,  particularly  for  services  that  are  within  reach  but  not  under  control  of  
a   provider   (i.e.   Scenario   1   presented   in   Section   3.1.3).   Comparing   to   existing  web  
vulnerability   scanners   based   on   penetration   testing,   our   approach   has   three   key  
improvements:    
1. It  uses  a  representative  workload  to  exercise  the  services  and  understand  the  
expected  behavior  (i.e.  the  typical  responses  in  the  presence  of  valid  inputs);    
2. It   uses   a   more   complete   set   of   attacks.   The   attacks   considered   are   a  
compilation  of  all  the  attacks  performed  by  a  large  set  of  scanners  plus  many  
attack  methods  that  can  be  found  in  the  literature;  and    
3. It  applies  well-­‐‑defined  rules  to  analyze  the  web  services  responses  in  order  to  
improve  coverage  and  reduce  false  positives.  These  rules  include  comparing  
the   responses   obtained   when   using   malicious   inputs   with   the   normal  
responses   (i.e.   responses   in   the  presence  of   a   valid  workload)   and  with   the  
responses   from   classical   robustness   tests   (Vieira,   Laranjeiro,   and   Madeira  
2007).    
Figure  4.1  presents  the  overall  design  of  the  technique.  Obviously,  a  service  monitor  
component   is   not   represented   as   in   penetration   testing   the   monitoring   consists  
simply   in   collecting   web   services   requests   and   responses,   which   are   directly  
provided  by  the  workload  emulator  and  by  the  attacks  emulator.  Also,  information  
about   the   services   and   resources   that   used   is   not   accessible,   thus   they   are   not  
represented.  The  represented  modules  are  detailed  in  the  following  subsections.  
 Workload	  Emulation	  4.1.1
For   generating   the   workload   the   technique   automatically   reads   the   web   service  
definitions  (i.e.  operations,  return  values,  parameters,  data  types,  and  domains)  from  
the  WSDL  file.  As  the  valid  values  for  each  parameter  (i.e.  the  domain  restrictions  of  
the   parameter)   may   not   be   available,   the   user   is   allowed   to   provide   additional  
information   about   the   valid   domains   (including   for   parameters   based   on   complex  
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data   types,   which   are   decomposed   in   a   set   of   individual   parameters).   Table   4.1  
shows  an  example  of  how  the  user  should  specify  the  domains  for  an  example  web  
service   named  ValidateService   that   provides   the   following   operation   to   the   clients:  




WE Workload Emulator 
    User input  
 WG Workload generator 
 WI Workload injector 
AE Attack Emulator 
 AG Attack generator 
 AI Attack injector 
VD Vulnerability detection module 
   TD 4.1.2 Testing driver 
 VI Vulnerability identifier 
R Vulnerabilities detected 
SP Service Provider 
 WS Web Service under test 
--- Optional elements or connections 
Figure  4.1  –  Overall  design  the  improved  penetration  testing  technique.  
This  technique  targets  Injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  services.  
Being  an  approach  based  on  penetration  testing,  some  of  the  modules  depicted  in  Figure  3.2  
are  not  applicable,  thus  they  are  not  presented.    
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Table  4.1  –  Example  of  the  domain  specification  for  each  parameter.    
Example  parameters  that  represent  different  data  types  and  domains.  For  instance,  the  
trackingNumber  must  respect  the  pattern  shown  in  the  third  row  in  the  table.    
Service  Operation  and  Parameter   Parameter  Domain  Definition  
ValidateObject.name 
Type: String  
Min Length: 3 
Max Length: 15 
ValidateObject.date 




Pattern: \u{2} \d{4} \d{4} \d \u{2} 
ValidateObject.number 
Type: Integer  
Min Value: 100000000 
Max Value: 999999999 
Two  options  are  available   for  generating   the  workload.  The   first  option   is   to  use  a  
user-­‐‑defined   workload.   In   this   case,   the   user   should   implement   a   workload  
emulation   component   to   be   integrated   in   our   testing   technique   (the   tool   allows   to  
load   the   workload   from   xml   files   that   respect   a   certain   format;   also,   an   API   is  
provided  to  allow  the  user  to  program  an  adaptor).  To  simplify  the  implementation  
of   the  workload   generator   there   are   several   easy   to   use   client   emulation   tools   like  
soapUI   (eviware   2008)   that   can   be   used.   The   second   option   is   to   use   the   random  
Workload   Generator   (WG)   provided,   which   is   able   to   generate   a   workload  
automatically  by  performing  the  following  steps:  
1. Generate   test   values   for   each   input   parameter:   using   the   web   service  
definitions  mentioned  above,  the  technique  generates  randomly  a  set  of  valid  
input  values  (i.e.  values  in  the  parameter  domain  specified  by  the  user).  The  
number  of  test  values  to  be  generated  is  also  defined  by  the  user.  
2. Generate   test   calls   for   each   operation:   the   technique   creates   a   large   set   of  
calls   for   each  operation.  This   consists   in   the   sum  of   all   combinations  of   the  
test  values  generated  for  all   the  parameters.  For  example,   take  an  operation  
with   5   parameters   (p)   and   10   test   values   (v)   for   each   parameter.   The   total  
number  of  test  calls  is  100000  (i.e.  vp).  
3. Select  test  calls  for  each  operation:  as  it  may  be  unfeasible  to  use  a  workload  
based   on   all   the   test   calls   generated   (e.g.   due   to   time   constraints),   the  
technique  is  able  to  randomly  select  a  subset  of  the  calls.  Obviously,  it   is  up  
to  the  user  to  specify  the  size  of  this  subset,  which  determines  the  final  size  of  
the  workload  to  be  applied  during  the  tests.    
Note  that,  the  main  problem  of  the  random  workload  generation  approach  is  that  the  
representativeness  of  the  web  service  calls  is  not  guaranteed  (although  our  technique  
allows   using   workloads   of   different   sizes   and   randomly   generated   values   are  
Chapter  4  
  68  
enough  in  most  cases).  Thus,  this  approach  should  be  used  only  if  the  user-­‐‑defined  
workload  approach  is  not  possible.  Obviously,  replacing  the  workload  generator  by  
more  advanced  workload  generation  approaches  (as  discussed  in  Section  3.2)  allows  
easily  improving  the  effectiveness  of  the  technique.  After  the  generation  process,  the  
workload   injector   (WI)  executes   the  workload  to  gather   information  about   the  web  
service  typical  responses  (i.e.  responses  obtained  without  injecting  attacks).  
 Attack	  Emulation	  4.1.3
The   IPT-­‐‑WS   technique   includes   an   attack   generator   (AG)   module   that   takes   the  
workload   and   replaces   valid   values   by  malicious   values   one   parameter   at   a   time.  
This   replacement   follows   an   extensive   set   of   mutation   rules   that   is   based   on   the  
compilation   of   the   attacks   used   by   a   large   set   of   scanners   (three   commercial:  
Acunetix  Web  Vulnerability  Scanner  (Acunetix  2008a),  IBM  Rational  AppScan  (IBM  
2008),   HP   WebInspect   (HP   2008),   and   two   open   source:   Foundstone   WSDigger  
(Foundstone,   Inc.   2005),   and   wsfuzzer   (OWASP   Foundation   2008)).   This   list   was  
analyzed  and  complemented  based  on  practical  experience  and  using  information  on  
injection   methods   available   in   the   literature   (e.g.   (Jensen   et   al.   2007;   Stuttard   and  
Pinto   2007;   Shema   2010;   W.   G.   Halfond,   Viegas,   and   Orso   2006)).   The   final   list  
includes   137   attack   types   (see   Table   3.1   for   examples   and   (Antunes   2013)   for   the  
complete  list).  
The  number  of  attacks  to  be  performed  can  be  extremely  huge  and  depends  on  the  
size  of  the  workload  considered  and  on  the  number  of  mutation  rules  to  be  applied.  
Take   for   example   a   web   service   with   3   operations   with   5   parameters   each   and   a  
workload  with  25  test  calls  per  operation.  Applying  all  the  attack  types  (137)  over  the  
entire  set  of  test  calls  (25)  for  every  parameter  (5)  of  each  operation  (3)  would  end  up  
representing  51375  (137  x  25  x  5  x  3)  web  service  executions.  Depending  on  the  time  
available  this  may  be  unfeasible.  This  way,  the  technique  allows  the  user  to  specify  
the  number  of  test  calls  from  the  original  workload  that  should  be  used  for  the  attack  
load  generation.  For   this,   the  original   test   calls  are   ranked  based  on   their  ability   to  
help  us  detecting  vulnerabilities  and  then  a  subset  is  selected.  In  practice,  ranking  is  
built  using  the  following  rules:  
1. Test  calls   that  during  Phase  1   leaded  to  valid  web  service  responses   (i.e.  no  
exception,  no  server  error,  and  no  SOAP  error)  are  in  the  top  of  the  list.  
2. Test  calls  that  during  Phase  1  leaded  to  web  service  exceptions  are  in  second  
place.  
3. Test  calls  that  during  Phase  1  leaded  to  server  errors  (e.g.  HTTP  errors  in  the  
400  and  500  intervals)  are  in  third  place.  
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4. Test   calls   that   during   Phase   1   leaded   to   client-­‐‑side   errors   (e.g.   SOAP  
exceptions)  are  in  the  bottom  of  the  list  (used  only  as  last  resource).  
After   the   generation  process,   the   attacks   are   submitted   to   the  web   service   and   the  
responses   are   collected.   This   (attacks   and   corresponding   responses)   together   with  
the   information  gathered  during  the  execution  of   the  workload  (valid  requests  and  
corresponding  responses)  provide  the  support  for  the  vulnerability  detection  phase.  
 Vulnerability	  Detection	  4.1.4
The  VD  module  is  in  charge  of  processing  and  correlating  the  information  collected  
to  detect  vulnerabilities.  As  proposed  in  the  generic  approach  (see  Section  3.2),  two  
elements   are   included   in   the   detector:   the   vulnerability   identifier   (VI)   and   the  
testing  driver  (TD).  However,  some  of  the  (optional)  elements  represented  in  Figure  
3.4   are   not   needed   in   the   case   of   IPW-­‐‑WS.   In   fact,   as   this   technique   is   based   on  
penetration   testing,   no   instrumentation   phase   is   required   and   no   additional  
information  is  available  besides  the  analysis  of  requests  and  responses.  This  way,  the  
resulting   procedure   includes   three   phases:   1)   workload   execution   phase,   which  
consists  of  generating  and  submitting  the  workload  requests  as  specified  in  4.1.1;  2)  
attack  phase,  in  which  the  attacks  are  generated  and  submitted  to  the  web  service  as  
detailed  in  4.1.3;  and  finally  3)  vulnerability  detection  phase,  where  the  information  
collected  is  used  to  identify  vulnerabilities,  as  detailed  in  the  next  paragraphs.    
By   analyzing   the   responses   obtained   during   the   workload   and   attacks   execution,  
together   with   the   application   of   well-­‐‑defined   rules,   makes   it   possible   to   identify  
vulnerabilities  and  exclude  potential  false  positives.  This  is  a  crucial  step  to  achieve  





Figure  4.2  –  Web  service  response  analysis.  
Specific  vulnerability  detection  procedure  for  finding  the  maximum  number  of  vulnerabilities  
while  reducing  the  false  positives  reported.  
The   following   points   describe   the   figure   and   the   steps   performed   to   analyze   the  
results  for  each  of  the  attacks  performed  over  each  parameter:  
1. If	   the	   response	   obtained	   is	   a	   client	   side	   error	   (e.g.	   SOAP	   stack	   error)	   then	   the	   attack	  was	   not	  
successful	  and	  no	  vulnerability	  was	  explored,	  as	  the	  web	  service	  code	  was	  not	  even	  executed.	  
2. Otherwise,	  if	  the	  response	  is	  an	  error	  then	  
2.1. PIf	  the	  response	  for	  the	  original	  test	  call	  (before	  being	  mutated	  with	  malicious	  values)	  was	  
the	  same	  then	  the	  error	  is	  not	  due	  to	  the	  attack,	  but	  to	  another	  characteristic	  of	  the	  service	  
(e.g.	  a	  software	  bug	  or	  database	  server	  problem).	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2.2. Otherwise,	  apply	  robustness	  testing	  over	  the	  parameter,	  as	  proposed	  in	  (Vieira,	  Laranjeiro,	  
and	  Madeira	  2007).	  Creating	  a	   robustness	   test	   is	   very	   similar	   to	   the	   creation	  of	   an	  attack.	  
However,	  instead	  of	  a	  malicious	  input,	  the	  attack	  injector	  uses	  a	  non-­‐malicious	  invalid	  input	  
(i.e.	   values	  outside	   the	  expected	   input	  domain).	   The	  Testing	  Driver	  module	   is	   in	   charge	  of	  
asking	   the	  Attack	   Injector	   to	   generate	   and	   execute	   this	   request.	   The	   technique	   includes	   a	  
predefined	   set	   of	   values	   for	   each	   possible	   parameter	   domain	   (see	   details	   in	   (Vieira,	  
Laranjeiro,	  and	  Madeira	  2007)).	  
2.3. PIf	  the	  responses	  obtained	  during	  robustness	  testing	  include	  the	  same	  error	  then	  the	  error	  
obtained	  is	  due	  to	  a	  robustness	  problem	  and	  not	  to	  a	  vulnerability.	  
2.4. OOtherwise,	  an	   injection	  vulnerability	  exists	  as	  the	  attack	  leaded	  to	  invalid	  responses	  that	  
could	   not	   be	   observed	  when	   using	   a	   valid	  workload	   or	  when	   applying	   robustness	   testing.	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  invalid	  response	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  attack,	  and	  not	  by	  a	  value	  out	  of	  the	  
target	  parameter’s	  domain.	  This	  is	  a	  strong	  symptom	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  vulnerability.	  
3. OOtherwise	  (i.e.	  a	  valid	  response	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  attack),	  if	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  original	  
test	  call	  (before	  being	  mutated	  with	  malicious	  values)	  leaded	  to	  a	  database	  error,	  server	  error	  or	  
web	  service	  exception	  then	  an	  injection	  vulnerability	  has	  been	  detected,	  as	  the	  attack	  was	  able	  
to	  exercise	  parts	  of	  the	  service	  that	  were	  not	  possible	  to	  execute	  when	  using	  a	  valid	  workload.	  
An	   example	   of	   this	   situation	   is	   when	   an	   attack	   is	   able	   to	   circumvent	   an	   authentication	  
mechanism	  that	  was	  preventing	  valid	  test	  calls	  from	  proceeding.	  
4. OOtherwise,	   if	   the	   response	   obtained	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   attack	   is	   the	   opposite	   of	   the	  
response	   obtained	   for	   the	   original	  workload	   call	   (before	   being	  mutated	  with	  malicious	   values)	  
then	   an	   injection	   vulnerability	   has	   been	   detected,	   as	   the	   attack	   leaded	   to	   the	   successful	  
execution	   of	   the	   operation,	   which	   was	   not	   the	   case	   when	   using	   the	   valid	   workload.	   Take	   for	  
example	  an	  operation	  that	  performs	  a	  database	  modification	  and	  only	  returns	  a	  value	  indicating	  
the	   success	   or	   nonsuccess	   of	   the	   modification.	   If	   and	   attack	   is	   able	   to	   circumvent	   an	  
authentication	  mechanism	  that	  was	  preventing	  valid	  test	  calls	   from	  proceeding,	  then	  there	   is	  a	  
security	  vulnerability.	  
5. POtherwise,	  no	  vulnerability	  was	  found.	  The	  attack	  did	  not	  change	  the	  web	  service	  behavior	  in	  
a	  visible	  manner.	  
The   most   difficult   step   of   the   algorithm   is   Step   4.   In   fact,   it   is   quite   difficult   to  
establish   if   a   response   obtained   in   the   presence   of   an   attack   is   the   opposite   of   the  
response  obtained  for  the  original  test  call.  The  rules  must  be  simple  and  applied  to  
data   types   that   allow   determining   the   opposition   between   the   result   of   a   valid  
request  and  an  attack.  This  way  we  propose  the  set  of  rules  presented  in  Table  4.2  to  
make  these  decisions.  Obviously,  these  rules  may  be  a  source  of  false  positives,  but  
the  user  of  the  technique  can  easily  integrate  new  rules.  
As   in   classical   penetration   testing,   the   proposed   IPT-­‐‑WS   is   based   on   the   effective  
execution  of  the  code,  and  as  the  service  is  tested  from  the  user  point  of  view,  there  
is   no   need   to   access   or   modify   the   source   code   (which   many   times   is   not   even  
available),   for   instance  when  testing  third  party  web  services.  The  main  problem  is  
that,  in  practice,  vulnerability  identification  can  only  rely  on  the  analysis  of  the  web  
services   output   to   the   client.   This   way,   the   effectiveness   of   the   proposed  
penetration  testing  approach  is  still  limited  by  the  lack  of  visibility  on  the  internal  




Table  4.2  –  Rules  for  the  analysis  of  opposite  responses.  
Simple  and  effective  rules  that  allow  the  technique  to  easily  find  if  one  value  is  the  opposite  of  
another.    
Original  Response   Opposite  Response  
False   True  
Fail   Success  
0   1  
Empty  list  or  array   List  or  array  with  values  
0   GUID  data  type  
Error   No  Error  
Invalid   Valid  
4.2 Attack	  Signatures	  and	  Interface	  Monitoring	  [Sign-­‐WS]	  
To  tackle  the  limitations  of  penetration  testing,  this  section  presents  the  design  of  a  
technique  named  Sign-­‐‑WS  that  uses  attack  signatures  and  interface  monitoring  for  
the   detection   of   injection   vulnerabilities.   This   technique   targets   the   detection   of  
Injection   vulnerabilities   in   services   partially   under   control   (Scenario   2   defined   in  
Section  3.1.3).    
The   goal   is   to   improve   the   testing   process   by   providing   enhanced   visibility,   yet  
without  needing  to  access  or  modify  the  web  services  code.  The  key  assumption  is  
that   most   injection   attacks   manifest,   in   some   way,   in   the   interfaces   between   the  
attacked  web  service  and  other  systems  (e.g.  database,  operating  system,  gateways)  
and   services   (e.g.   other   web   services   in   a   service   composition).   For   example,   a  
successful  SQL  Injection  attack  leads  the  service  to  send  malicious  SQL  queries  to  the  
database.   Thus,   these   attacks   can   be   observed   in   the   SQL   interface   between   the  
service  and  the  database  server.  Similarly,  XPath  Injection  attacks  (on  top  of  XPath  or  
XQuery)  manifest  at  the  interface  with  XML  files  (OWASP  Foundation  2013)  and  OS  
Command   Injection  are  visible  at   the   interface  with   the  operation   system   (Stuttard  
and   Pinto   2007),   etc.   In   practice,   the   approach   targets   the   vulnerabilities   that   lead  
web  services  to  be  used  as  front  end  for  attacking  backend  resources.  
Comparing  with  traditional  penetration  testing  and  with  the  IPT-­‐‑WS  technique,  the  
Sign-­‐‑WS   technique   is   more   effective   as   it   uses   additional   information   that   allows  
increasing   the   number   of   vulnerabilities   detected   and   reduce   false   positives.   For  
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example,  blind  injection  vulnerabilities  (that  exist  when  an  application  is  vulnerable,  
but  the  results  of  an  attack  are  not  directly  visible  to  the  attacker)  cannot  be  detected  
by   traditional  penetration   testing   (or  by  our   IPT-­‐‑WS  technique);  however,   they  can  
be   detected   by   the   Sign-­‐‑WS   approach   as   they   can   be   observed   in   the   interface  
between   the   web   services   and   the   resource   targeted   by   the   attack.   Furthermore,  
detecting  vulnerabilities  based  on  the  effects  of  attacks  (e.g.  changes  in  SQL  queries),  
is  much  more  precise  than  considering  only  the  analysis  of  the  web  service  output,  
allowing  decreasing  the  rate  of  false  positives.  Figure  4.3  presents  the  overall  design  
of   the   technique,  which   is  detailed   in   the  next  subsections.  Note   that   the   technique  
does  not  require  a  Workload  Injector  module,  as  the  technique  has  no  need  to  know  
the   regular   behavior   of   the   web   service   (i.e.   how   the   service   behaves   under   non-­‐‑
malicious  requests).  The  random  workload  generator  presented  in  Section  4.1.1  is  used  
to   support   the  generation  of  attacks  when  using   the   internal  attack  generator.  This  
way,  the  workload  emulation  component  is  not  discussed.  
 Attack	  Emulation	  4.2.1
Sign-­‐‑WS   supports   two   options   for   generating   attacks:   it   includes   a   specific  
generation  module,  similar  to  the  one  presented  in  Section  4.1.3,  and  also  allows  the  
integration   of   an   external   technique   (e.g.   another   vulnerability   scanner).   A   key  
aspect   that   is   common   to   both   cases   is   that   signatures   are   added   to   the   attacks   to  
later   support   the   detection   of   vulnerabilities.      This   way,   the   concept   of   attack  
signatures   is   transversal   to   both   cases.  Also   common   to   both   cases   is   the   fact   that  
after   the   submission  of   a   signed  attack,   the   tool   continuously  waits   for   receiving  a  
notification  of  any  signature  detected.  When  it  receives  such  notification,  a  match  is  
established  between  the  information  received  and  the  attacked  input.  This  way,  it  is  
possible  to  precisely  identify  the  attacked  input  and  report  it  as  vulnerable.  The  next  
paragraphs   present   the   concept   of   attack   signatures   and   describe   how   they   are  
added  to  the  attacks.  
Defining  Efficient  Attack  Signatures  
In   the   literature,   attack   signatures   are  defined   in  multiple  ways,  depending  on   the  
type   of   system   studied,   but   according   to   (Sabhnani   and   Serpen   2004)   an   attack  
signature   is   “a   distinctive   complex   pattern  used   to   detect   system  penetration,  which  may  
involve   comparison   of   audit   and   log   data   from   a   variety   of   sources   within   the   computing  






WE Workload Emulator 
    User input  
 WG Workload generator 
 WG Ext. External workload generator 
AE Attack Emulator 
 AG Attack generator 
 AI Attack injector 
 AG Ext. External attack generator 
VD Vulnerability detection module 
  TD Testing driver 
 VI Vulnerability identifier 
R Vulnerabilities detected 
SM Service monitor 
 IC Information collector  
 SI Service instrumentation 
 IM Information manager 
SP Service Provider 
 WS Web Service under test 
R Resource 
 R0  XML database 
 R1  Payment gateway 
 R2 Database 
 R3 FTP server 
--- Optional elements or connections 
Figure  4.3  –  Overall  design  of  the  Sign-­‐‑WS  technique.  
The  technique  detects  injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  services  using  attack  signatures  and  
interface  monitoring.  The  resources  are  faded  because  they  may  be  outside  of  the  provider’s  
control.  However,  their  interface  is  known.  
In  the  context  of  this  work,  an  attack  signature  is  a  token  that  is  introduced  inside  a  
malicious  string  (the  injection  attack)  in  such  way  that,  if  the  attack  is  successful,  the  
token   is   observable   somewhere   in   the   interfaces   of   the   service.   For   example,   in   a  
successful   SQL   Injection   attack,   the   signature   should   show  up   in   the  manipulated  
SQL  command  (the  target  of  the  attack),  outside  any  literal  string  (i.e.  as  a  part  of  the  
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actual  command),  revealing  that  it  is  possible  for  attackers  to  modify  the  structure  of  
the  command  sent  to  the  database  server  (OWASP  Foundation  2013).  In  this  case,  the  
signature   is   considered   active   (see   example   in   Figure   4.4   (a)).   Otherwise,   if   the  
signature  is  placed  inside  a  literal  string,  it  is  considered  inactive  and  is  inoffensive  
(Figure  4.4  (b)).  
 




Select n from t where dsc LIKE '%input SIGNATURE%'; 
 
(b) 
Figure  4.4  –  Examples  of  queries  with  signatures.  
(a)  the  signature  is  active;  (b)  the  signature  is  inside  a  literal  string,  it  is  inactive.    
The  red  text  represents  the  signature  while  the  bold  signals  a  literal  string.  
Defining  attack   signatures   is  not   easy.  On  one  hand,   signing  attacks  with   complex  
signatures  may  not  be  possible  due  to  length  limitations  of  the  target  commands  or  
parameters,  restrictions  in  terms  of  the  characters  that  can  be  used,  etc.  On  the  other  
hand,  very  simple  signatures  may  raise  false  positives,  as  there  is  the  risk  of  using  a  
signature  that  matches  a  valid  keyword  (the  valid  keyword  would  wrongly  suggest  
the  presence  of   the   signature).  This  way,   to  maximize   the   success  of   the  approach,  
the  signature  token  must  be:  
1. Unambiguous:   the   signature   must   not   be   easily   confused   with   the  
tokens/keywords   regularly   found   in   the   context   of   the   applications   being  
tested;  
2. Inoffensive:   the   signature  must  not   include  characters   that  may  be   filtered,  
escaped   or   refused.   Although   the   goal   is   the   attack   to   pass   the   protection  
mechanisms,  the  signature  token  must  be  harmless;  
3. Informative:   the   signature   must   include   information   about   what   is   being  
attacked  to  later  allow  the  identification  of  the  vulnerable  input;  
4. Short:  the  token  must  be  as  short  as  possible  to  avoid  problems  with  limited  
length   fields   or   protection   mechanisms   as   length   validators,   which   are  
extremely  common  in  web  services.  
The  proposed  signature  model  is  composed  of  a  set  of  five  elements,  including  two  
delimiters,   two   identifiers   (that   represent   the   information   transported   by   the  
signature),  and  a  qualifier  (see  example  in  Figure  4.5).  The  first  delimiter  (underscore  
character)   marks   the   beginning   of   the   signature,   the   first   identifier   represents   the  
web   service   operation   or   resource   being   tested,   the   second   identifier   is   the   input  
parameter  attacked,  and  the  second  delimiter  (again  an  underscore  character)  marks  
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the  end  of  the  signature  information.  The  qualifier,  placed  after  the  second  delimiter,  
indicates  whether  the  signature  is  applied  in  normal  or  reversed  mode,  as  explained  
below.  
This   model   allows   short   and   informative   enough   signatures.   To   reinforce  
unambiguity,   each   time   a   signature   is   detected   in   an   interface,   a   confirmation  
request   is   submitted,   now   containing   a   reversed   version   of   the   signature.   This   is  
important   to   decrease   the   probability   of   using   a   signature   that,   by   coincidence,  
partially  matches  a  part  of  the  target  command,  also  providing  a  second  validation  
of   the  vulnerability.  As  signatures  do  not   include  any  “special”  characters,   they  do  
not   suffer   any   transformation   due   to   existing   escaping   routines,   thus   assuring  
inoffensiveness.  Obviously,  to  guarantee  portability  and  allow  adapting  to  different  
types  of  web  services,  the  user  of  the  technique  is  allowed  to  configure  the  signature  
model  he  wants  to  apply  (using  regular  expressions).    
Figure  4.5  shows  the  signature  model  (including  the  reversed  version)  used  with  the  
default   configuration   of   our   technique.  When   building   the   signature,   digit   “1”   is  
replaced  by  the  identifier  of  the  web  service  operation  under  testing,  and  digit  “2”  is  
replaced  by   the   identifier  of   the   input  parameter  attacked.  Each   identifier   can  be  a  
number  (10)  or  a  letter  (52).  The  attack  injector  maintains  a  dictionary  that  maps  each  
identifier   to   their   real   meaning.   Obviously,   if   the   number   of   operations   or   input  
parameters   is   greater   than   62   (it   rarely   is)   then   it   is   necessary   to   add  digits   to   the  








Figure  4.5  –  Signature  token  used.  (a)  regular  token;  (b)  reversed  token.  
The  regular  token  respects  characteristics  that  help  it  to  be  successful.  The  reversed  token  is  
used  to  confirm  the  vulnerabilities  detected.  
Generating  Signed  Attacks  in  the  Internal  Attack  Generator  
As   presented   in   Section   4.1.3,   the   approach   implemented   by   the   internal   attack  
generator  (AG)  consists  of  mutating  the  workload  requests.  In  practice,  valid  values  
are  replaced  by  the  malicious  values.  Differently  from  IPT-­‐‑WS,  however,   is   the  fact  
that   Sign-­‐‑WS   adds   signatures   to   the   attacks   for   later   supporting   the   vulnerability  
identification.  In  the  default  configuration,  Sign-­‐‑WS  uses  a  set  of  attack  types  that  is  
based  on  the  compilation  of  the  types  used  by  a  large  set  of  scanners,  complemented  
with  practical  experience  and  information  on  SQL  Injection  methods  available  in  the  
literature  (as  shown  in  Section  4.1.3).  The  final  list  includes  102  attack  types  (this  list  
slightly  differs  from  the  list  used  in  Section  4.1.3,  as  in  many  cases  the  attacks  are  not  
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adequate  to  be  used  together  with  a  signature).  Some  examples,  including  signatures  
placeholders,  are  presented  in  Table  4.3  and  the  full  list  available  at  (Antunes  2013).  
For   better   understanding   the   concept,   consider   the   following   examples:   attack   1)  
tries   to   invalidate   the   query   by   closing   a   literal   string   and   exposing   the   signature.  
Attack   2)   is   designed   to   avoid   naive   escaping   mechanisms   using   a   slash   (‘\’)   as  
protection.   Attacks   4)   and   5)   try   to   turn   a   where   clause   into   a   tautology   (e.g.   to  
circumvent  an  authentication  mechanism),  while  exposing  the  signature.  Attack  10)  
is  similar   to  1)  but   tries   to  also   include   the  value  of   the  valid  workload  to  disguise  
the  attack  and  signature.  As  shown,  there  are  some  tokens  representing  placeholders  
to   be   replaced   at   runtime.   These   tokens   are   useful   to   define   more   complex   and  
efficient  attacks.  The  meaning  of  each  of  the  tokens  is  as  follows:  
Table  4.3  –  Examples  of  signed  SQL  Injection  attack  types.  
These  include  special  placeholders  that  define  where  the  technique  will  insert  the  signature  
and  other  important  data.  
SQL/XPath  Injection  mutation  rules 
 1) ' %SIGNATURE% 
 2) \' %SIGNATURE% 
 3) ' -- %SIGNATURE% 
 4) ' or 0=0 -- %SIGNATURE% 
 5) ' = '' or %SIGNATURE% = ' 
 6) hi') %SIGNATURE% ('a'='a 
 7) = %SIGNATURE% || ' 
 8) 1' || %SIGNATURE% || ' 
 9) ' UNION %SIGNATURE% 
 10) %WORKLOAD%' %SIGNATURE% 
 11) %WORKL_%' or %SIGNATURE%=%SIGNATURE% -- 
• %SIGNATURE% –   is   a   placeholder   to   be   replaced   by   the   signature   token  
dynamically  generated.  Using   this,   the  user  can  control   the  specific   location  
of  the  signature  inside  the  malicious  string;  
• %WORKLOAD% –  is      a  placeholder  to  be  replaced  at  runtime  by  the  value  of  
the  input  in  the  original  workload  request.  This  is  useful  because  it  helps  to  
disguise   the   attack   with   valid   data,   avoiding   some   weak   validators   that  
perform   pattern   matching.   An   example   is   a   validator   that   only   accepts   a  
format   that   consists   of   a   date  with   some  more   text   (“DD-­‐‑MM-­‐‑YYYY   (…)”).  
For   an   attack   to   be   successful,   it   needs   to   contain   the   date   token.   If   the  
workload   was   correctly   generated   to   fit   this   kind   of   domain   restrictions,  
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using  the  workload  as  a  base  to  generate  the  attacks  increases  the  chances  of  
generating  a  successful  attack;  
• %WORKL_% –   similar   to  %WORKLOAD%,   but   in   this   case   only   the   initial  
characters   are   used   in   order   to  maintain   the   total   length   of   the   input.   This  
helps   avoiding   length   validators.   For   instance,   considering   a   validator   that  
accepts  a  string  with  a  length  between  100  and  150  characters  (or  even  a  more  
restrictive  range),   if  the  workload  request  is  valid,  then  the  attack  generated  
using  this  token  is  also  valid  (as  we  cut  from  the  string  the  characters  needed  
to  introduce  the  signature  without  exceeding  the  limits).  
An   important   point   is   the   use   of   the   apostrophe   character   (‘).   This   character   is  
usually   the   one   that   delimits   literal   strings   in   commands   or   queries.   However,  
sometimes  other  characters  have  similar   functions,   for   instance   the  quote  character  
(“).  This  way,   the  user  can  define   in  the  configuration  file   the  values  to  use   in  that  
position,   and   at   runtime   the   technique   performs   the   needed   replacements.   If  
multiple   values   are   defined,   the   technique   replicates   the   attack   for   each   one.   For  
example,  during  our  tests  (presented  in  Chapter  7),  four  values  were  used:  “'”,  “"”,  
“&apos;”  and  “&quot;”   (the   two  string  delimiters  and   the   correspondent  html  
entities).    
The   defined   attacks   cover   the  majority   of   the   cases,   using   techniques   that   try,   for  
instance,   to   avoid   weak   escaping   mechanisms   by   combining   multiple   escaping  
characters   together.  However,   the  user  can  easily  add  more  attacks  using   the   rules  
defined   above.   A   key   aspect   is   that,   to   reveal   a   vulnerability,   the   attack   does   not  
need  to  be  successful  on  accessing,  modifying  or  destroying  data.  It  is  only  required  
that  the  attack  is  able  to  modify  the  structure  of  the  backend  command.  For  example,  
in   the  case  of  SQL  Injection,  what   is   required   is   the  attack   to  be  able   to  change   the  
structure  of  the  SQL  query  in  such  way  that  the  signature  token  can  be  identified  in  
the  service   interface  with  the  database  server  as  being  active.  The  same  is  valid  for  
other  types  of  injection  vulnerabilities.  
Signing  attacks  generated  by  an  External  Attack  Generator  
As  an  alternative  to  the  internal  attack  generator,  the  technique  allows  to  use  a  third  
party  tool  to  generate  the  attacks  that   later  will  be  signed.  The  concepts  behind  the  
signatures  used  are  exactly  the  same  as  introduced  before.  Here  we  focus  solely  on  
the  way  externally  generated  attacks  are  intercepted  and  signed.    
For   supporting   the   integration   of   an   external   tool   to   generate   attacks,   the   attack  
injector   intercepts   the   requests  performed  by   that   tool.   In  practice,   all   the   requests  
are   intercepted,   locally   stored,   and   finally   forwarded   (without   any   change)   to   the  
target  web  service.  The  idea  consists  of  later  strategically  placing  a  signature  close  to  
the  attack.  The  overall  architecture  of  the  system  is  depicted  in  Figure  4.6.  
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Figure  4.6  –  Mechanism  to  intercept  and  sign  external  requests.  
The  proxy  intercepts  the  HTTP  requests  and  stores  a  copy  for  future  use.  
As  we  can  observe,  an  HTTP  proxy   is  used   to   intercept   the   requests  performed  by  
the  penetration  testing  tool.  Regarding  the  external  tool,  it  is  only  required  that  it  is  
configured   to  use   an  HTTP  proxy,  which   is   allowed  by  most   tools   and   consists   in  
changing  a  simple  parameter  (e.g.  add  a  proxy  address  and  port  in  the  tool  settings).  
Sign-­‐‑WS  uses  LittleProxy  (LittleShoot  2010)  that  is  an  open-­‐‑source  “high-­‐‑performance  
HTTP  proxy  written  in  Java”,  available  online  under  Apache  2  license.  The  proxy  was  
modified   to   intercept   all   the   requests   performed   by   the   external   testing   tool   and  
forward  them  without  any  change.  In  this  phase,  the  requests  are  not  signed,  as  the  
goal  is  to  allow  the  penetration  tester  to  perform  its  work  without  any  interference.  
The  only  interference  are  the  very  small  delays  introduced  by  the  proxy,  but  this  is  
not  considered  an  important  problem  as  timing  issues  are  not  particularly  important,  
especially  during  the  type  of  security  testing  targeted  by  our  tool.  
After  the  external  testing  tool  completes  the  scanning  process,  all  the  stored  requests  
are   analyzed   by   the   attack   injector,   searching   for   attacks   (i.e.   requests   containing  
malicious  input  strings).  When  an  attack  is  found,  a  signature  token  is  added  to  the  
attack   string.   The   signature   includes   information   about   the   component   and   input  
under   attack   (obtained   from   the   original   request)   that   is   also   inserted   in   the  
dictionary   that  maps   the   identifiers   to   the   inputs   they   represent.   The   place   in   the  
attack   string   where   the   signature   is   inserted   can   be   defined   by   the   user   of   the  
technique,  in  the  form  of  key  characters.  These  key  characters  depend  on  the  type  of  
attack   being   conducted;   for   example,   in   our   experiments   with   SQL   Injection   we  
considered   the   typical   characters   necessary   to   launch   SQL   Injection   campaigns:  
literal  string  delimiters   ('   and  "),   the  equal  character   (=)  often  used  to  manipulate  
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SQL  conditions,  and  the  parenthesis  characters  ()   and  (),  used  to  manipulate  or  add  
subqueries.  After  this,  the  new  request  is  sent  to  the  web  service.  If  no  key  character  
is  found  in  the  original  request,  then  it  is  discarded,  as  it  is  not  considered  an  attack  
(e.g.  the  external  tool  is  issuing  a  non  malicious  request).  
 Service	  Monitoring	  4.2.2
Simultaneously  to  the  submission  of  the  attacks  containing  the  attack  signatures,  it  is  
necessary   to   monitor   the   interfaces   of   the   application   to   capture   the   executed  
commands   (IC   component   in   Figure   4.3).   To   monitor   the   interface   of   the   web  
services  there  are  multiple  options  depending  on  the  type  of  interface,  including  (as  
detailed   in  Section  3.2.3):  use  network  packet   sniffing,  use  a  proxy,   instrument   the  
code,   etc.   In   the  particular   case   of   Sign-­‐‑WS  we  perform  driver   instrumentation.   In  
practice,  when  the   interface   to  be  monitored   is  accessed  through  a  driver   (e.g.   Java  
applications   use   JDBC   drivers   to   access   the   database   server),   this   driver   can   be  
instrumented   to   include  monitoring   facilities.  Obviously,   driver   instrumentation   is  
an   intrusive   technique,   but   the  modifications   can   be   done   outside   the   core   of   the  
applications  being  tested.  In  fact,  it  is  possible  to  create  an  instrumented  version  of  a  
specific  driver  that  can  even  be  used  in  different  applications.    
For   example,   the   Sign-­‐‑WS   implementation   targeting   SQL   Injection   attacks   we  
instrumented  a  JDBC  driver  using  Aspect-­‐‑Oriented  Programming  (AOP)  (Kiczales  et  
al.  2002),  in  order  to  monitor  the  queries  sent  to  the  database.  AOP  is  a  well-­‐‑known  
programming   paradigm   that   allows   injecting   crosscutting   concerns   into   any  
application   in   a   non-­‐‑intrusive   way   (Kiczales   et   al.   2002).   The   Java   Database  
Connectivity   (JDBC)   API   is   designed   to   access   any   kind   of   tabular   data,   but   it   is  
mostly   used   to   access   relational   databases   in   Java   applications   (Reese   and   Oram  
2000).  It  is  the  responsibility  of  each  database  vendor  to  provide  a  library  containing  
the   JDBC  driver   and   the   implementation   of   the   JDBC  API   for   Java   applications   to  
interact  with  its  Database  Management  System  (DBMS).  
In  practice,  AOP  was  used  to  transparently  intercept  the  key  points  inside  the  JDBC  
library  where  the  SQL  commands  are  sent  to  the  database  server.  The  result  of  this  
process   was   a   new   driver   library.   To   use   this   driver   during   the   web   application  
testing  process,  what  is  needed  is  to  refer  the  modified  version  in  the  classpath  of  the  
application   instead  of   the  original  one.  This   is   the  main  reason   for  our  option:   it   is  
very   practical   to   use   it   in   different   Java   based-­‐‑systems   during   the   experimental  
evaluation.  A  similar  approach  is  used  for  other  drivers.  
When  the  signed  attacks  are  submitted  to  the  service,  the  information  collector  (IC)  
gathers   information   from   the  web   service   interfaces.   This   information   is   stored   by  
the   information   manager   (IM)   in   a   database   (together   with   the   corresponding  
requests)  and  later  used  by  the  vulnerability  detector  (VD)  to  identify  vulnerabilities.  
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 Vulnerability	  Detection	  4.2.3
After  capturing  the  commands  at  the  service  interfaces,  it  is  necessary  to  process  and  
analyze  them  to  detect  potential  vulnerabilities.  In  practice,  when  a  signature  token  
is   found   outside   a   literal   string   in   a   command   sent   to   an   external   resource,   this  
means  that  there  is  a  vulnerability  in  the  web  service.  Thus,  before  applying  regular  
expressions  to  find  signatures,  it  is  necessary  to  process  the  data  in  order  to  remove  
the   inoffensive  parts   (e.g.   control   characters,  well-­‐‑formed   literal   strings).  Figure  4.7  
shows   an   example   of   the   transformations   applied   to   SQL   queries   during   the  
command   processing   steps   (a   similar   approach   is   used   for   other   types   of  
commands).    
• Step  1:   all   the   correctly   escaped   slashes   (\),   apostrophes   (')   and  quotes   (")  
are  removed  from  the  string.  Obviously,  the  definition  of  “correctly  escaped”  
varies  according  to  the  type  of  commands  that  are  being  processed.    
• Step   2:   the   remaining   literal   strings   identified   by   the   regular   expression  
“'[^']*'”   are   removed.   This   regular   expression   represents   a   collection   of  
characters   delimited   by   two   apostrophes   that   cannot   contain   apostrophes  
inside.    
• Step   3:   any   attack   signature   that   still   remains   in   the   command   after   this  
process  is  considered  active,  as  can  be  observed  in  Figure  4.7  (a).  In  this  case  a  
vulnerability  is  identified,  having  the  associated  information:  ‘2’  (operation  or  
resource   under   testing)   and   ‘8’   (input   parameter   attacked).   This   is   the  
information  that  allows  linking  the  vulnerability  to  the  input  that  can  be  used  
to  exploit  it.  Obviously,  the  attack  signatures  should  include  the  information  
needed  to  make  a  correspondence  between  this  information  and  the  inputs  of  
the  service  under  testing.  
 
 1: Select n from t where dsc LIKE '%input' _28_p%'; 
 2: Select n from t where dsc LIKE '%input' _28_p%'; 




 1: Select n from t where dsc LIKE '%input\' _28_p%'; 
 2: Select n from t where dsc LIKE '%input _28_p%'; 
 3: Select n from t where dsc LIKE ; 
 
(b) 
Figure  4.7  –  Examples  of  command  processing  steps  with  SQL  queries.  
  (a)  an  active  signature  is  found;  (b)  no  active  signature  is  found.  Transformations  
applied  to  each  query  during  the  processing.  Tokens  in  red  are  removed  in  that  step.  Tokens  
in  bold  are  active  signatures.  
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4.3 Runtime	  Anomaly	  Detection	  [RAD-­‐WS]	  
Although   the   use   of   attack   signatures   and   interface   monitoring   pushes   the  
effectiveness   of   the   Sign-­‐‑WS   technique   beyond   the   limits   of   penetration   testing,   it  
still   ignores   important   information   that  may   be   available   to   the   providers   of   web  
services.   This   information   is   related   to   the   internals   of   the   application   and   can   be  
effectively   used   to   understand   the   internal   behavior   of   the   web   services.   To   take  
advantage  of  this  information,  this  section  presents  the  design  of  a  runtime  anomaly  
detection   technique   for   the   detection   of   injection   vulnerabilities.   The   technique  
targets  the  detection  of  Injection  vulnerabilities  in  services  under  control  (Scenario  3  
defined   in  Section  3.1.3),  as   it   is  necessary   to  perform  some  changes   to   the  services  
under  testing.  
The  idea  is  to  instrument  the  web  service  and  then  to  generate  and  run  a  workload  
to  exercise   it,  while   learning   the  profile  of   the   internal   commands   issued   (e.g.  SQL  
and   XPath   commands).   Afterwards   we   generate   and   run   a   large   set   of   injection  
attacks   and   observe   the   internal   commands   being   executed.   By   matching   the  
command   issued  during   the  attack  phase  with   the  profile   that  was   learned  during  
the   previous   phase,   it   is   possible   to   detect   anomalies   that   can   be   reported   as  
vulnerabilities.  
Comparing   to   the   approaches   proposed   before,   RAD-­‐‑WS   takes   advantage   of  
information   about   the   internal   behavior   of   the   service  under   testing,  which   allows  
increasing   detection   coverage.   Figure   4.8   presents   the   design   of   the   technique  
components,   which   are   detailed   in   the   next   subsections.   The   Attack   Emulator  
component   is   not   detailed   as   this   technique  uses   the   one   implemented   by   IPT-­‐‑WS  
(presented  in  Section  4.1.3).  
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WE Workload Emulator 
    User input  
 WG Workload generator 
 WI Workload injector 
 WG Ext. External workload generator 
AE Attack Emulator 
 AG Attack generator 
 AI Attack injector 
 AG Ext. External attack generator 
VD Vulnerability detection module 
  TD Testing driver 
 VI Vulnerability identifier 
R Vulnerabilities detected 
SM Service monitor 
 IC Information collector  
 SI Service instrumentation 
 IM Information manager 
SP Service Provider 
 WS Web Service under test 
R Resource 
 R0 XML database 
 R1  Payment gateway 
 R2 Database 
 R3 FTP server 
--- Optional elements or connections 
Figure  4.8  –  Overall  design  of  the  RAD-­‐‑WS  technique.  
The  technique  learns  the  profile  of  the  regular  behavior  of  the  service  and  then  detects  




 Workload	  Emulation	  	  4.3.1
The  workload  emulator  (WE)  module  is  similar  to  the  one  presented  for  the  IPT-­‐‑WS  
technique  in  the  Section  4.1.1.  In  fact,  the  workload  generator  (WG)  is  based  on  the  
random  workload  generator  presented.  However,  during   the  process   of   executing   the  
workload,  a  responsibility  of  the  workload  injector  (WI)  module,  there  is  a  key  part  
of   the   process   that   is   substantially   different:   the   Service  Monitor  must   profile   the  
commands  executed  to  latter  be  used  for  vulnerability  detection.  
The   workload   injector   exercises   the   service   by   executing   the   generated   workload.  
During   this   phase,   internal   commands   (e.g.   SQL   and   XPath   commands)   are  
intercepted  (using  AOP,  as  presented  in  Section  4.3.2)  and  parsed  in  order  to  remove  
the  data  variant  part  (if  any)  and  a  hash  code  is  generated  to  uniquely  identify  each  
command.   In   other   words,   the   information   used   does   not   represent   the   exact  
command   text,   since   commands   may   differ   slightly   in   different   executions,   while  
keeping  the  same  structure.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  SQL  command  presented  
in  Figure  4.9,  the  job  and  the  salary  in  the  select  criteria  are  dependent  on  the  user’s  
choices  (see  line  1  in  Figure  4.9).  Thus,  instead  of  considering  the  full  command  text,  
we   just   represent   the   invariant   part   of   it   (see   line   3   in   Figure   4.9).   As   shown,   the  
variant  parts  (i.e.  numbers  and  literal  strings)  are  progressively  removed.  
 
1: SELECT * from EMP where job like 'CLERK' and SAL > 1000; 
2: SELECT * from EMP where job like Str? and SAL > 1000; 
3: SELECT * from EMP where job like Str? and SAL > Nbr?; 
Figure  4.9  –  Process  to  remove  the  variant  parts  of  an  SQL  query.  
The  lines  show  the  transformations  applied  to  each  query  during  the  processing.  Tokens  in  
red  (and  italic)  are  removed  in  that  step.  
Each  hash  signature  is  associated  with  a  source  code  entry  point  (which  is  provided  
by   the   AOP)   in   a   Map   structure.   This   does   not   mean   that   we   need   the   original  
application’s  source  code;  it   just  means  that  we  need  bytecode  compiled  with  source  
code  line  information,  which  is  generally  the  case,  even  in  production  applications,  
as   it   provides   extra   information   on   failure   events.   In   the   previously   referred  Map  
structure,   each  key  corresponds   to  a   code   that   includes   the   source   code  point  and,  
when  available,  a  part  of   the  stack   trace   information.  Each  key   is  associated  with  a  
set  of  valid/expected  hashed  commands.  Using  the  stack  trace  information  allows  to  
differentiate  information  that  otherwise  would  not  be  available,  since  the  application  
can  use  a  single  piece  of  specific  code  to  execute  all   the   interactions  with  database,  
thus   using   only   the   entry   source   point   would   be   less   informative.   Note   that,   as  
represented  in  Figure  4.10,  in  a  given  point  there  might  be  several  valid  commands  
(this  is  why  we  need  a  set  of  valid  commands  for  each  source  code  point).    
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... 
if (isInsert()) { 
  sql = “INSERT INTO CLIENT VALUES (seq.nextval, Jack')”; 
} else { 




Figure  4.10  –  Example  of  SQL  commands  execution.  
The  actual  “sql”  executed  has  two  different  valid  possibilities,  depending  on  the  execution.    
An  important  aspect  is  that  the  workload  must  guarantee  a  minimum  level  of  code  
coverage   (as   discussed   in   Section   0).   Although   this   does   not   assure   a   complete  
learning  of   internal  commands,   it  allows  us   to  have  a  high  confidence  degree.  This  
way,   the   technique   allows   easily   integrating   an   external   code   coverage   analysis  
technique.   Additional   workload   requests   are   generated   if   the   coverage   value   is  
under  a  given  threshold  defined  by  the  user.  
 Service	  Monitoring	  4.3.2
For  the  web  service  instrumentation  we  again  use  the  well-­‐‑known  Aspect-­‐‑Oriented  
Programming   (AOP)   paradigm   (Kiczales   et   al.   2002).   In   this   case   it   was   used   to  
intercept  key  web  service  execution  points  and  introduce  the  vulnerability  detection  
mechanisms.    
Vulnerability   detection   starts   by   automatically   identifying   all   the   locations   in   the  
web  service  code  where  commands  are  executed.  This  is  achieved  by  using  AOP  to  
intercept  all  the  calls  to  methods  that  belong  to  APIs  used  to  execute  SQL  commands  
(e.g.   Java’s  JDBC,  the  Spring      JDBC,  etc.),   to  evaluate  XPath  expressions  (e.g.   Java’s  
JAXP,  JaxenXPath,  etc.),  etc.  Virtually  any  API  can  be  added,  as  the  only  requirement  
is  to  know  the  signature  of  the  method  to  be  intercepted.  Figure  4.11  represents  the  



























Figure  4.11  –  The  AOP  Based  Service  Monitoring  system.    
The  Information  Collector  intercepts  the  commands  and  sends  them  to  the  Profiler  or  to  the  
Vulnerability  Identifier  depending  on  the  phase  of  the  process.  The  names  of  the  modules  are  
the  same  as  in  Figure  4.8.  
As  we   can  observe,   at   runtime   the   issued  SQL   commands,  XPath  queries,   etc.,   are  
intercepted   and   delivered   to   the   Information   Collector   that   includes   a   dispatcher.  
The   decision   here   is   simply   to   check   if   the   application   is   in   profiling  mode   or   in  
detection  mode  and  to  deliver  the  request  to  the  appropriate  module  (i.e.  the  profiler  
or   vulnerability   identifier   modules).   It   is   important   to   emphasize   that  
instrumentation   does   not   change   the   web   service   behavior   (the   code   logic   is   not  
modified)  and   that   it   is  only  meant   for   the  RAD-­‐‑WS  technique   (it   is   removed  after  
testing).  
 Vulnerability	  Detection	  4.3.3
To  detect   vulnerabilities  we  perform   security   checks   for   each  data   access   executed  
during  the  attack  phase.  As  mentioned  before,  all  commands  (SQL,  XPath,  etc.)  are  
intercepted  (using  AOP),  hashed,  and  stored  during  that  phase.  These  are  compared  
to   the   values   of   the   learned   valid   commands   for   the   code   point   at   which   the  
command  was   submitted.   In  practice,   the  matching  process   consists   of   looking  up  
the  current  source  code  origin  in  the  previously  referred  Map  structure  and  getting  
the   set   of   hash   codes   of   the   valid   (learned)   commands   for   that   point.   This   set  
(generally  quite  small)  is  then  searched  for  an  element  that  exactly  matches  the  hash  
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of  the  command  that  is  being  executed.  If  a  match  is  not  found,  the  occurrence  (i.e.  
the  potential  vulnerability)  is  logged  for  future  reference.    
The  log  entry  includes  a  reference  to  the  code  location  where  the  vulnerability  was  
detected,  the  query  that  was  executed  in  the  presence  of  the  attack,  and  information  
about   the   operation   input   values,   namely   the   attacked   parameter   and   the   attack  
value.  If  the  source  code  origin  is  not  found  in  the  Map  lookup,  the  log  indicates  that  
the   line  was   not   learned.   This   case   indicates   that   the   learning  phase   is   incomplete  
(coverage  was  not  good  enough)  and  that  a  more  exhaustive  workload  is  required.  
Note   that   the   lines   that   have   not   been   learned   provide   indications   on   how   to  
improve  the  workload  to  increase  coverage.  
4.4 Conclusion	  
This   chapter   presented   the   design   of   three   vulnerability   detection   techniques   that  
implement  the  generic  approach  and  components  presented  in  the  in  Chapter  3.  The  
domain  of  these  techniques  is  SOAP  web  services  and  Injection  vulnerabilities.  The  
vulnerability   detection   approaches   are   respectively:   improved   penetration   testing,  
attack  signatures  and  interface  monitoring,  and  runtime  anomaly  detection.  For  each  
of  these  techniques  the  generic  design  was  instantiated  and  the  generic  components  
and   procedure   were   defined.   These   tools   use   different   parts   of   the   generic  
architecture,  showing  the  versatility  of  the  approach.    
The  improved  penetration  testing  uses  representative  workloads  to  exercise  the  web  
services,  implements  effective  attackloads,  and  applies  well-­‐‑defined  rules  to  analyze  
the  web  services  responses,  thus  improving  detection  coverage  while  reducing  false  
positives   (compared   to   traditional   penetration   testing).   The   attack   signatures   and  
interface  monitoring   approach   overcomes   the   visibility   limitations   of   penetration  
testing  by  introducing  special  tokens  inside  the  injection  attacks  and  then  monitoring  
the   interfaces   of   the   service   under   testing   looking   for   these   tokens   to   detect  
vulnerabilities.   Finally,   the   runtime   anomaly   detection   approach   exercises   the  
service   for   profiling   its   regular   internal   behavior   and   then   attacks   the   service,  
reporting  a  vulnerability  when  some  deviation  is  detected.  This  grasp  on  the  internal  
behavior   of   the   application   allows   going   even   further   in   terms   of   vulnerability  
detection  coverage  and  false  positive  avoidance.  
It  is  important  to  note  that  each  technique  presented  targets  the  individual  testing  of  
web  services  while  the  integrated  approach  focusing  on  service-­‐‑based  infrastructures  
is   presented   in   Chapter   5.   The   experimental   evaluation   results   are   discussed   in  
Chapter  7,  which  shows  the  potential  of  the  proposed  techniques,  when  compared  to  
the  current  state-­‐‑of-­‐‑the-­‐‑art.  
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Chapter	  5	  
Integrated	  Tool	  for	  Detecting	  
Vulnerabilities	  in	  Service-­‐Based	  
Infrastructures	  
Although  the  problem  of  testing  services  for  security  has  been  addressed  in  the  past  
(see  Chapter  2  for  related  work  and  Chapter  4  for  proposed  techniques),  most  works  
disregard   the   specific   challenges   raised   by   service-­‐‑based   environments,   as  
discussed   in   Section   3.1.   The   integrated   approach   proposed   in   Section   3.3   is   a  
solution   towards   this   problem.   In   short,   the   approach   is   based   on   continuous  
monitoring  to  discover  the  services,  resources  and  interactions,  which  allows  coping  
with   the   dynamicity   of   these   environments.   It   is   based   on   three   generic   steps:  
architecture  description,  profiling   interactions,  and  testing  services.  The  key   idea   is  
to   take   advantage  of  multiple  vulnerability  detection   tools   to   test   the  web   services  
depending  on  the  level  of  access  and  information  available  about  each  service.  
This  chapter  presents  an  extensible   tool,  named  SOA-­‐‑Scanner,   that   instantiates   the  
approach  presented  Section  3.3.  The   tool   is   extensible   in   the   sense   that   it   follows  a  
modular  architecture  and  can  be  easily  extended  to  more  types  of  software  services  
and   additional   kinds   of   security   vulnerabilities,   although   the   implementation  
described   here   targets   only   SOAP   web   services   and   injection   vulnerabilities.   In  
practice,   the   SOA-­‐‑Scanner   tool   consists   of   three   main   components:   a   centralized  
controller,  a  monitoring  system,  and  a  set  of  testing  tools.    
The  centralized  controller  is  responsible  for  the  coordination  of  the  monitoring  and  
testing   process.  During   the   description   of   the   architecture   of   the   environment,   the  
controller  acts  as  the  interface  with  the  user  (that  should  introduce  some  description  
information).   Next,   the   controller   is   responsible   for   executing   the   profiling  
interactions  to  exercise  the  web  services  under  testing.  Additionally,  it  centralizes  the  
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flux  of   information  originated  by   the  monitoring   system.   Finally,   it   is   in   charge  of  
assigning   the  available   testing   tools   to   the  web   services  being   tested  and,   after   the  
completion  of  the  testing  process,  of  integrating  the  results  reported.  
To   analyze   the   infrastructure   we   need   to   collect   as   much   information   as   possible  
about  the  web  services  under  testing;  this  is  the  responsibility  of  monitoring  system,  
which  afterwards  sends  the  information  to  the  controller.  Obviously,  the  information  
that   can   be   collected   depends   on   the   access   conditions   to   each   target   service.   In  
practice,   the   monitoring   system   consists   of   a   set   of   probes   deployed   close   to   the  
services   under   control   or   partially   under   control   (obviously,   in   the   case   of  within  
reach  services  there  is  no  control  or  access  to  deploy  the  probes).  
To  test  the  web  services  it  is  necessary  to  select,  from  a  set  of  available  testing  tools,  
the  ones  that  are  most  suited  for  the  level  of  access  and  information  available  about  
each   service.   Three   tools   implementing   the   techniques   presented   in   Chapter   4   are  
included  in  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  to  cover  the  three  testing  scenarios  defined  in  Section  
3.1.3.  More   tools   can   easily   be   added,   provided   that   those   tools   follow   the   design  
approach  proposed  in  Section  3.2.    
The   outline   of   this   chapter   is   as   follows.   The   next   section   presents   the   overall  
architecture   of   the   tool   and   explains   the   role   of   each   component   in   the   process.  
Section   5.2   presents   the   centralized   controller   component   and   describes   its   role   of  
coordination   the   entire   process.   Section   5.3   presents   the   monitoring   system   and  
details   the   implementation  of   the  probes   that   constitute   it.   Section  5.4  presents   the  
testing   tools,   discusses   how   the   tools   are   assigned   to   the   services   to   be   tested   and  
explains  how  the  results  are  integrated  at  the  end.  Finally,  Section  5.5  concludes  the  
chapter.  
5.1 Architecture	  of	  the	  SOA-­‐Scanner	  
As  proposed  in  Section  3.3,  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  implements  three  main  steps:  
1. Architecture  Description:   the   tool   asks   the  user   to   specify   the   services   that  
act   as   entry   points   for   the   system   and,   if   possible,   information   about   the  
services  under  control,  including  input  domains.  It  is  also  possible  to  specify  
additional   services   (not   under   control),   resources   and   the   relations   among  
them;  
2. Profiling   Interactions:   based   on   the   description   provided,   the   tool   issues   a  
set  of  profiling  interactions  to  discover  additional  resources  and  services  and  
to   gather   complementary   information.   This   is   a   progressive   process   that  
finishes  when  no  more  services  can  be  discovered;  
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3. Testing  Services:  finally,  the  vulnerability  detection  phase  consists  on  testing  
each   service   using   the   most   effective   technique   available   and   also   on  
integrating  the  reports  from  the  multiple  tools  in  a  single  one.  
The  tool  is  implemented  in  a  modular  fashion  in  order  to  be  easily  extended.  Figure  
5.1   depicts   its   overall   architecture   (the   relation   of   the   tool   with   the   complete  
infrastructure  is  discussed  ahead  in  this  section).  
As  shown,  the  tool  is  divided  in  three  main  modules,  identifiable  in  the  figure:    
• Centralized  Controller:   subdivided  in   three  controllers   (profiling  controller,  
monitoring   controller,   and   testing   controller),   it   is   responsible   for   the  
coordination  of  the  process.  
• Monitoring   System:   consisting   of   a   set   of   probes   (W),   it   is   responsible   for  
collecting  information  about  the  architecture  of  the  infrastructure;    
• Testing  Tools:  composed  of   three   tools,   and  prepared   to   include  additional  
ones,  it  is  responsible  for  testing  the  services  to  detect  vulnerabilities.    
Note  that  some  optional  elements  are  represented  in  Figure  5.1  (elements  that  are  not  
always  applicable).  For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  workload  emulator,  the  user  has  
the  option  of  replacing  the  included  workload  generator  by  one  that  is  more  effective  
in  the  context  of  the  services  to  be  tested.  Also,  the  monitoring  system  (MS)  is  only  
applicable   in   the   case   of   services   under   control   (partially   or   totally).   To   better  
understand   this   and   how   the   tool   interacts   with   a   service-­‐‑based   infrastructure,  
Figure   5.2   depicts   where   each   component   is   located   considering   as   context   the  
reference   infrastructure   presented   in   Section   3.1.   In   the   case   represented,   the  
depicted  consumer  (C)  is  an  external  user  of  the  infrastructure.  The  user  of  the  SOA-­‐‑
Scanner   tool   is   assumed   to   be   the   provider   represented   by   P0,   and   the   services  
totally  or  partially  under  control  are  the  ones  that  the  tool  can  access  and  in  which  it  






    User input  
   Report Vulnerabilities Detected 
WE Workload Emulator 
 WG Workload generator 
 WI Workload injector 
 WG Ext. External workload generator 
 Testing Tools 
 IPT-WS Improved Penetration Testing 
 Sign-WS Attack Signatures and Interface Monitoring  
 RAD-WS Runtime Anomaly Detection  
 ... New tools easily pluggable 
CC Centralized Controller 
  PC Profiling Controller 
 MC Monitoring Controller 
 TC Testing Controller 
MS Monitoring System 
 W Probe 
SP Service Provider 
 WS Web Service under test 
R Resources 
 R0 XML Database 
 R1  Payment gateway 
 R2 Database 
 R3 FTP server 
--- Optional elements or connections 
Figure  5.1  –  Design  of  SOA-­‐‑Scanner.  
Interactions  between  the  modules  and  also  with  a  web  service  under  testing.  Some  of  the  
presented  modules  are  optional,  depending  on  the  web  service  testing  scenario  and  on  user  
options  to  improve  workload  generator.  
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Figure  5.2  –  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  components  in  the  infrastructure.  
The  centralized  controller  deploys  probes  in  the  interfaces  of  the  services  under  control  and  
uses  different  testing  techniques  depending  on  the  testing  scenario.    
5.2 Centralized	  Controller	  
The  centralized  controller  is  the  core  of  the  tool  and  consists  of  three  subcomponents  
that  interoperate  to  coordinate  the  process:    
1. Profiling   controller:   interfaces   with   the   tool’s   users   and   is   responsible   for  
controlling  the  generation  of  the  profiling  interactions;  
2. Monitoring  controller:   centralizes   the  monitoring  elements  and  maintains  a  
mapping  of  the  service-­‐‑based  infrastructure;  
3. Testing   controller:   schedules   the   testing   tasks   and  merges   the   results   in   a  
report  to  be  presented  to  the  user.  
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 Profiling	  Controller	  5.2.1
The   user   is   provided   with   a   graphical   user   interface   (GUI)   that   allows   defining  
services  and  resources  that  belong  to  the  target  infrastructure.  The  user  must  provide  
information   about,   at   least,   the   services   that   act   as   entry   points   to   the   system.  
However,  when  possible  he  must  also  provide  information  about  other  services  and  
resources,  as  well  as   the   relations  between   them  (Service-­‐‑to-­‐‑Service  and  Service-­‐‑to-­‐‑
Resource).  
For   each   service   or   resource,   the   user  must   provide   the  URL   via  which   it   can   be  
accessed   or   additional   information   about   how   this   can   be   obtained   (e.g.   a   set   of  
connection   properties).   The   controller   will,   in   background,   access   the   URL   to  
discover  information  about  the  service  or  resource  and,  when  applicable,  the  user  is  
asked  for  additional  information  (e.g.  parameter  input  types  and  domains).  For  each  
service  the  user  also  needs  to  define  if  it  is  under  control  (or  not).  For  each  resource  it  
may  be  necessary  to  select  the  type  of  resource,  although  in  most  cases  the  tool  can  
deduct  this  from  the  information  provided.  
For  example,  in  the  specific  case  of  a  SOAP  Web  Service,  the  user  must  provide  the  
URL  of  the  WSDL  file  that  describes  it.  This  file  is  processed  automatically  to  obtain  
the  list  of  operations,  parameters,  and  data  types.  However,  as  most  cases  the  valid  
values   for   each   parameter   (i.e.   the   domain   restrictions   of   the   parameter)   are   not  
available,   the   user   is   asked   to   provide   additional   information   about   the   valid  
domains  for  each  parameter.  
Based  on  the  specification  provided,  the  controller  creates  an  initial  mapping  of  the  
service-­‐‑based   infrastructure   (Architecture   in   Figure   5.2).   It   is   a   responsibility   of   the  
monitoring   controller   to   store   and   manage   this   mapping,   as   explained   in   Section  
5.2.2.  Using  information  about  the  architecture,  the  controller  creates  and  issues  a  set  
of   profiling   interactions   with   two   goals:   to   discover   additional   resources   and  
services   and   to   gather   complementary   information   (e.g.   to   train   vulnerability  
detection   tools  based  on   runtime  anomaly  detection,  as   is   the   case  of   the  RAD-­‐‑WS  
tool  described  in  Section  4.3).    
In  practice,  profiling  interactions  consist  of  running  a  set  of  workloads,  one  for  each  
of   the   services   known.   A   workload   is   a   set   of   invocations   to   the   service   that  
simulates  a  valid  and  non-­‐‑malicious  usage.  The  tool  is  able  to  automatically  generate  
a   random  workload   for   each   service  using   the   random  workload  generator   presented  
for   the   IPT-­‐‑WS   technique   in  Section  4.1.1   (as  discussed   there,   the  main  problem  of  
using   a   random   workload   generation   is   that   the   representativeness   of   the  
interactions  is  not  guaranteed).  Nevertheless,  the  modularity  of  the  tool  allows  easily  
integrating   components   that   implement   other   workload   generation   approaches,  
including   real   applications.   In  practice,   the   tool   allows   loading   the  workload   from  
xml   files   that   respect   a   certain   format,   but   the   user   can   also   opt   by   program   an  
adaptor  using  the  provided  API.  
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 Monitoring	  Controller	  5.2.2
Using  the  specification  provided  by  the  user,  an  initial  mapping  of  the  service-­‐‑based  
infrastructure  is  created.  The  monitoring  controller  is  responsible  for  managing  this  
mapping   of   the   architecture,   which   is   stored   using   an   xml   format,   following   the  
schema  depicted  in  Figure  5.3.    
As  we   can   observe,   the   format   allows   to   store   services,   resources   and   relations.   Each  
one   consists   of   an   URL   and   a   type.   The   relations   are   always   between   an   origin  
service  and  a  target  service  or  resource.  As  the  resources  are  not  tested  (this  is  out  of  
the  scope  of  the  tool),   it   is  neither  possible  nor  important  to  know  if  they  use  other  
resources.  The  services  are  the  tricky  part  of  the  definitions  as  it  is  necessary  to  store,  
in   addition   to   the   URL   and   type,   information   about   the   operations,   fields  
(parameters)  of  those  operations,  and  the  domains  of  each  field.  It  is  also  possible  to  
store  the  vulnerabilities  found  in  each  parameter  for  later  use.  
After   the   creation   of   the   initial   architecture,   the   monitoring   controller   starts   the  
monitoring  phase.   In  practice,   it  deploys  a  set  of  probes  close  to  the  services  under  
control  defined   initially   (see  Section  5.3).  The  monitoring  controller   then   listens   for  
information  reported  by  these  probes  to  update  the  architecture  mapping.    
As   the   workloads   are   progressively   submitted   to   the   services,   exercising   the  
infrastructure,  additional  services  and  resources  are  discovered  and  reported  by  the  
probes.   For   each   new   service   discovered   the   profiling   controller   is   requested   to  
create  the  respective  workload  (repeating  the  steps  discussed  above).   In  the  case  of  
the   services   that   are   totally   or   partially   under   control,   the   monitoring   controller  
deploys   the   probes   before   the   workload   is   submitted.   Finally,   the   monitoring  
controller   receives   the   information   collected   by   the   probes   and   updates   the  
architecture  file  accordingly  (Section  5.3  provides  more  details  on  the  functioning  of  





Figure  5.3  –  Schema  of  the  XML  format  used  to  store  the  architecture.  
This  format  allows  storing  all  the  information  about  the  services  and  resources  that  constitute  
the  architecture  to  be  tested,  including  vulnerability  information.    
 Testing	  Controller	  5.2.3
During   the   testing  phase,   the   testing  controller  must   schedule   the   testing   tasks.  As  
discussed,  the  services  to  be  tested  may  be  under  the  control  of  multiple  providers.  
To   accomplish   the   different   testing   scenarios,   the   testing   controller   needs   several  
vulnerability   detection   techniques,   which   should   be   implemented   following   the  
generic  design  proposed  in  Section  3.2.    
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Different  techniques  require  diverse  types  of  access  to  the  services  and  diverse  types  
of   information   to   implement   the  vulnerability  detection  process   (i.e.   several   testing  
scenarios  exist,  as  discussed  in  Section  3.1.3).  It  is  thus  a  responsibility  of  the  testing  
controller  to  assign  to  each  service  the  technique  (or  techniques)  that  will  be  used  to  
test  it,  according  to  the  specific  testing  scenario.  A  key  aspect  is  that,  depending  on  
the  level  of  access  and  information  available  about  each  service,  multiple  techniques  
may  be   applicable.  This  way,  using   the  knowledge  available,   the   testing   controller  
ranks  the  applicable  detection  techniques  and,  for  each  service,  selects  one  or  more  
(depending   on   the   configuration)   from   the   highest   ranked   techniques   (Section   5.4  
presents  the  vulnerability  detection  tools  used,  the  scenarios  applicable  to  each  one,  
and  discusses  how  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  ranks  these  tools).  
After  completing  the  testing  tasks,  the  testing  controller  builds  an  integrated  report  
to  present  to  the  user.  In  practice,  the  vulnerabilities  detected  are  associated  with  its  
location  (web  service,  operation,  parameter)  and  added  to  the  architecture  mapping.  
When  more  than  one  vulnerability  detection  technique  is  scheduled  to  test  the  same  
web  service,   it   is  necessary  to  deal  with  contradictory  results  because,  as  explained  
previously,   different   tools   frequently   report   distinct   vulnerabilities   for   the   same  
piece  of  code   (the  current   implementation  associates   to  each  vulnerability   the   tools  
that   reported   it   and  weighs   this   information   using   the   ranking   defined   in   Section  
5.4).  
5.3 Monitoring	  System	  
The  monitoring   system   consists   of   a   network   of   probes   (distributed   as   shown   in  
Figure  5.2)  that  have  the  responsibility  of  collecting  information  about  the  interface  
activity  originated  in  services  totally  or  partially  under  control.  To  achieve  this,  each  
time   a  new   service   is   found  and   classified   as  under   control,   the   controller  module  
deploys  probes  in  this  service,  following  the  steps  presented  later  in  this  section.  
As   discussed   in   Section   3.3,   there   are   multiple   alternatives   available   for  
implementing   these  probes,   including:  network  packet   sniffing,  use  of  proxies   and  
driver  instrumentation  (details  on  these  alternatives  are  provided  in  Section  3.2.3).  In  
its  current  implementation,  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  uses  probes  implemented  making  use  
of   driver   instrumentation   with   aspect-­‐‑oriented   programing   (AOP),   which   allows  
injecting  crosscutting  concerns  into  any  application  in  a  non-­‐‑intrusive  way  (Kiczales  
et   al.   2002).   In   this   case,   the   aspects   used   are   as   simple   as   possible   to   avoid  
introducing  bugs.    Figure  5.4  presents  an  example  of  an  aspect.  
As   it   is   possible   to   observe,   minimum   changes   are   introduced   in   the   drivers.   In  
practice,  a  light  thread  is  added  to  each  driver.  This  thread  runs  in  background  and  
is   responsible   for  handling   the   task  of   reporting   the  new   interactions   found   to   the  
centralized   controller.   The   Around   advices   (line   3)   are   introduced   to   intercept   the  
necessary  methods.    In  this  case,  the  interception  consists  of  extracting  the  necessary  
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values  from  the  intercepted  method  arguments  (line  5),  check  if  they  are  new  (line  6)  
and   if   so  deliver   it   to   the  background   thread   (line  7),   and   finally  proceed  with   the  
execution  of  the  method  (line  8).  This  way,  the  impact  of  the  probe  in  the  behavior  of  
the  application  is  reduced  to  a  minimum.  Nevertheless,  the  introduced  method  is  the  
result  of  well  tested  code  effort  and  the  resulting  drivers  were  also  thoroughly  tested  




2: public class AroundConnectionProbe extends AbstractProbe { 
 
3:    @Around("execution(* java.sql.Driver.connect(..))") 
4:    public Object aroundConnect(ProceedingJoinPoint p) throws {       
5:       final String dbUrl = (String) p.getArgs()[0]; 
6:       if (databaseUrls.isNew(dbUrl)) {             
7:          Thread.enqueue(dbUrl); 
          } 
8:       return p.proceed(); 
      }     
   } 
Figure  5.4  –  Example  of  an  Aspect  in  Java.  
The  code  intercepts  jdbc  connections  and  in  the  case  of  the  new  ones,  enqueues  to  a  
background  thread  that  will  report  to  the  controller,  and  proceeds  immediately.  
The   tool   includes   aspects   that   can   be   used   to   instrument   three   types   of   drivers,  
which  is  sufficient  to  test  a  complex  infrastructure  consisting  of  SOAP  web  services  
using  relational  database  solutions  or  XML  based  solutions.  Those  aspects  are:  
• JAX-­‐‑WS:  the  Java  API  for  XML-­‐‑Based  Web  Services  is  used  for  creating  web  
services.  It  can  be  also  be  used  to  invoke  other  web  services  (Kotamraju  2007).  
In  this  case,  the  probe  monitors  interactions  among  services.  
• JDBC:  the  Java  Database  Connectivity  API  is  designed  to  access  any  kind  of  
tabular   data,   but   it   is   mostly   used   to   access   relational   databases   in   Java  
applications   (Reese   and   Oram   2000).   In   this   case,   the   probe   monitors   the  
interactions  with  database  resources.  
• JDOM:   a   complete   Java-­‐‑based   solution   for   accessing,   manipulating,   and  
outputting   XML   data   from   Java   code   (Hunter   2002).   It   supports   XPath,   a  
query  language  for  selecting  nodes  from  an  XML  document.  In  this  case,  the  
probes  monitor  the  access  to  XML  resources.  
The   output   of   this   process   consists   of   new   driver   libraries   that   can   be   used   by  
referring  the  modified  versions  in  the  classpath  of  the  deployed  application  (instead  
of  the  original  ones).  In  practice,  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  copies  the  required  set  of  libraries  
to   the   application   servers   where   the   web   services   are   running   and   replaces   the  
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original  ones  by  updating  the  classpath  parameter.  At  runtime,  this  enhanced  driver  
library   monitors   the   target   interface.   During   the   execution   of   the   workloads  
(profiling   phase),   the   probes  monitor   the   interactions   and   report   the   newly   found  
ones   to   the   centralized   controller   via   the   network,  which   updates   the   architecture  
accordingly.  This  process  continues   in  an   iterative  way,  expanding   the  mapping  of  
the   architecture   of   the   infrastructure,   until   no   new   services   are   detected,   i.e.   until  
finishing  the  execution  of  the  workloads  for  all  the  services  known.    
5.4 Testing	  Tools	  
After  completing  the  profiling  phase,  the  services  are  tested.  It  is  possible,  although  
improbable,   that  new  services  are   found   in   this  phase.  These  services  must  also  be  
reported  to  the  controller  in  order  for  the  process  to  be  applied  to  them  also  (starting  
from  the  profiling  phase).  
As  mentioned  before,  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  supports  the  integration  of  testing  tools  that  
implement   the   generic   approach   and   components   presented   in   Section   3.2.   The  
current  implementation  includes  three  tools  implementing  the  techniques  presented  
in   Chapter   4,   which   cover   the   three   testing   scenarios   defined   in   the   reference  
infrastructure  in  Section  3.1.3:  1)  within-­‐‑reach,  2)  partially  under  control,  and  3)  fully  
under  control.  Just  to  recall,  the  included  tools  are:    
1. Penetration  Testing  (IPT-­‐‑WS):  black-­‐‑box  technique  that  tries  to  penetrate  the  
service  by  issuing  a  huge  amount  of  interactions;  
2. Attack  Signatures  and  Interface  Monitoring  (Sign-­‐‑WS):  penetration  testing  
improved  with   extra   information,   yet  without   needing   to   access   or  modify  
the  service  code;  
3. Runtime  Anomaly  Detection  (RAD-­‐‑WS):  profiles  the  behavior  of  the  service  
to   detect   vulnerabilities   by   finding   deviations   from   the   normal   (earned)  
behavior  during  an  attack  phase.  
To  better  understand  the  context,  Table  5.1  crosses  the  testing  techniques  against  the  
scenarios  where  it  is  possible  to  apply  them  (report  to  Chapter  4  for  details  on  these  
techniques  and  the  discussion  on  their  weaknesses  and  strengths).  
The  techniques  in  the  table  are  ordered  from  the  least  effective  (IPT-­‐‑WS)  to  the  most  
effective   (RAD-­‐‑WS).   This   ranking   was   established   using   the   results   from   the  
benchmarking   campaigns   presented   in   Chapter   7.   These   results   are   far   from  
unexpected,  as  the  most  effective  tools  use  more  information  than  the  less  effective  
ones,   constraining   the   scenarios   in  which   they   can  be  used   (e.g.   the  most   effective  
tool  (RAD-­‐‑WS)  can  only  be  used  in  services  under  control,  but  the  less  effective  can  




Table  5.1  –  Correlation  between  testing  techniques  and  scenarios.  
The  check  symbol  marks  the  scenarios  in  which  each  tool  is  available.  The  tools  are  




(see  Section  4.1)  
Sign-­‐‑WS    
(see  Section  4.2)  
RAD-­‐‑WS  
(see  Section  4.3)  
Within-­‐‑Reach   ✓   ✗   ✗  
Partially  Under  
Control   ✓   ✓   ✗  
Under  Control   ✓   ✓   ✓  
New   tools   that   extend   the   design   presented   in   Section   3.2   can   be   easily   added   to  
SOA-­‐‑Scanner.   For   this,   it   is   necessary   to   add   the   libraries   of   the   tool   to   the   SOA-­‐‑
Scanner  and  register  the  tool  in  the  configuration  file.  It  is  also  necessary  to  configure  
in  which  scenarios  the  tool  can  be  used  (in  practice,  fill  another  column  in  the  Table  
5.1)   and   to   provide   information   about   the   ranking   of   the   tool   in   respect  with   the  
existing  ones.  
The   testing   task   finishes   with   the   tool   reporting   to   the   testing   controller   the  
vulnerabilities   identified.   This   report   includes,   for   each   tested   service,   information  
about   the   vulnerabilities   detected:   web   service,   operation,   parameter,   and   type   of  
vulnerability.  The  testing  controller  maintains  a  global  report  of   the  vulnerabilities,  
executing  a  process  based  in  two  key  steps:  1)  the  reported  vulnerabilities  are  added  
to   the   architecture   description   and   indexed   by   their   location   in   the   infrastructure:  
web  service,  operation,  parameter;  2)  the  tool  extracts  all  the  vulnerabilities  reported  
and  unifies   them   in   a   single   report,   keeping   the   information   of   the   location   of   the  
vulnerability,   its   type   and  which   tools   reported   it   vulnerability.   Figure   5.5   depicts  
this  process.    
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Figure  5.5  –  Process  to  Integrate  the  Reports  of  multiple  tools.  
The  vulnerabilities  are  added  to  the  mapping  of  the  architecture  indexed  by  operation  
parameter  (field).  In  the  second  step,  all  the  vulnerabilities  are  extracted  to  create  an  
integrated  report.  
5.5 Conclusion	  
This   chapter   presented   the   SOA-­‐‑Scanner,   an   extensible   tool   implementing   the  
integrated   approach   for   vulnerability   detection   in   service-­‐‑based   infrastructures  
presented  Section  3.3.  Although  the  current  implementation  targets  only  SOAP  web  
services,   and   focuses   on   injection   vulnerabilities,   the   tool   follows   a   modular  
architecture   and   can   be   easily   extended   to   more   types   of   software   services   and  
security  vulnerabilities.  
The   tool   is   based   in   three  main   components   that   allow   implementing   the   generic  
steps  of  the  approach.  The  first  is  a  centralized  controller  that,  besides  controlling  the  
execution  of   the  complete  process,   is   in  charge  of  receiving  input   information  from  
the  user  and  reporting   the   testing   results   to  him.  Additionally,   it   is   responsible   for  
scheduling  the  profiling  interactions  and  testing  tasks.  The  second  is  the  monitoring  
system   that,   using   a   set   of   probes   deployed   to   the   services,   collects   information  
about  the  interactions  between  the  parts  of  the  infrastructure,  also  discovering  new  
services  and  resources  to  be  tested.  The  final  component  is  in  charge  of  integrating  a  
set   of   vulnerability   detection   tools   following   a   generic   and  modular   design.   Three  
testing   tools   are   already   included,   covering   different   testing   scenarios   and   taking  
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advantage  of   the  different   levels  of  access   to   the  services.  Adding  new   tools   to   the  
component  is  easy  and  improves  the  effectiveness  of  the  testing  process.  
A  case  study  demonstrating  the  capabilities  of  the  tool  is  presented  in  Chapter  7.  The  
case   study   consists   of   a   service-­‐‑based   infrastructure   that   represents   a   simple  
organization.   The   infrastructure   is   composed   by   different   services   with   different  
levels  of  access  and  using  different  types  of  resources  and,  consequently,  containing  
different  types  of  vulnerabilities.  
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Chapter	  6	  
Benchmarking	  Vulnerability	  
Detection	  Tools	  for	  Services	  
Vulnerability  detection   tools   are   frequently   considered   the   silver-­‐‑bullet   for   finding  
vulnerabilities   in   web   services.   As   mentioned   before,   developers   and   system  
integrators  widely   use   such   tools   to   perform   automated   security   checking   in  web  
applications   and   services,  which  makes   them   some  of   the  best   examples  of   critical  
artifacts  for  secure  software  development.  
Due  to  time  constraints  or  resource  limitations,  developers  frequently  have  to  select  
a  specific   tool   from  the   large  set  of   tools  available   (usually  without  really  knowing  
how   good   each   tool   is)   and   strongly   rely   on   that   tool   to   detect   potential   security  
problems  in  the  code  being  developed.  Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that  the  performance  
of  a  given  tool  strongly  depends  on  the  specificities  of   the  application  scenario  (i.e.  
the   class   of   target   web   services   (e.g.   SOAP,   REST),   the   types   of   vulnerabilities   to  
detect,   etc.),   and   that   the   same   tool   may   have   different   performance   levels   in  
different  scenarios.    
In   this   context,   developers   and   researchers   urge   the   definition   of   a   practical  
approach  that  helps  them  assessing  and  comparing  alternative  tools  concerning  their  
ability   to   detect   vulnerabilities.   Benchmarking   is   a   standard   way   to   evaluate   and  
compare  different   systems  or   components   according   to   specific   characteristics   (e.g.  
performance,  dependability,  etc.)  (Gray  1992).  Several  works  have  tried  to  assess  the  
effectiveness  of  vulnerability  detection  tools  (e.g.,  (Antunes  and  Vieira  2009a;  Vieira,  
Antunes,  and  Madeira  2009;  Fonseca,  Vieira,  and  Madeira  2007;  Wagner  et  al.  2005))  
however,   none   has   proposed   a   standard   approach   that   allows   the   comparison   of  
results,  as  is  the  case  of  benchmarking.  
To  address  this  problem,  we  propose  an  approach  for  benchmarking  vulnerability  
detection   tools   for  web   services.   This   approach   specifies   all   the   components   and  
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steps   needed   to   define   benchmarks   to   assess   and   compare   alternative   tools,   with  
particular   focus   on   two  well   known  metrics:   precision   and   recall.   Additionally,   it  
defines   the   other   required   components,   which   include   a   workload   (work   that   the  
vulnerability  detectors  under  testing  have  to  do,  in  the  form  of  a  set  of  web  services  
that   should   be   searched   for   vulnerabilities)   and   a   well-­‐‑defined   benchmarking  
procedure   (set   of   steps   that   have   to   be   followed   for   conducting   a   benchmarking  
campaign,   ranging   from   the   preparation   of   the   experiments   to   the   ranking   of   the  
tools   and   selection   of   the   most   adequate   one).   A   key   aspect   if   that   the   proposed  
approach   is   generic   and   can   be   used   to   specify   different   benchmarks   for   specific  
application  domains  and  different  types  of  vulnerabilities.  
The  benchmarking  approach  has  been  used  to  define  two  concrete  benchmarks.  The  
first   targets   tools   capable   of   detecting   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   in   SOAP   web  
services,   including   detection   approaches   based   on   penetration   testing,   static   code  
analysis,   and   runtime   anomaly   detection.   This   benchmark   is   based   on   a   well  
defined   and   large   set   of   web   services   adapted   from   standard   performance  
benchmarks,   and   includes   both   vulnerable   and   non-­‐‑vulnerable   versions   of   the  
services.   The  main   limitation   of   this   benchmark   is   that,   although  based   on   a  well-­‐‑
defined  set  of  rules,  it  is  not  protected  against  "ʺgaming"ʺ  (i.e.  adaptations/tuning  that  
allow   producing   optimistic   or   biased   results).   In   fact,   as   the   workload   is   known,  
providers  can  easily  tune  their  tools  to  maximum  effectiveness  in  the  context  of  the  
benchmark,  while  failing  in  different  scenarios.    
To  overcome  this  limitation,  we  propose  a  second  benchmark  for  penetration  testing  
tools  capable  of  detecting  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities   in  SOAP  web  services.  This  
benchmark  circumvents   the  “gaming”  problem  by  allowing  the  benchmark  user  to  
specify   the  workload   (i.e.   the  workload   is   not   predefined   and   is   unknown   to   the  
tools’   providers)   that   best   represents   his   specific   development   conditions,   thus  
providing  more   realistic   (and  specific   to   the  development  environment)   results.  To  
support  the  user  in  the  task  of  characterizing  the  workload,  the  benchmark  includes  
a   procedure   and   a   tool   to   identify   vulnerabilities   in   the   target   web   services,   thus  
avoiding  the  need  for  conducting  such  analysis  manually.  
The   outline   of   this   chapter   is   as   follows.   Next   section   presents   the   generic  
benchmarking   approach   and   its   components.   Section   6.2   presents   the   benchmark  
based  on  the  predefined  workload,  while  Section  6.3  discusses  the  benchmark  based  
on  the  user-­‐‑defined  workload.  Section  6.4  discusses  aspects  related  to  the  validation  
of  key  benchmarking  properties.  Finally,  Section  6.5  concludes  the  chapter.    
6.1 Generic	  Benchmarking	  Approach	  
Our   proposal   to   benchmark   vulnerability   detection   tools   is   inspired   on  
measurement-­‐‑based   techniques.   The   basic   idea   is   to   exercise   the   tools   under  
benchmarking  using  web  services  code  with  and  without  vulnerabilities  and,  based  
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on   the   detected   vulnerabilities,   calculate   a   small   set   of   measures   that   portray   the  
detection  capabilities  of  the  tools.    
Due  to  the  high  diversity  of  web  services,  types  of  vulnerabilities,  and  vulnerability  
detection   approaches,   the   definition   of   a   benchmark   for   all   vulnerability   detection  
tools   is   an   unattainable   goal.   This   way,   as   recommended   in   (Gray   1993),   a  
benchmark  must  be  specifically  targeted  to  a  particular  domain.  In  fact,  the  division  
of   the   spectrum   into   well-­‐‑defined   areas   is   necessary   to   make   it   possible   to   make  
choices   during   the   definition   of   the   benchmark   components.   In   the   context   of   this  
work,   the  definition   of   the   benchmarking   domain   includes   selecting   the   class   of  
web  services,  the  type  of  vulnerabilities,  and  the  vulnerability  detection  approaches  
for  the  target  tools  under  benchmarking,  which  mainly  influence  the  definition  of  the  
workload  (see  Section  6.1.2).  
The  main  components  of  a  benchmark  are:  
• Metrics:   characterize   the   effectiveness   of   the   tools   under   benchmarking   in  
detecting   the  vulnerabilities   that  exist   in   the  workload  services.  The  metrics  
must  be  easy  to  understand  and  must  allow  the  comparison  among  different  
tools.  
• Workload:   represents   the   work   that   a   tool   must   perform   during   the  
benchmark   execution.   In   practice,   it   consists   of   a   set   of   services   (with   and  
without  security  vulnerabilities)  that  will  be  used  to  exercise  the  vulnerability  
detection   tools  during   the  benchmarking  process.  Depending  on   the  goal  of  
the   benchmark,   the   workload   can   be   predefined   (i.e.   defined   in   the  
benchmark  specification  itself)  or  provided  by  the  benchmark  user.  
• Procedure:   describes   the   procedure   and   rules   that  must   be   followed  when  
executing  the  benchmark.  
The  procedure  and  rules  have  to  be  specified  during  the  definition  of  the  benchmark.  
In   fact,   those   procedures   and   rules   are   the   core   of   the   benchmark   specification.  
Although  this   is,  obviously,  dependent  on  the  specific  benchmark,   in   the  following  
points  we  identify  some  guidelines  on  specific  aspects  needed  in  most  of  the  cases:  
• Standardized   procedures   for   “translating”   the   workload   defined   in   the  
benchmark  specification  into  the  actual  workload  that  will  be  applied  to  the  
tools   under   benchmarking.   These   procedures   guarantee   that   the   different  
users  understand  and  use  the  benchmark  in  a  consistent  way.    
• Uniform   conditions   to   build   the   experimental   benchmark   setup,   perform  
initialization   tasks   that   might   be   defined   in   the   specification,   and   run   the  
benchmark   according   to   the   specification   (i.e.   apply   the   workload   and  
calculate  the  metrics).  
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• Rules   related   to   the   collection   of   the   experimental   results.   These   rules  may  
include,   for   example,   available   possibilities   for   system   instrumentation,  
degree  of   interference  allowed,  common  references  and  precision  for   timing  
measures,  etc.  
• Rules   for   the  production  of   the   final  measures   from   the  direct   experimental  
results,  such  as  calculation  formulas,  ways  to  deal  with  uncertainties,  errors  
and  confidence  intervals,  etc.  
• Disclosures   required   for   interpreting   the   benchmark   measures.   In   a   similar  
way   to  what   happens   in   other   domains   (Kanoun   and   Spainhower   2008),   a  
report  may  be  required  in  order  for  results  to  be  considered  compliant  with  
the   benchmark   specification.   The   goal   is   to   allow   the   reproduction   of   the  
experiments  in  other  sites  using  the  same  vulnerability  detection  tools.  
• Rules  to  avoid  “gaming”  to  produce  optimistic  or  biased  results.  For  example,  
rules  regarding  the  use  and/or  definition  of  the  workload.  
 Metrics	  6.1.1
The  benchmark  metrics  should  be  computed  from  the  information  collected  during  
the   benchmark   run   and   must   follow   the   well-­‐‑established   measuring   philosophy  
typically  used  in  performance  and  dependability  benchmarking  (Gray  1993;  Kanoun  
and   Spainhower   2008).   In   fact,   benchmarks   should   provide   relative  measures   (i.e.  
measures   related   to   the   conditions   disclosed   in   the   benchmark   report)   that   can   be  
used  for  comparison  or  for  improvement  and  tuning.  For  example,  it  is  well  known  
that   performance   benchmarking   results   do   not   represent   an   absolute   measure   of  
performance  and   cannot  be  used   for  planning   the   capacity  or   to  predict   the   actual  
performance  of   the  system  in   field.   In  a  similar  way,   the  measures   in  a  benchmark  
for   vulnerability   detectors  must   be   understood   as   results   that   can   only   be   used   to  
characterize  the  tools  in  a  relative  fashion  (e.g.  to  compare  alternative  tools).  
A  key  difficulty   related   to   the  definition  of   the  benchmark  metrics   is   that  different  
vulnerability  detection  tools  report  vulnerabilities  in  different  ways.  For  example,  for  
penetration   testing   tools   (that   identify   vulnerabilities   based   on   the   application  
response)  vulnerabilities  are  reported  for  each  vulnerable  input.  On  the  other  hand,  
for   static   analysis   tools   (that   vet   code   looking   for   possible   security   issues)  
vulnerabilities   are   reported   for   each   vulnerable   line   in   the   code.   Due   to   this  
dichotomy,   it   is   very  difficult   (or   even   impossible)   to   compare   the   effectiveness   of  
tools   that   implement   different   vulnerability   detection   approaches,   based   on   the  
number   of   vulnerabilities   reported   for   the   same   piece   of   code.   This   way,   our  
proposal   is   to   characterize   vulnerability   detection   tools   using   the   F-­‐‑Measure  
proposed  by  van  Rijsbergen  (Van  Rijsbergen  1979),  which  is  largely  independent  of  
the  way  vulnerabilities  are  counted.  In  fact,  it  represents  the  harmonic  mean  of  two  
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very  popular  measures  (precision  and  recall),  which,   in  the  context  of  vulnerability  
detection,  can  be  defined  as:  
• Precision:   the  ratio  of  correctly  detected  vulnerabilities   to   the  number  of  all  
detected  vulnerabilities.  In  our  context  it  can  be  represented  as:  
€ 
precision = TPTP + FP   
  
(1)  
• Recall:  the  ratio  of  correctly  detected  vulnerabilities  to  the  number  of  known  
vulnerabilities.  In  our  context  it  can  be  represented  as:  
€ 




o TP  (true  positives)   is   the  number  of   true  vulnerabilities  detected  (i.e.  
vulnerabilities  that,  in  fact,  exist  in  the  code);  
o FP   (false  positives)   is   the  number   of   vulnerabilities  detected   that,   in  
fact,  do  not  exist;  
o TV   (true   vulnerabilities)   is   the   total   number   of   vulnerabilities   that  
exist  in  the  code.  
Assuming  an  equal  weight  for  precision  and  recall,  the  formula  for  the  F-­‐‑Measure  is:  
€ 
F −Measure = 2 ⋅ precision ⋅ recallprecision + recall   
  
(3)  
A   highly   effective   tool   will   generate   a   high   F-­‐‑Measure   (which   obviously   ranges  
between   0   and   1).   For   example,   consider   a   set   of   100   vulnerabilities   in   a   piece   of  
code.  A  tool  that  achieves  a  precision  of  0.7  is  able  to  detected  vulnerabilities  with  a  
probability  of  70%.  A  recall  of  0.8  expresses  that  80%  of  all  the  known  vulnerabilities  
are   detected   and   that   20%   are   missed.   In   this   case   the   F-­‐‑Measure   would   be  
approximately  0.7466.    
The   three  metrics  can  be  used   to  establish  a   ranking  of   several   tools  depending  on  
the  purposes  of  the  benchmark  user  (i.e.  to  select  the  tool  with  the  highest  precision,  
the  highest  recall,  or  having  the  best  compromise  between  precision  and  recall).  Note  
that   these  are  proven  metrics   that  are   typically  used   to  portray   the  effectiveness  of  
  Chapter  6  
  108  
many  computer  systems  (Van  Rijsbergen  1979),  particularly  in  information  retrieval.  
Thus,  they  are  easy  to  be  understood  by  most  users.  
 Workload	  6.1.2
The  workload  defines   the  work   that   has   to   be   done   by   the   vulnerability   detection  
tools  during  the  benchmark  execution.  In  other  words,  the  workload  should  include  
the  code   that  will  be  used   to  exercise   the  vulnerability  detection  capabilities  of   the  
tools  under  benchmarking.  It  is  mainly  influenced  by  three  factors:  
• The   class   of   web   services   (e.g.   SOAP,   REST),   which   allows   defining   the  
characteristics   of   the   services   that   will   be   used   to   exercise   the   tools   under  
benchmarking;  
• The   types   of   vulnerabilities   (e.g.   SQL   Injection,   XPath   Injection,   file  
execution)   to  be  detected  by  the  tools.  This  defines  vulnerabilities   that  must  
exist  in  the  workload;  
• The   vulnerability   detection   approaches   (e.g.   penetration   testing,   static  
analysis,  anomaly  detection),  which  specify  the  approaches  used  by  the  tools  
under  benchmarking  to  detect  vulnerabilities.  
Three  different  types  of  workloads  can  be  considered  for  benchmarking  purposes:    
• Real  workloads:   these   are  made   of   applications   used   in   real   environments  
that  have  real  vulnerabilities.  Benchmarks  using  real  workloads  are  expected  
to   be   quite   representative.  However,  many   applications   and   vulnerabilities  
may   be   needed   to   achieve   good   representativeness   and   those   applications  
frequently  require  some  adaptation.  
• Realistic  workloads:  artificial  workloads  that  are  based  on  the  adaptation  of  
real  applications  in  the  domain  of  the  benchmark.  Although  artificial,  realistic  
workloads   still   reflect   real   situations   and   are   more   portable   than   real  
workloads.  
• Synthetic  workloads:  a  synthetic  workload  can  be  a  set  of  randomly  selected  
code   elements   in   which   vulnerabilities   are   artificially   injected.   Synthetic  
workloads  are  easy  to  use  but  their  representativeness  is  questionable.  
In   summary,   the   workload   includes   the   web   services   code   that   will   be   used   to  
exercise  the  vulnerability  detection  capabilities  of  the  tools  under  benchmarking.  For  
example,   the  workload  for  a  benchmark  targeting  static  code  analysis  tools  capable  
of   detecting   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   in  web   services  must   include   the   source  
code  of  web  services  with  realistic  (and  well  identified)  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities.  
On  the  other  hand,  for  penetration  testers  access  to  the  source  code  is  not  needed.  
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Two  options  are  available   regarding   the  definition  of   the  workload   (these  apply   to  
the  three  types  of  workloads  defined  above):    
• Predefined   workload:   the   benchmark   includes   a   predefined   set   of   web  
services  with  vulnerabilities.  
• User-­‐‑defined  workload:   the  benchmark  leaves  to  the  user  the  responsibility  
of  selecting  the  target  set  of  services.    
While  the  first  approach  guarantees  some  level  of  standardization  and  uniformity  of  
results   across   different   executions   of   the   benchmark,   the   second   allows  
circumventing   the   “gaming”   problem   and   best   represents   the   user   specific  
development  conditions,   thus  providing  more   realistic   results.  A  key  aspect   is   that  
the  workload  should   include  both  vulnerable  and  non-­‐‑vulnerable  services   in  order  
to  better  characterize  the  tools  under  assessment  (e.g.  vulnerable  services  are  useful  
to   gather   coverage   metrics   while   non-­‐‑vulnerable   services   help   on   assessing   false  
positive  rates).  
In   both   cases,   information   about   the   vulnerabilities   that   exist   in   the   target   web  
services  is  needed  in  order  to  be  able  to  calculate  the  metrics.  This  can  be  obtained  by  
extensively  searching  the  web  services  for  vulnerabilities,  using  different  techniques,  
including   penetration   testing,   code   inspection,   static   analysis,   etc.   For   the   case   of  
predefined   workloads   this   information   must   be   provided   together   with   the  
benchmark   specification.   On   the   other   hand,   for   user-­‐‑defined   workloads,   the  
benchmark   may   provide   only   guidelines   on   how   to   perform   the   workload  
characterization  or  include  tools  to  facilitate  the  work.  
As   different   vulnerability   detection   approaches   report   vulnerabilities   in   different  
ways,  different  characterizations  about   the  existing  vulnerabilities  may  be  required  
(e.g.   the  number  of  vulnerable   inputs   is  needed  for  penetration   testing   tools,  while  
the   number   of   vulnerable   lines   of   code   is   required   for   static   analysis   tools),  
depending   on   the   vulnerability   detection   approaches   of   tools   targeted   by   the  
benchmark  (as  defined  in  the  benchmark  domain).  
 Procedure	  6.1.3
Although  the  detailed  procedure  depends  on  the  specificities  of  the  benchmark,  we  
proposed  three  main  phases:  
1. Preparation:  prepare  the  benchmark  execution,  including:  
a. Workload   selection   and   characterization:   this   is   a   step   that   is  
required   only   when   the   benchmark   leaves   to   the   user   the  
responsibility   of   selecting   the   target   services.   In   such   case,   the   user  
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has   to   define   the   web   services   and   characterize   the   existing  
vulnerabilities  (as  discussed  before).  
b. Tools   identification:   select   the   vulnerability   detection   tools   to   be  
benchmarked.  
2. Execution:  use  the  tools  under  benchmarking  to  detect  vulnerabilities  in  the  
workload  services.  
3. Comparison:  characterize  the  tools  benchmarked.  This  includes  two  steps:  
a. Metrics  calculation:  analyze   the  vulnerabilities  reported  by  the   tools  
(i.e.   confirm  true  positives  and   identify   false  positives)  and  calculate  
the  metrics.  
b. Ranking  and  selection:   rank   the   tools  under  benchmarking  using  F-­‐‑
Measure,  precision,  and  recall.  Based  on  the  preferred  ranking,  select  
the  most  effective  tool  (or  tools).  
In  the  case  of  benchmarks  based  on  a  predefined  workload  Step  1.a  is  not  required,  
as   the   target   web   services   are   characterized   in   the   benchmark   specification  
(including   the   number   of   existing   vulnerabilities).   On   the   other   hand,   for  
benchmarks  based  on  a  user-­‐‑defined  workload  Step  1.a   is   extremely   relevant,   as   it  
greatly  influences  the  benchmark  results  (e.g.  if  the  workload  services  do  not  contain  
representative   vulnerabilities   then   the   measures   will   not   be   representative   of   the  
tools  effectiveness).  
The   benchmark   execution   is   a   straightforward   process   and   consists   of   using   each  
tool   to   detect   vulnerabilities   in   the   workload   code.   Depending   on   the   tool   under  
benchmarking   this   may   require   some   configuration   of   the   parameters.   After  
executing   the  benchmark   it   is  necessary   to   compare   the  vulnerabilities  detected  by  
the   tool   with   the   ones   that   effectively   exist   in   the   workload   code.   Vulnerabilities  
correctly  detected  are  counted  as  true  positives  and  vulnerabilities  detected  but  that  
do  not  exist  in  the  code  are  counted  as  false  positives.  This  is  the  information  needed  
to  calculate  the  precision  and  recall  of  the  tool,  and  consequently  the  F-­‐‑measure.  
6.2 Benchmark	  with	  a	  Predefined	  Workload	  
[VDBenchWS-­‐pd]	   	  
In   this   section   we   present   a   benchmark   (VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd)   based   on   a   workload  
consisting   of   a  well   defined   and   large   set   of  web   services   adapted   from   standard  
performance  benchmarks,  including  both  vulnerable  and  non-­‐‑vulnerable  versions  of  
the  services.  The  benchmark  targets  the  following  domain:    
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• Class  of  web  services:  SOAP  web  services  implemented  in  Java;  
• Type  of  vulnerabilities:  SQL  Injection;  
• Vulnerability  detection  approaches:  penetration  testing,  static  code  analysis,  
and  runtime  anomaly  detection.  
The   reasoning   behind   the   selection   of   this   domain   is   as   follows.   Web   services  
implemented   in   Java   are   nowadays   widely   used   in   many   scenarios,   with   several  
frameworks   available   to   implement   and   support   the   development   (Curbera   et   al.  
2002;  D.  A  Chappell  and  Jewell  2002a).  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  are  particularly  
relevant   in  web  services   (Christey  and  Martin  2007),  as   these   frequently  use  a  data  
persistence   solution   based   in   a   relational   database.   Finally,   we   have   all   the  
information  needed  regarding   the  vulnerabilities   in  predefined  set  of  web  services,  
which   are   quite   representative   of   real   scenarios.   Although   (virtually)   any  
vulnerability   detection   approach   can   be   used   to   detect   vulnerabilities   in   these  
services,  the  benchmark  targets  specifically  penetration  testing,  static  code  analysis,  
and   runtime   anomaly  detection   (Arkin,   Stender,   and  McGraw  2005;  Ayewah   et   al.  
2008;  Kruegel  and  Vigna  2003),  which  are  widely  used  techniques  (and  that  include  
the  ones  used  by  the  tools  proposed  in  Chapter  4).  
As   mentioned   before,   the   workload   is   the   component   most   influenced   by   the  
benchmarking  domain  and   strongly  determines   the  benchmark   results.   In  order   to  
define   a   representative   workload   we   have   decided   to   adapt   code   from   three  
standard   benchmarks   developed   by   the   Transactions   processing   Performance  
Council,  namely:  TPC-­‐‑App,  TPC-­‐‑C,  and  TPC-­‐‑W  (see  details  on  these  benchmarks  at  
(Transaction   Processing   Performance   Council   2009)).   TPC-­‐‑App   is   a   performance  
benchmark   for   web   services   infrastructures   and   specifies   a   set   of   web   services  
accepted  as  representative  of  real  environments.  TPC-­‐‑C  is  a  performance  benchmark  
for  transactional  systems  and  specifies  a  set  of  transactions  that  include  entering  and  
delivering   orders,   recording   payments,   checking   the   status   of   orders,   and  
monitoring  the  level  of  stock  at  the  warehouses.  Finally,  TPC-­‐‑W  is  a  benchmark  for  
web-­‐‑based   transactional   systems.   The   business   represented   by   TPC-­‐‑W   is   a   retail  
store   over   the   Internet  where   several   clients   access   the  website   to   browse,   search,  
and  process  orders7.    
As   an   adaptation   of   real   applications,   the  proposed  workload   follows   the   realistic  
workloads   approach,   and   thus   needs   to   include   realistic   SQL   Injection  
vulnerabilities.  Although  feasible,  artificial  vulnerabilities  injection  (Fonseca,  Vieira,  
and  Madeira  2007)  would   introduce  complexity  and  suffer   from  representativeness  
issues.   When   possible,   the   option   should   be   to   consider   code   with   real  
                                                                                                              
  
7 Although TPC-C and TPC-W do not define the transactions in the form of services, they can easily be implemented and 
deployed as such. 
  Chapter  6  
  112  
vulnerabilities,   (inadvertently)   introduced   by   the   developers   during   the   coding  
process.   This   way,   for   the   present   work   we   invited   an   external   developer   to  
implement   the   TPC-­‐‑App   web   services   (without   disclosing   the   objective   of   the  
implementation  in  order  not  to  influence  the  final  result)  and  successfully  searched  
the  web   for  publicly  available   implementations  of  TPC-­‐‑C  and  TPC-­‐‑W,  which  were  
adapted  to  the  form  of  web  services  by  the  same  external  developer  (this  adaptation  
consisted  basically  on  the  encapsulation  of  the  transactions  as  web  services,  without  
modifying  the  functional  structure  of  the  code).  Obviously,  this  was  a  risky  choice  as  
there   was   some   probability   of   getting   code   without   vulnerabilities.   However,   as  
expected,  the  final  code  includes  several  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  (see  Table  6.1),  
which  is  representative  of  the  current  situation  in  real  web  services  development  (as  
shown  in  (Vieira,  Antunes,  and  Madeira  2009;  NTA  Monitor  2011b)).    
The   workload   services   are   currently   implemented   in   Java.   Although   this   is   not  
relevant   when   benchmarking   penetration   testing   tools   (that   detect   vulnerabilities  
based   on   the   application   responses   and   do   not   need   to   have   access   to   the   source  
code),  it  limits  the  application  of  the  benchmark  to  static  code  analyzers  and  runtime  
anomaly  detectors  that  look  for  vulnerabilities  in  Java  code.  This  way,  to  increase  the  
domain   of   the   benchmark,   we   would   need   to   develop   the   workload   in   more  
languages.  The  problem  is  that  different  implementations  of  the  services  might  have  
different   vulnerabilities,   which   limits   tools   comparison.   For   example,   the  
comparison  of  a  static  code  analyzer  for  Java  with  a  static  code  analyzer  for  C#  is  not  
possible  if  the  Java  code  has  vulnerabilities  that  are  different  from  the  ones  in  the  C#  
code.   One   possibility   to   mitigate   this   problem   is   to   use   automatic   code  
transformation   to   translate   the   current   implementation   of   the   services   to   other  
languages,   while   maintaining   the   existing   vulnerabilities.   Obviously,   this   process  
requires   a   subsequent   manual   verification   step   to   check   the   correctness   and  
usefulness   of   the   transformed   code.   Nevertheless,   the   current   implementation   is  
sufficient   to   demonstrate   the   benchmarking   approach   proposed   in   this   chapter,   as  
Java   is   a   language   widely   used   to   implement   web   services   and   there   are   many  
vulnerability  detection  tools  that  focus  on  Java  code.  
To  characterize  the  vulnerabilities  that  exist  in  the  workload  code,  we  invited  a  team  
of   3   external   developers,   with   two   or   more   years   of   experience   in   security   of  
database  centric  applications,  to  conduct  a  formal  inspection  of  the  code  looking  for  
vulnerabilities.  As  the  different  vulnerability  detection  approaches  considered  report  
vulnerabilities   in   different   ways   (penetration   testers   report   the   vulnerable   inputs,  
while   static   code   analyzers   and   runtime   anomaly   detectors   report   the   vulnerable  
lines  of   code),  we  asked   the   security   experts   to   identify  both   the   input  parameters  
and   the   source   code   lines   prone   to   SQL   Injection   attacks.   Table   6.1   presents   the  
summary  of  the  vulnerabilities  detected  by  the  security  experts,  the  total  number  of  
lines  of  code  (LoC)  per  service,  and  the  average  Cyclomatic  Complexity  (Lyu  1996)  
(Avg.  C.)  of   the  code   (calculated  using  SourceMonitor   (Campwood  Software  2008).  
The  results  show  a  total  of  56  vulnerable  inputs  and  of  49  vulnerable  SQL  queries  in  
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the   set   of   services   considered.   As   shown,   the   services   have   diverse   sizes   and  
complexities,  which  is  representative  of  real  scenarios.  
In  order  to  exercise  the  tools  under  benchmarking  in  a  more  exhaustive  and  realistic  
manner  we  decided  to  generate  additional  versions  of  the  web  services.  The  first  step  
consisted   of   creating   a   new   version   for   each   service   with   all   the   known  
vulnerabilities  fixed.  Then  we  generated  several  versions  for  each  service,  each  one  
having  only  one  vulnerable  SQL  query.  This  way,  for  each  web  service  we  have  one  
version  without   known   vulnerabilities,   one   version  with   N   vulnerabilities,   and  N  
versions   with   one   vulnerable   SQL   query   each.   This   accounts   for   a   total   of   80  
versions,  with  158  vulnerable   inputs  and  87  vulnerable  queries   as   listed   in  Table  
6.2,  which  we  believe  is  enough  to  exercise  detection  tools  (as  shown  in  Chapter  7).  
In  summary,  we  have  the  following  versions  for  each  web  service:  
Table  6.1  –  Vulnerabilities  found  in  the  workload  services.  
For  each  service  it  is  presented  the  vulnerabilities  reported,  the  number  of  lines  of  code  and  
the  average  complexity  of  the  code.  The  differences  of  the  presented  values  show  the  diversity  
of  the  services.  





LoC   Avg.  C.  
TPC-­‐‑App  
ProductDetail   0   0   121   5  
NewProducts   1   1   103   4.5  
NewCustomer   15   4   205   5.6  
ChangePaymentMethod   2   1   99   5  
TPC-­‐‑C  
Delivery   2   7   227   21  
NewOrder   3   5   331   33  
OrderStatus   4   5   209   13  
Payment   6   11   327   25  
StockLevel   2   2   80   4  
TPC-­‐‑W  
AdminUpdate   2   1   81   5  
CreateNewCustomer   11   4   163   3  
CreateShoppingCart   0   0   207   2.67  
DoAuthorSearch   1   1   44   3  
DoSubjectSearch   1   1   45   3  
DoTitleSearch   1   1   45   3  
GetBestSellers   1   1   62   3  
GetCustomer   1   1   46   4  
GetMostRecentOrder   1   1   129   6  
GetNewProducts   1   1   50   3  
GetPassword   1   1   40   2  
GetUsername   0   0   40   2  
Total   56   49   2654   -­‐‑  
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• Version   with   all   the   vulnerabilities:   includes   all   the   vulnerabilities  
introduced   by   the   developers,   which   makes   it   representative   of   real  
scenarios.   In   fact,   it   simulates   the   situations   in  which   a   tool   is   used   over   a  
web   service   that   includes   multiple   (and   maybe   interdependent)  
vulnerabilities.    
• Version  without   known  vulnerabilities:   useful   to   characterize   the   tools   in  
terms  of  false  positives.  In  fact,  tools  should  not  detect  any  vulnerabilities  in  
this   code   as   it   does   not   have   known   vulnerabilities   (guaranteed   by   the  
experts  that  reviewed  the  code).    
• Versions  with  one  vulnerability:   represent  more   subtle   scenarios   in  which  
there  are   few  vulnerabilities   in   the  code.  This  makes  vulnerability  detection  
more  complex.    
Table  6.2  –  Final  numbers  of  vulnerabilities  in  the  workload  servicers.  
For  each  service  it  is  presented  the  number  of  versions  created  and  the  total  number  of  
vulnerabilities  exiting.  




ProductDetail   2   0   0  
NewProducts   2   1   1  
NewCustomer   6   35   8  
ChangePaymentMethod   2   2   1  
TPC-­‐‑C  
Delivery   9   10   14  
NewOrder   7   15   10  
OrderStatus   7   18   10  
Payment   13   34   22  
StockLevel   4   6   4  
TPC-­‐‑W  
AdminUpdate   2   2   1  
CreateNewCustomer   6   27   8  
CreateShoppingCart   2   0   0  
DoAuthorSearch   2   1   1  
DoSubjectSearch   2   1   1  
DoTitleSearch   2   1   1  
GetBestSellers   2   1   1  
GetCustomer   2   1   1  
GetMostRecentOrder   2   1   1  
GetNewProducts   2   1   1  
GetPassword   2   1   1  
GetUsername   2   0   0  
Total   80   158   87  
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It   is   important   to   emphasize   that  we   are   aware   of   the   limitations   of   the  workload  
code.   In   fact,   this   code   may   not   be   representative   of   all   the   SQL   Injection  
vulnerability  patterns  found  in  real  web  services.  However,  what  is   important   is  to  
define   the   benchmark   components   in   such   a   way   that   allow   characterizing   the  
effectiveness   of   the   tools  under   benchmarking   in   a   relative  manner   (i.e.   that   allow  
establishing   comparisons   between   tools).   Based   on   the   extensive   experimental  
evaluation  conducted  (see  Chapter  7),  and  in  particular  on  the  benchmark  properties  
discussion,   we   believe   that   the   proposed   workload   is   sufficient   to   assess   and  
compare   the   effectiveness   of   SQL   Injection   vulnerability   detection   tools   for   web  
services.  Nevertheless,   the   proposed   benchmark   can   easily   be   extended   to   include  
more  services.  Readers  can  find  details  on   the  benchmark  (with  detailed  results)  at  
(Antunes  2013).  
6.3 Benchmark	  with	  a	  User-­‐Defined	  Workload	  
[PTBenchWS-­‐ud]	  
In  this  section  we  present  a  benchmark  (PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud)  based  on  a  user-­‐‑provided  
workload   (any   set   of   services),   allowing   to   the   user   to   overcome   the   “gaming”  
problem   and   providing,   at   the   same   time,   more   realistic   results.   The   benchmark  
targets  the  following  domain:  
• Class  of  web  services:  SOAP  web  services  (Curbera  et  al.  2002).  
• Type  of  vulnerabilities:  SQL  Injection  (Christey  and  Martin  2007).  
• Vulnerability  detection  approaches:  penetration  testing  (Arkin,  Stender,  and  
McGraw  2005).  
Contrarily  to  the  benchmark  presented  in  Section  6.2,  this  benchmark  is  not  limited  
to   Java,   as   it   is   independent   from   the   technology   used   to   implement   the   web  
services.  The  main  reason  for  this  is  that  penetration  testing,  the  target  vulnerability  
detection  approaches,  does  not  require  access  to  source  code  testing  the  web  services  
from   an   external   point   of   view.   Together   with   the   focus   of   approach   for  
characterizing   the  workload   (which   is   based   on   testing,   as   discussed   later   on   this  
section),  this  is  also  a  reason  for  focusing  this  benchmark  on  penetration  testing.  
The  set  of  web  services   that   compose   the  benchmark  workload   is   to  be  defined  by  
the  benchmark  user.  This  should  include  a  number  of  SOAP  web  services  with  and  
without  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities.  As  defined  in  Section  6.1.2,  this  workload  can  
be  real,  realistic,  or  synthetic.  What  is  important  is  to  understand  that  the  workload  
definition  determines  the  benchmark  results  and  properties,  thus  the  user  should  be  
aware  of  the  impact  of  the  decisions  regarding  the  web  services  being  considered.  
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A  key  aspect   is   the   characterization  of   the   existing  vulnerabilities.  As   the   target   of  
the   benchmark   is   penetration   testing   tools,   the   number   of   vulnerable   inputs   is  
needed   to   later   calculate   the   metrics.   Such   characterization   can   be   based   on   an  
extensive   manual   analysis   of   the   selected   web   services   in   order   to   identify   the  
existing  vulnerabilities  (in  a  similar  way  to  what  we  did  for  the  benchmark  proposed  
in  Section  6.2).  The  problem  is  that  such  process  can  become  extremely  expensive  if  
the   set   of   services   is   large   and   complex.   Thus,   as   an   alternative,   we   propose   an  
automatic  approach  for  identifying  the  base  set  of  vulnerabilities,  grounded  on  the  
use  of  a  tool  that  combines  attack  signatures  and  interface  monitoring  to  detect  SQL  
Injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  services  presented  in  Section  4.2.    
As  mentioned  before,  the  Sign-­‐‑WS  technique  addresses  the  limitations  of  penetration  
testing   by   using   attack   signatures   and   interface   monitoring   for   the   detection   of  
injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  services.  The  goal  is  to  improve  the  detection  process  
by  providing  enhanced  visibility,  yet  without  needing  to  access  or  modify  the  code  
of   the   target  service.  The  key  assumption   is   that  most   injection  attacks  manifest,   in  
some  way,   in   the   interfaces   between   the   attacked  web   service   and  other   resources  
(e.g.   database,   operating   system)   and   services.   Although   the   proposed   approach  
does  not  guarantee  the  detection  of  all  existing  vulnerabilities,  it  assures  that  no  false  
positives  are  reported.  The  vulnerabilities  detected  will  serve  as  reference  to  estimate  
the  number  of  true  positives  and  false  positives  of  the  tools  under  benchmarking,  as  
discussed  next.  
In  practice,  the  signatures  and  monitoring  approach  provides  information  that  is  not  
available  to  the  penetration  testing  tools  under  benchmarking,  thus  it  is  expected  to  
detect  more  vulnerabilities  and  present  less  false  positives.  In  fact,  and  based  on  the  
precise  detection  of  signatures,  no  false  positives  are  expected  (see  Section  4.2).  Thus,  
the  vulnerabilities  identified  using  interface  monitoring  can  be  effectively  used  as  a  
baseline  for  evaluating  other  tools.  
The  vulnerability  detection  coverage  is  the  percentage  of  real  vulnerabilities  that  are  
detected   by   a   tool.   Assuming   that   the   number   of   vulnerabilities   reported   by   the  
signatures   and   monitoring   approach   is   a   valid   estimation   of   the   total   number   of  
existing  vulnerabilities,  then  the  percentage  of  those  vulnerabilities  that  are  reported  
by   a   given   penetration   testing   tool   is   also   a   valid   estimation   for   its   vulnerability  
detection  coverage.  In  a  similar  way,  we  can  estimate  the  false  positives  rate,  which  
represents   the  percentage  of  vulnerabilities   reported  by   the   tool   that   in   fact  do  not  
exist.  Considering   that   the   set   of   vulnerabilities   detected  using   our   approach  does  
not   include   false  positives   (guaranteed  by   the  use   of   adequate   signatures),  we   can  
estimate   the   false   positives   rate   of   a   penetration   testing   tool   by   calculating   the  
difference  between   the  vulnerabilities   reported  by  such   tool  and   the  vulnerabilities  
identified  via  interface  monitoring.    
To   better   understand   our   proposal,   let’s   take   a   simple   scenario.   Consider   that   the  
signatures   system   is   able   to   detect   10   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   in   a   given  web  
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service  and  that  a  penetration  testing  tool  A  detects  8  of  those  and  6  more,  and  that  a  
penetration   testing   tool  B  detects  4  of   those  and  1  more.  As  shown  in  Table  6.3  we  
can   use   these   values   to   estimate   the   coverage   and   false   positives   of   both   tools.   A  
similar   approach   can  be  used   to   estimate   the  metrics  of  our  benchmark   (precision,  
recall,   and  F-­‐‑Measure).  Note   that,   the   considered   total  number  of  vulnerabilities   is  
only  an  estimated  value,  as  there  is  no  guarantee  of  perfect  detection  coverage  from  
the  signatures  system.  This  way,   the   total  number  of  vulnerabilities  will  be  always  
equal   or   superior   to   the   estimated   number   of   vulnerabilities   and   this   fact   can  
diminish  the  importance  of  the  evaluation  in  two  ways.    
First,   the   coverage   rates   calculated   for   the   evaluated   tools   may   be   overestimated.  
Although  this  seems  a  key  problem,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  the  evaluation  of  the  
different   tools   is   done   for   benchmarking   purposes   (e.g.   to   select   one)   and   not   for  
assessing  actual  effectiveness  (as  this  depends  on  several  factors,  including  the  target  
application,  programing  language,  type  of  vulnerability,  etc.).  Thus,  taking  a  relative  
perspective   of   the   results   (rather   than   an   absolute  perspective),   the   overestimation  
should  be  equivalent  for  all  the  evaluated  tools,  affecting  them  in  a  similar  manner,  
while  maintaining  a  fair  comparison.  
Second,   the   false   positive   rates   for   the   evaluated   penetration   testers   may   also   be  
overestimated.  Again,  although  this  seems  a  major  issue,  in  practice  the  impact  will  
be  minor:   it   is  highly  probable   that  a  vulnerability  detected  by  a   tester  will  also  be  
detected  by  our  approach  as   it   is  based  on   the   internal  behavior  of   the  application  
provided  by  the  interface  monitoring.  This  way,  the  estimation  for  the  false  positives  
should  be  close  to  the  real  values,  which  again  is  adequate  for  a  relative  view  of  the  
results.  
Table  6.3  –  Example  of  coverage  and  false  positive  rates  estimation.  
The  values  presented  are  estimated  using  the  results  of  Sign-­‐‑WS  as  the  baseline  to  evaluate  
the  penetration  testing  tools.  
Tool   Estimated  Coverage  Rate   Estimated  False  Positive  Rate  
PTA   8  /  10  =  80%   6  /  (8  +  6)  ~=  43%  
PTB   4  /  10  =  40%   1  /  (4  +  1)  =  20%  
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  proposed  benchmark  can  be  easily  extended  to  other  
types  of  injection  vulnerabilities.  The  only  constraint  is  that  the  benchmark  user  has  
to  define  a  workload  containing  other  types  of  vulnerabilities  and  then  characterize  
those   vulnerabilities.   Although   in   this   benchmark   we   are   targeting   only   SQL  
Injection,   the   Sign-­‐‑WS   technique   can   also   be   used   to   detect   other   Injection  
vulnerabilities  (see  Section  4.2  for  additional  details).  
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6.4 Benchmarking	  Properties	  
Computer  benchmarking  is  primarily  an  experimental  approach  (Gray  1993).  As  an  
experiment,  its  acceptability  is  largely  based  on  two  salient  facets  of  the  experimental  
method:   1)   the   ability   to   reproduce   the  observations   and   the  measurements,   either  
on  a  deterministic  or  on  a  statistical  basis,  and  2)   the  capability  of  generalizing   the  
results   through   some   form   of   inductive   reasoning.   The   first   aspect   (ability   to  
reproduce)   gives   confidence   in   the   results   and   the   second   (ability   to   generalize)  
makes  the  benchmark  results  meaningful  and  useful  beyond  the  specific  setup  used  
in  the  benchmarking  process.    
In  practice,  benchmarking  results  are  normally  reproducible  in  a  statistical  basis.  On  
the  other  hand,  the  necessary  generalization  of  the  results  is  inherently  related  to  the  
representativeness  of   the  benchmark  experiments.  The  notion  of  representativeness  
is  manifold  and   touches  almost  all   the  aspects  of  benchmarking,  as   it   really  means  
that   the   conditions   used   to   obtain   the  measures   are   representative   of  what   can   be  
found  in  the  real  world.    
The   key   aspect   that   distinguishes   benchmarking   from   existing   evaluation   and  
validation   techniques   is   that   a   benchmark   fundamentally   represents   an   agreement  
(explicit   or   tacit)   that   is   accepted   by   the   computer   industry   and   by   the   user  
community.  This  technical  agreement  is  in  fact  the  key  that  turns  a  benchmark  into  a  
standard.   In  other  words,   a  benchmark   is   something   that   the  user   community  and  
the   computer   industry   accept   as   representative   enough   of   a   given   application  
domain   to   be   deemed   useful   and   to   be   generally   used   as   a   (standard)   way   of  
measuring   specific   features   of   a   computer   system   and,   consequently,   a   way   to  
compare  different  systems.  
The   concept   of   benchmarking   can   then   be   summarized   in   three   words:  
representativeness,   usefulness,   and   agreement.   A   benchmark   must   be   as  
representative  as  possible  of  a  given  domain  but,  as  an  abstraction  of  that  domain,  it  
will   always   be   an   imperfect   representation   of   reality.  However,   the   objective   is   to  
find   a   useful   representation   that   captures   the   essential   elements   of   the   application  
domain  and  provides  practical  ways  to  characterize  the  computer  features  that  help  
the   vendors/integrators   to   improve   their   products   and   help   the   users   in   their  
purchase  decisions.  
To   achieve   acceptance   by   the   computer   industry   or   by   the   user   community   a  
benchmark   should   fulfill   a   set   of   key   properties   (Gray   1993):   representativeness,  
portability,   repeatability,  non-­‐‑intrusiveness,  and  simplicity  of  use.  These  properties  
were   taken   into  account   from  the  beginning  of   the  definition  of   the  components  of  
the   proposed   benchmarks   and   were   validated   after   the   benchmark   has   been  
completely  defined  (see  sections  7.2.4  and  7.3.4).  
To   be   credible,   a   benchmark   for   vulnerability   detection   tools   must   report   similar  
results  when  run  more  than  once  over  the  same  tool.  However,  repeatability  has  to  
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be  understood  in  statistical  terms,  as  it  might  be  impossible  to  reproduce  exactly  the  
same   conditions   concerning   the   tool   and   the   web   services   state   during   the  
benchmark  run.  In  practice,  small  deviations  in  the  measurements  in  successive  runs  
are  normal  and  just  reflect  the  non-­‐‑deterministic  nature  of  web  applications.    
Another   important   property   is   portability,   as   a   benchmark   must   allow   the  
comparison   of   different   tools   in   a   given   domain.   In   practice,   the   workload   is   the  
component  that  has  more  influence  on  portability,  as  it  must  be  able  to  exercise  the  
vulnerability  detection  capabilities  of  a  large  set  of  tools  in  the  domain.    
In  order  to  report  relevant  results,  a  benchmark  must  represent  real  world  scenarios  
in   a   realistic   way.   In   our   work,   representativeness   is   mainly   influenced   by   the  
workload,  which  must  be  based  on  realistic  code  and  must  include  a  realistic  set  of  
vulnerabilities.  This  can  more  easily  be  taken  into  account  in  the  case  of  benchmarks  
based   on   a   predefined   workload,   as   it   is   possible   to   address   representativeness  
issues  during  the  benchmark  specification.  However,  this  may  be  an  issue  in  the  case  
of   user-­‐‑defined   workloads,   as   the   benchmark   user   may   not   be   aware   of   the  
representativeness  issues  of  the  services  considered  and,  consequently,  of  the  results  
obtained.  
A   benchmark  must   require  minimum   changes   (or   no   changes   at   all)   in   the   target  
tools.   If   the   implementation  or  execution  of   the  benchmark  requires  changes   in   the  
tools  (either  in  the  structure  or  in  the  behavior)  then  the  benchmark  is  intrusive  and  
the  results  might  not  be  valid.  
Finally,   to   be   accepted,   a   benchmark   must   be   as   easy   to   implement   and   run   as  
possible.  Ideally,  the  benchmark  should  be  provided  in  a  form  ready  to  be  used  or,  if  
that  is  not  possible,  as  a  document  specifying  in  detail  how  the  benchmark  should  be  
implemented   and   executed.   In   addition,   the   benchmark   execution   should   take   the  
smallest   time   possible   (preferably   not   more   than   a   few   hours   per   tool).   This   is  
obviously  easier  to  achieve  in  benchmarks  based  on  a  predefined  workload,  as  in  the  
case  of  user-­‐‑defined  workloads  the  benchmark  user  has  the  added  work  of  defining  
and   characterizing   the   workload   (if   possible,   the   such   benchmark   should   include  
guidelines  and/or  tools  to  facilitate  this  task).  
6.5 Conclusion	  
This  chapter  presented  a  generic  approach  to  define  benchmarks  for  vulnerability  
detection   tools   in  web  services.   It   specifies   the  guidelines   for   the  definition  of   the  
benchmark   components   (i.e.   workload,   metrics   and   procedure)   and   the   steps  
necessary  to  implement  concrete  benchmarks,  focusing  on  two  key  metrics:  precision  
and  recall.  This  approach  has  been  used  to  define  two  concrete  benchmarks  targeting  
tools  able  to  detect  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities.    
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The  first  benchmark  is  based  on  a  predefined  workload  that  consists  of  large  set  of  
web   services   adapted   from   standard   performance   benchmarks,   and   including  
versions   of   the   services   both   with   and   without   vulnerabilities.   Being   based   on   a  
predefined  set  of  services,  the  main  limitation  of  this  benchmark  is  that  it  is  not  fully  
protected  against  "ʺgaming"ʺ.  
The   second   benchmark   leaves   to   the   user   the   responsibility   for   defining   that  
workload,   thus   avoiding   the   “gaming”   problem.   The   problem   of   such   approach   is  
that   it   leaves   to   the   user   the   task   of   characterizing   the   workload   in   terms   of   the  
existing  vulnerabilities.  To   support   the  user   in   this   task,   the  benchmark   includes  a  
procedure   and   a   tool   to   identify   injection   vulnerabilities   in   the   web   services,  
providing  a  good  estimation  of  the  benchmark  metrics.  
The  experimental  evaluation  of  these  benchmarks  will  be  presented  in  Chapter  7.  In  
practice,   the   benchmarks   were   used   to   evaluate   and   rank   several   tools   with  
capabilities  to  detect  SQL  injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  services,  including  the  tools  
that  implemented  the  techniques  presented  in  Chapter  4.    
Finally,   this  chapter  discussed  the  benchmarking  properties   that  guarantee  that   its  
results   are   reproducible   and   can   be   generalized   in   that   specific   domain.   To   be  
accepted  by  the  computer  industry  and  by  the  user  community  a  benchmark  should  
fulfill  such  a  set  of  properties,  namely:  representativeness,  portability,  repeatability,  
non-­‐‑intrusiveness,  and  simplicity  of  use.  These  properties  will  be  discussed  in  more  
detail  for  both  benchmarks  together  with  the  results  in  Chapter  7.  
  
     121  
Chapter	  7	  
Case	  Studies	  	  
This   chapter   presents   the   practical   application   and   experimental   evaluation   of   the  
techniques   and   tools   proposed   in   the   previous   chapters.   Four   case   studies   are  
presented   with   the   objective   of   assessing   how   effective   are   the   vulnerability  
detection  techniques  and  tools  proposed.  Furthermore,  the  case  studies  show  how  to  
assess  and  compare  vulnerability  detection  tools  using  the  benchmarks  presented  in  
Chapter  6.  
The   first   case   study   focuses   on   the   use   of   well   known   web   security   scanners   in  
publicly   available   web   services.   In   these   experiments   we   use   four   web   security  
scanners   to   identify   security   flaws   in   300   publicly   available   web   services.   The  
purpose  of  this  experiment  is  twofold.  In  the  one  hand,  it  allows  understanding  the  
effectiveness   of  well-­‐‑known  web   security   scanners.   On   the   other   hand,   it   allows  
understanding   the   most   common   types   of   vulnerabilities   in   web   services  
environments,  providing  some  insight  on  the  priority  of  the  types  to  be  addressed.  
The  second  case  study  presented  is  a  benchmarking  campaign  conducted  using  the  
VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   benchmark   to   evaluate   and   rank   a   large   set   of   vulnerability  
detection  tools  including  web  security  scanners,  static  code  analyzers,  and  the  three  
tools   proposed   in   Chapter   4.   The   objectives   of   this   campaign   are:   assessing   the  
effectiveness   of   the   vulnerability   detection   tools   proposed   in   this   work  
(comparing  to  other  existing  ones)  and  validating  the  proposed  benchmark.  
The   third   case   study   is   another   benchmarking   campaign,   now   using   the  
PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud   benchmark,   to   evaluate   four   penetration   testing   tools,   including  
three   commercial   scanners   and   the   improved  penetration   testing   tool   presented   in  
Chapter   4.   This   campaign   was   conducted   with   the   objective   of   validating   the  
PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud  benchmark  as  an  alternative  that  can  be  effectively  used  in  specific  
scenarios  for  comparing  penetration  testing  tools  (recall  that  this  benchmark  is  based  
on  a  user-­‐‑defined  workload).  
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The  final  case  study  demonstrates  the  use  of  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  presented  in  Chapter  
5.  This  case  study  uses  a  simple  infrastructure  based  on  SOAP  web  services  having  
injection  vulnerabilities.   In  practice,  this   infrastructure  is  a  subset  of   jSeduite  SOA  
(Delerce-­‐‑Mauris  et  al.  2009).  Although  the  resulting  infrastructure  is  quite  simple,  it  
allows   demonstrating   all   the   different   scenarios   and   thus,   exploring   the  
functionalities  of  the  tool.  
The  outline  of  this  chapter  is  as  follows.  The  next  section  presents  the  first  case  study  
where  web  security  scanners  are  used  to  detect  vulnerabilities   in  publicly  available  
web  services.  Section  7.2  presents  a  benchmarking  campaign  using  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd  
to   evaluate   and   compare   several   tools,   including   the   ones   proposed   in  Chapter   4.  
Section   7.3   presents   a   benchmarking   campaign   using   PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud   to   evaluate  
and  compare  four  penetration  testing  tools.  Section  7.4  presents  the  case  study  based  
on  a   service  based   infrastructure   to  demonstrate   the  effectiveness  of   the   integrated  
tool  proposed  in  Chapter  5.  Finally,  Section  7.5  concludes  the  chapter.  
7.1 Case	  Study	  #1:	  Assessing	  Public	  Web	  Services	  
As   discussed   before,   commercial   web   security   scanners   are   widely   used   by  
developers   and   are   considered   as   representative   of   the   state   of   the   art   in   web  
applications  black-­‐‑box   testing   (Acunetix  2008a).  These   scanners  are   regarded  as   an  
easy   way   to   test   applications   searching   for   security   vulnerabilities.   However,  
previous   research   suggests   that   the   effectiveness   of   scanners   in   the   detection   of  
vulnerabilities   varies   a   lot,   most   times   providing   unsatisfactory   results   (Fonseca,  
Vieira,   and   Madeira   2007).   This   section   presents   an   experimental   campaign  
conducted   to   understand   the   strengths   and   limitations   of   penetration   testing   in  
public   web   services   and   to   try   to   identify   the   common   types   of   vulnerabilities   in  
such  environments.   In  summary,  the  experiments  were  conducted  to  answer  to  the  
following  three  questions:  
• What   is   the  detection   coverage   (percentage   of   total   existing   vulnerabilities  
detected  by  the  tool)  of  the  vulnerability  scanners  tested?  
• What   is   the   false   positives   rate   (percentage   of   vulnerabilities   identified   by  
the  tool  but  that  do  not  really  exist)  of  the  web  vulnerability  scanners  tested?  
• What   are   the   most   common   types   of   vulnerabilities   in   web   services  
environments?  
The  experimental  study  consisted  of  four  steps:  
1. Preparation:  select  the  security  scanners  to  use  and  the  web  services  to  scan.  
2. Execution:  use  the  security  scanners  to  scan  the  services  in  order  to  identify  
potential   vulnerabilities.   The   tests   were   executed   with   the   scanners  
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configured  to  use  their  most  complete  profile  (i.e.  to  use  all  the  tests  that  they  
have  available  for  web  services  assessment).  
3. Verification:   perform   manual   testing   to   confirm   that   the   vulnerabilities  
identified  by  the  scanners  do  exist  (i.e.  are  not  false  positives).  
4. Analysis:  analyze  the  results  obtained  and  systematize  the  lessons  learned.  
Four   commercial  web   vulnerability   scanners  widely   used  were   selected,   including  
two  different  versions  of  a  specific  brand.  The  three  brands,  introduced  in  Chapter  2,  
are:   HP  WebInspect   (HP   2008),   IBM   Rational   AppScan   (IBM   2008),   and   Acunetix  
Web  Vulnerability  Scanner  (Acunetix  2008a).  For  the  results  presentation  we  decided  
not   to  mention   the  brand  and  the  versions  of   the  scanners   to  assure  neutrality  and  
because   commercial   licenses   do   not   allow   in   general   the   publication   of   tool  
evaluation  results.  This  way,  the  scanners  are  referred  in  this  section  as  VS1.1,  VS1.2,  
VS2,   and   VS3   (without   any   order   in   particular).   Vulnerability   scanners   VS1.1   and  
VS1.2  refer  to  the  two  versions  of  the  same  product  (being  VS1.2  the  most  recent).  
Three  hundred  publicly  available  web  services  were  randomly  selected.  The  reason  
for  random  selection   is   twofold:  allow  a   fair  comparison  between  the  scanners  and  
allow   us   to   gather   information   about   vulnerability   distribution   in   web   services  
context   without   biasing   the   results.   The   set   of   web   services   included   services  
implemented  with   several   technologies   (.NET,   Java,   php,   etc.)   and   services   owned  
by  different  relevant  parties,  including  Microsoft,  Google,  and  Xara.  
 Overall	  Results	  7.1.1
Table  7.1  presents  the  overall  results  of  the  study.  For  each  scanner  it  is  presented  the  
total  number  of  vulnerabilities  reported  and  the  number  of  services   in  which  those  
vulnerabilities  were  found.  The  scanners  pointed  six  different  types  of  vulnerabilities  
(already  introduced  in  Chapter  2).  
As  we  can  see,  different   scanners   report  different   types  of  vulnerabilities.  This   is  a  
first  indicator  that  tools  implement  different  forms  of  vulnerability  identification  and  
that  the  results  from  different  scanners  may  be  difficult  to  compare.  Some  additional  
observations  are:  
• Tool  VS1.1  and  VS1.2  (two  different  versions  of  the  same  brand)  are  the  only  
ones   that   detected   XPath   Injection   vulnerabilities.   An   important   aspect   is  
that,   when   compared   to   SQL   Injection,   the   number   of   XPath-­‐‑related  
vulnerabilities  is  quite  small.  In  fact,  XPath  vulnerabilities  were  detected  in  a  
single   service,   suggesting   that   most   web   services   make   use   of   a   database  
instead  of  XML  documents  to  store  information.  
• Tools   VS1.1   and   VS1.2   detected   a   code   execution   vulnerability.   This   is   a  
particularly  critical  vulnerability  that  allows  attackers  to  execute  code  in  the  
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server.  After  discovering  this  vulnerability  we  performed  some  manual  tests  
and   we   were   amazed   by   the   possibility   of   executing   operating   system  
commands  and  get  the  corresponding  answer  in  a  readable  format.  
•   VS3   was   the   only   one   pointing   vulnerabilities   related   to   buffer   overflow,  
username  and  password  disclosure,  and  server  path  disclosure.  
• SQL  Injection  is  the  only  type  of  vulnerability  that  was  reported  by  the  four  
scanners  used.  However,  different  scanners  reported  different  vulnerabilities  
in  different  web  services.  In  fact,  the  number  of  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  
detected   by   VS1.1   and   VS1.2   is   much   higher   than   the   number   of  
vulnerabilities  detected  by  VS2  and  VS3.    
Table  7.1  –  Overall  results  obtained.  
For  each  type  of  vulnerability  scanner,  the  table  shows  the  number  reported  by  each  scanner  
and  the  number  of  web  services  with  vulnerabilities.  
Vulnerability  Types  

















SQL  Injection   217   38   225   38   25   5   35   11  
XPath  Injection   10   1   10   1   0   0   0   0  
Code  Execution   1   1   1   1   0   0   0   0  
Possible  Parameter  Based  Buffer  
Overflow  
0   0   0   0   0   0   4   3  
Possible  Username  or  Password  
Disclosure  
0   0   0   0   0   0   47   3  
Possible  Server  Path  Disclosure   0   0   0   0   0   0   17   5  
Total   228   40   236   40   25   5   103   22  
As  SQL   Injection   is   the  only   type  of  vulnerability   reported  by  all   the   scanners,  we  
look  at  this  vulnerability  type  in  more  detail.  The  intersection  areas  of  the  circles  in  
Figure  7.1  represent  the  number  of  vulnerabilities  detected  by  more  than  one  scanner  
(the  number  of  vulnerabilities  detected  is  shown;  zero  is  the  value  when  no  number  
is  presented).  Note  that  the  area  of  each  circle  is  roughly  proportional  to  the  number  
of   vulnerabilities   detected,   but   there   is   no   correspondence   between   the   size   of   the  
intersection  areas   and   the  number  of  vulnerabilities   (it   is   too   complex   to   represent  
graphically).    
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Figure  7.1  –  Interception  of  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  reported.  
The  circles  areas  are  proportional  to  the  number  of  vulnerabilities  reported  by  the  respective  
scanner.  The  cloud  represents  the  unknown  vulnerabilities.  
Figure   7.1   clearly   shows   that   the   four   scanners   detected   different   sets   of   SQL  
Injection   vulnerabilities   and   the   differences   are   considerable,   pointing   again   to  
relatively  low  detection  coverage  of  each  vulnerability  scanner  individually.  In  fact,  
even   for  VS1.1   and  VS1.2,   two   consecutive  versions  of   the   same   scanner,   there   are  
considerable   differences.   VS1.1,   the   older   version,   reported   19   SQL   Injection  
vulnerabilities  that  were  not  reported  by  VS1.2.  On  the  other  hand,  VS1.2  reported  27  
vulnerabilities  that  were  not  reported  by  VS1.1.  
 False	  Positive	  Analysis	  7.1.2
The  results  presented  so  far  do  not  consider  false  positives  (i.e.  situations  where  tools  
detected  a  vulnerability  that  in  the  reality  does  not  exist).  However,  it  is  well  known  
that   false   positives   are   very   difficult   to   avoid.   This  way,   we   decided   to  manually  
confirm  the  existence  (or  not)  of  each  vulnerability  reported.  
Confirming  the  existence  of  a  vulnerability  without  having  access  to  the  source  code  
is  quite  difficult.  Thus,  we  defined  a  set  of  rules  and  corresponding  checks  to  classify  
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the  vulnerabilities  detected  by  the  penetration  testing  tools  in  three  groups:  a)  False  
positives,  b)  Confirmed  vulnerabilities,  and  c)  Doubtful.  
Reported  vulnerabilities  were  classified  as  false  positives  when  meeting  at  least  one  
of  the  following  cases:        
• For  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities,  if  the  error/answer  obtained  is  related  to  an  
application   robustness   problem   and   not   to   a   SQL   command   (e.g.   a  
NumberFormatException).  
• The   error/value   in   the  web   service   response   is   not   caused   by   the   elements  
"ʺinjected"ʺ  by  the  scanner.  In  other  words,  the  same  problem  occurs  when  the  
service  is  executed  with  valid  inputs.  
• For  path  and  username/password  disclosure,  the  information  returned  by  the  
service   is   equal   to   the   information   submitted   by   the   client   (e.g.   the  
vulnerability  scanner)  when  invoking  the  web  service.  In  other  words,  there  
is  no  information  disclosure.  
Reported   vulnerabilities   were   classified   as   confirmed   vulnerabilities   if   satisfying  
one  of  the  following  conditions:  
• For   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities,   if   it   is   possible   to   observe   that   the   SQL  
command  executed  was   invalidated  by   the  values   "ʺinjected"ʺ  by   the   scanner  
(or  manually).  This  is  possible  if  the  SQL  command  or  part  of  it  is  included  in  
the  web  service  response  (e.g.  stack  trace).  
• For  SQL   Injection  vulnerabilities,   if   the   “injected”  values   lead   to   exceptions  
raised  by  the  database  server.  
• If  it  is  possible  to  access  unauthorized  services  or  web  pages  (e.g.  by  breaking  
the  authentication  process  using  SQL  Injection).    
• For  Path  disclosure,  if  it  is  possible  to  observe  the  location  of  folders  and  files  
in  the  server.  
• For  XPath  Injection,   if   the  “injected”  values   lead  to  exceptions  raised  by  the  
XPath  parser.  
• For  Buffer  Overflow,  if  the  server  does  not  answer  to  the  request  or  raises  an  
exception  specifically  related  to  buffer  overflow.  
If   none   of   these   rules   can   be   applied   then   there   is   no   way   to   confirm   whether   a  
vulnerability  really  exists  or  not.  These  cases  were  classified  as  doubtful.  Figure  7.2  
shows  the  results  for  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  (the  only  type  detected  by  all  the  
scanners  tested).  
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Figure  7.2  –  False  positives  for  SQL  Injection  in  the  public  services.  
Doubtful  cases  are  cases  in  which  the  vulnerability  was  not  confirmed  but  also  it  was  not  
possible  to  rule  it  as  a  false  positive.  
As   shown,   the   percentage   of   vulnerabilities   that   we   were   not   able   to   confirm  
(doubtful   cases)   is   low   for   VS1.1,   VS1.2,   and   VS3   (always   less   than   15%),   but  
considerably   high   for   VS2   (32%).   This   means   that   the   false   positive   results   are  
relatively   accurate   for   the   first   three   tools,   but   it   is   an   optimistic   figure   (zero   false  
positives)   for   scanner   VS2.   Obviously,   we   can   also   read   the   false   positive   results  
shown   in   Figure   7.2   as   a   range,   going   from   an   optimistic   value   (confirmed   false  
positives)  to  a  pessimistic  value  (confirmed  false  positives  +  doubtful  cases).  
The  number  of  (confirmed)  false-­‐‑positives  is  high  for  scanners  VS1.1  and  VS1.2,  and  
is   also   high   for   VS3,   in   relative   terms.   Scanner   VS2   shows   zero   confirmed   false  
positives,  but   it  detected  a   fair  percentage   (8  out  of  25)  of  vulnerabilities   that  were  
classified  as  doubtful,   thus  a  pessimistic   interpretation  of   results   is   that  8  out  of  25  
vulnerabilities  may  be  false  positives.  Obviously,   the  low  number  of  vulnerabilities  
detected  by  VS2  and  VS3  (25  and  35  respectively)  also  limits  the  absolute  number  of  
false  positives.  
Table  7.2  presents  the  false  positive  results  for  the  other  vulnerabilities.  In  this  case,  
we  were   able   to   confirm   the   existence   (or   inexistence)   of   all   vulnerabilities   and  no  
doubts   remained.   An   interesting   aspect   is   that   all   XPath   injection   and   Code  
Execution   vulnerabilities   were   confirmed.   On   the   other   hand,   all   vulnerabilities  
related  to  username  and  password  disclosure  were  in  fact  false  positives  (in  all  cases  




Table  7.2  –  False  positives  for  other  vulnerability  types.  
As  these  types  of  vulnerabilities  were  reported  by  only  one  brand  of  scanners,  for  each  type  of  
vulnerability  the  table  also  indicates  the  scanner  that  reported.    
Vulnerability   Scanner   Confirmed   F.  Positives  
XPath  Injection   VS1.1  &  VS1.2   10   0  
Code  Execution   VS1.1  &  VS1.2   1   0  
Possible  Parameter  Based  Buffer  
Overflow  
VS3   1   3  
Possible  Username  or  Password  
Disclosure  
VS3   0   47  
Possible  Server  Path  Disclosure   VS3   16   1  
Due   to   the   large   percentage   of   false   positives   observed   for   SQL   Injection  
vulnerabilities,   we   decided   to   repeat   the   analysis   of   the   interceptions   of   the  
vulnerability   report   sets.   Figure   7.3   presents   the   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities  
intersections  after  removing  the  false  positives.  The  doubtful  situations  were  in  this  
case  considered  as  existing  vulnerabilities  (i.e.  optimistic  assumption  from  the  point  
of  view  of  scanners  detection  effectiveness).    
Results   clearly   show   that,   even   after   removing   the   false   positives,   the   four   tools  
report  different  vulnerabilities.  An  interesting  result  is  that  three  vulnerabilities  were  
detected  by  VS1.1  and  were  not  detected  VS1.2   (the  newer  version  of   the  scanner).  
The   reverse   also   happens   for   15   vulnerabilities,   which   is   expectable   as   a   newer  
version   is   anticipated   to   detected  more   vulnerabilities   than   an   older   one   (but   that  
should   happen   without   missing   any   of   the   vulnerabilities   identified   by   the   older  
version,  which  was  not  the  case).  These  results  called  our  attention  and  we  tried  to  
identify   the   reasons.   After   analyzing   the   detailed   results  we   concluded   that   all   of  
these  18  vulnerabilities  are  in  the  group  of  the  doubtful  ones  (maybe  they  are  really  
false   positives,   but   we   were   not   able   to   demonstrate   that),   preventing   us   from  
drawing  a  definitive  conclusion.  
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Figure  7.3  –  Interception  of  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  without  False  Positives.  
The  circles  areas  are  proportional  to  the  number  of  vulnerabilities  represented.  The  cloud  
represents  the  unknown  vulnerabilities.  
 Coverage	  Analysis	  7.1.3
A  key  aspect  is  to  understand  the  detection  coverage  of  the  vulnerabilities  detected.  
Detection  coverage  compares  the  number  of  vulnerabilities  detected  against  the  total  
number  of  vulnerabilities.  Obviously,  in  our  case  it  is  impossible  to  know  how  many  
vulnerabilities  were  not  disclosed  by  any  of  the  scanners  (we  do  not  have  access  to  
the  source  code).  Thus,  it  is  not  possible  to  calculate  the  coverage.  However,  it  is  still  
possible  to  make  a  relative  comparison  based  on  the  data  available.  
In  practice,  we  know  the  total  number  of  vulnerabilities  detected  (which  correspond  
to  the  union  of   the  vulnerabilities  detected  by  the  four  scanners  after  removing  the  
false   positives)   and   the   number   of   vulnerabilities   detected   by   each   individual  
scanner.   Based   on   this   information   it   is   possible   to   get   an   optimistic   coverage  
indicator   for   each   scanner   (i.e.   the   real   coverage   will   be   lower   than   the   value  
presented).  Obviously,   this   is   relevant  only   for  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities  as   it   is  
the  only  type  that  is  detected  by  all  the  scanners.  
Table   7.3   presents   the   coverage   results.   As   shown,   149   different   SQL   Injection  
vulnerabilities   were   detected   (as   before,   we   decided   to   include   the   doubtful  
situations   as   existing   vulnerabilities).   Each   scanner   detected   a   subgroup   of   these  
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vulnerabilities,   resulting   in   partial   detection   coverage.   VS1.1   and   VS1.2   presented  
quite  good  results.  On  the  other  hand,  the  coverage  of  VS2  and  VS3  is  very  low.  
Table  7.3  –  Coverage  for  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities.  
As  it  is  not  possible  to  know  the  total  existing  number  of  vulnerabilities,  the  values  presented  
are  probably  overestimated.  
Scanner   #  SQL  Injection  Vulnerabilities   Detection  Coverage  
VS1.1   130   87.2%  
VS1.2   142   95.3%  
VS2   25   16.8%  
VS3   26   17.4%  
Total   149   100.0%  
 Lessons	  Learned	  7.1.4
The  results  presented  before  allow  us  to  observe  some  interesting  aspects.  The  first  
observation  is  that  different  scanners  detected  different  types  of  faults.  SQL  Injection  
was   the  only   type   that  was  detected  by  all  scanners.  The   two  scanners  of   the  same  
brand  (VS1.1  and  VS1.2)  were  the  only  ones  that  detected  XPath  and  code  execution  
vulnerabilities.   Only   one   scanner   (VS3)   detected   vulnerabilities   related   to   buffer  
overflow,  username  and  password  disclosure,  and  server  path  disclosure.  VS2  only  
detected  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities.  
SQL   Injection  vulnerabilities   are   the  dominant   type   in   the  web   services   tested   (see  
Figure   7.4).   However,   different   scanners   detected   different   vulnerabilities   of   this  
type.  In  fact,  VS1.1  and  VS1.2  detected  a  huge  number  of  vulnerabilities  (215  and  225  
respectively)   while   VS2   and   VS3   detected   a   very   low   number   (25   and   35  
respectively).   Additionally,   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   together   with   the   other  
types   of   injection   vulnerabilities   reported   (XPath   Injection   and   Code   Execution)  
represent  approximately  90%  of  the  vulnerabilities  detected.  
A  key  observation  is  the  very  large  number  of  false  positives.  In  fact,  for  three  of  the  
scanners   the  percentage  of   false  positives  was  more   than   25%.  VS2  presented   zero  
false   positives,   but   8   out   of   the   25   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   detected   by   this  
scanner   remained   as   doubtful   (i.e.   could   not   be   manually   confirmed   as   real  
vulnerabilities  nor  as  false  positives).  This  reduces  the  confidence  on  the  precision  of  
the  vulnerabilities  detected.  
A  very   low   coverage,   lower   than   18%,  was   observed   for   two  of   the   scanners   (VS2  
and   VS3),   while   the   other   two   scanners   (VS1.1   and   VS1.2)   present   a   coverage  
superior   to  87%.  Note   that   this  value   represents  an  optimistic   coverage,  as   the   real  
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coverage   of   the   tested   scanners   (at   least   for   the   300   web   services   used   in   the  
experiments)  is  definitely  lower  than  the  value  observed,  with  many  vulnerabilities  
probably  remaining  undetected.  
To   sum   up,   the   results   show   that   selecting   a   vulnerability   scanner   to   use   for  
detecting   vulnerabilities   in   web   services   is   a   very   difficult   task.   First,   different  
scanners   detect   different   types   of   vulnerabilities.   Second,   the   number   of   false  
positives  is  quite  high,  reducing  the  confidence  on  the  scanners’  results.  Finally,  the  
coverage   is   in   some   cases  very   low,   suggesting   that  many  vulnerabilities  probably  
remain  undetected.  This  also  highlights  the  need  that  users  have  for  techniques  that  
allow  to  evaluate  and  compare  the  effectiveness  of  different  vulnerability  detection  
tools  in  a  fair  way,  as  addressed  previously  in  this  thesis.  
The  final  remark  goes  to  the  final  distribution  of  vulnerabilities  per  type,  presented  
in  Figure  7.4,  after  removing  the  confirmed  false  positives  but  including  the  doubtful  
cases  (i.e.  optimistic  evaluation  of  the  scanners).  As  the  doubtful  cases  only  affect  the  
SQL   Injection,   it   means   that   the   number   of   SQL   injection   vulnerabilities   could   be  
overestimated.   Scanners   have   found   177   different   vulnerabilities   in   25   different  
services,  which  represent  approximately  8.33%  of  the  tested  services.  As  mentioned  
before,   the   predominant   vulnerability   is   SQL   Injection,   representing   84.18%   of   the  
vulnerabilities  found,  with  injection  vulnerabilities  representing  approximately  90%  
of  the  vulnerabilities  detected.  This  is  a  very  important  observation  due  to  the  high  
number  of  cases  found  and  the  high  severity  of  this  type  of  vulnerability.  
    
Figure  7.4  –  Vulnerabilities  detected  distributed  per  type.  
The  values  represented  exclude  false  positives.  The  sum  of  injection  vulnerabilities  (~90%)  
further  highlights  the  importance  of  this  type  of  vulnerabilities.    
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7.2 Case	  Study	  #2:	  Using	  VDBenchWS-­‐pd	  to	  Benchmark	  
Vulnerability	  Detection	  Tools	  	  
Using   the   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   to   benchmark   a   set   of   vulnerability   detection   tools   is  
basically  a  straightforward  process  that  consists  in  following  the  steps  defined  in  the  
benchmark  procedure  (see  Section  6.1.3).  As  specified,  the  tools  under  benchmarking  
must  be  selected  in  Phase  1:  Preparation.  Phase  1  also  specifies  the  step  of  selecting  
and   characterizing   a   workload,   however   this   is   only   necessary   in   the   case   of  
benchmarks   based   on   a   user   defined   workload,   which   is   not   the   case   of  
VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd.   Table   7.4   summarizes   the   tools   used   in   this   experimental  
campaign,   which   are   able   to   detect   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   in   SOAP   web  
services,  the  target  domain  of  the  benchmark.      
Table  7.4  –  Tools  under  benchmarking.    
The  third  party  penetration  testing  and  static  code  analyzers  are  referred  to  throughout  the  
section  by  using  the  codes  VS1,  VS2,  VS3,  SA1,  SA2,  and  SA3.  
Provider   Tool   Technique  
HP   WebInspect  
Penetration  testing  /  Identify  
vulnerable  inputs  
IBM   Rational  AppScan  
Acunetix   Web  Vulnerability  Scanner  
Univ.  Coimbra   IPT-­‐‑WS  (see  Section  4.1)  
Univ.  Coimbra   Sign-­‐‑WS  (see  Section  4.2)  
Attack  signatures  and  interface  
monitoring  /  
Identifies  vulnerable  inputs  
Univ.  Maryland   FindBugs  
Static  code  analysis  /  
Identify  vulnerable  queries  
SourceForge   Yasca  
JetBrains   IntelliJ  IDEA  
Univ.  Coimbra   RAD-­‐‑WS    (see  Section  4.3)  
Anomaly  detection  /  
Identifies  vulnerable  queries  
  
As   shown,   four  penetration   testing   tools   have  been  benchmarked,   including   three  
well-­‐‑known   commercial   tools,   namely:   HP   WebInspect   (HP   2008),   IBM   Rational  
AppScan   (IBM   2008),   and   Acunetix   Web   Vulnerability   Scanner   (Acunetix   2008a).  
These  tools  were  introduced  in  Section  2.3.1.  The  last  penetration  tester  considered  is  
the  improved  penetration  testing  (IPT-­‐‑WS)  tool  presented  in  Section  4.1.    
Three   vastly   used   static   code   analyzers   that   provide   the   capability   of   detecting  
vulnerabilities   in   Java  applications’  source  or  bytecode  have  also  been  considered   in  
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this   study,   namely:   FindBugs   (University   of  Maryland   2009),  Yasca(Scovetta   2008),  
and  IntelliJ  IDEA  (JetBrains  2009).  These  tools  were  introduced  in  Section  2.3.2.    
The   last   two   tools   used   are   also   proposed   in   this   thesis.   Sign-­‐‑WS   is   presented   in  
Section   4.2   and   implements   a   technique   based   on   attack   signatures   and   interface  
monitoring.   RAD-­‐‑WS   is   presented   in   Section   4.3   and   combines   runtime   anomaly  
detection   with   penetration   testing   for   uncovering   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   in  
web  services.  
The  second  phase  of   the  benchmark  consists  of   running   the  selected   tools  over   the  
workload   code   (Phase   2.   Execution).   Basically,   the   tools   are   used   to   detect  
vulnerabilities   in   the  web  services  of   the  workload.  An   important  aspect   is   that,   in  
the   case   of   testing   tools   and  when   allowed,   information   about   the  domain  of   each  
web   service   input   parameter  was   provided.   If   the   tool   requires   the   user   to   set   an  
exemplar   invocation   per   operation,   the   exemplar   respected   the   input   domains   of  
operation.  All  the  tools  in  this  situation  used  the  same  exemplar  to  guarantee  a  fair  
evaluation.  Similarly,  during  the  experiments  the  static  analyzers  were  configured  to  
fully   analyze   the   services   code.   For   the   analyzers   that   use   binary   code,   the  
deployment  ready  version  was  used.    
The  vulnerabilities  detected  were  then  compared  with  the  existing  ones  and  used  to  
calculate   the   benchmark   metrics   and   rank   the   tools   (Phase   3.   Comparison).  
Vulnerabilities   correctly   detected   by   the   tools   were   counted   as   true   positives.  
Vulnerabilities  detected  by  the  tools  that  did  not  match  any  of  the  known  ones  were  
manually  analyzed  before  being  classified  as   false  positives.  Although   this   is  not  a  
step  included  in  the  benchmarking  approach,   it  was  useful   to  validate  the  result  of  
the   code   reviews   conducted   by   the   security   experts   (during   the   definition   of   the  
benchmark,   as   detailed   in   Chapter   6).   The   outcome   was   that   no   additional  
vulnerabilities  were  identified  by  any  of  the  tools  (i.e.  all  the  vulnerabilities  reported  
by  the  tools  were  already  known  or  were  in  fact  false  positives),  which  gives  us  some  
guarantee   that   the   code   reviews   were   conducted   in   an   appropriate   manner   and  
identified  all  the  vulnerabilities.  
 Overall	  benchmarking	  results	  7.2.1
Table   7.5   presents   the   overall   benchmarking   results.   As   we   can   see,   the   anomaly  
detection  tool  (RAD-­‐‑WS)  is  the  one  that  presents  the  higher  F-­‐‑Measure.  Additionally,  
two   of   the   static   code   analysis   tools   (SA1   and   SA2)   present   better   results   than   the  




Table  7.5  –  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd  Benchmarking  results.  
After  the  execution  of  the  benchmark  it  is  possible  to  calculate  the  measures  for  each  tool.  
Tool   F-­‐‑Measure   Precision   Recall  
VS1   0.378   0.455   0.323  
VS2   0.297   0.388   0.241  
VS3   0.037   1.000   0.019  
IPT-­‐‑WS   0.338   0.567   0.241  
Sign-­‐‑WS   0.851   1.000   0.741  
SA1   0.691   0.923   0.552  
SA2   0.780   0.640   1.000  
SA3   0.204   0.325   0.149  
RAD-­‐‑WS   0.885   1.000   0.793  
The  benchmark  measures  can  be  used   to  rank   the   tools  under  benchmarking   (Step  
3.b:   Ranking   and   Selection)   according   to   three   criteria:   precision   (focus   on   the  
balance  between  true  positives  and  false  positives),  recall  (focus  on  the  true  positives  
rate),  and  F-­‐‑Measure   (focus  on   the  balance  between  precision  and  recall).  Table  7.6  
presents  a  possible  ranking  for  the  tools.  We  divide  the  ranking  in  two,  considering  
the   approach   used   to   report   vulnerabilities   (vulnerable   inputs   or   vulnerable   SQL  
queries),  as  defining  a  single  ranking  for  tools  that  report  vulnerabilities  in  different  
ways  may  not  be  meaningful   (nevertheless,   the  benchmark  measures   allow   such  a  
ranking).  Tools  presented  in  the  same  cell  are  ranked  in  the  same  position  due  to  the  
similarity  of  the  results.  
Table  7.6  –  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd  tools  ranking.  
The  tools  can  be  ranked  according  to  three  metrics,  depending  on  the  objectives  of  the  
benchmark  user.    
   Criteria   1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th  
Inputs  
F-­‐‑Measure   Sign-­‐‑WS   VS1   IPT-­‐‑WS   VS2   VS3  
Precision   Sign-­‐‑WS   VS3   IPT-­‐‑WS   VS1   VS2  
Recall   Sign-­‐‑WS   VS1   VS2/IPT-­‐‑WS   VS3  
   Criteria   1st   2nd   3rd   4th  
Queries  
F-­‐‑Measure   RAD-­‐‑WS   SA2   SA1   SA3  
Precision   RAD-­‐‑WS   SA1   SA2   SA3  
Recall   SA2   RAD-­‐‑WS   SA1   SA3  
As  we  can   see   in  Table  7.6,  RAD-­‐‑WS   is   the  most   effective   tool   considering  both  F-­‐‑
Measure  and  precision.  However,  the  most  effective  tool  when  we  consider  recall  is  
SA2,  being  RAD-­‐‑WS  the  second  best.  VS3  seems  to  be  the  least  effective  tool  in  terms  
of  F-­‐‑Measure  and  recall.  However,   it  has  a  very  good  precision  (in   fact,   it   reported  
no  false  positives,  but  detected  only  3  of  the  existing  vulnerabilities).  Excluding  SA3,  
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static  analysis  appears  to  be  a  better  option  than  penetration  testing.  The  following  
subsections  discuss  the  benchmark  results  in  more  detail.  
 Results	  for	  Tools	  that	  Report	  Vulnerable	  Inputs	  7.2.2
Figure   7.5   shows   the   vulnerabilities   reported   by   the   penetration   testing   tools   and  
Sign-­‐‑WS.  Columns  1,  2,  and  3  show  the  results  for  the  commercial  tools  and  the  last  
bar   in   the   graph   presents   the   total   number   of   vulnerabilities   in   the   workload  
parameters.  
As  we  can  see,  the  different  tools  reported  a  different  number  of  vulnerabilities  and  
the   coverage   for   the   commercial   tools   is   always   under   35%.   Among   these,   VS1  
identified   the   higher   number   of   vulnerabilities   (≈32%   of   the   total   vulnerabilities).  
However,   it   also   reports   a   very   higher   number   of   false   positives   (≈54%).   The   very  
low  number  of  vulnerabilities  detected  by  VS3  can  be  partially  explained  by  the  fact  
that   this   tool  does  not   allow   the  user   to   set   any   information  about   input  domains,  
nor  it  accepts  any  exemplar  request.  This  means  that  the  tool  generates  a  completely  
random  workload  that,  probably,  is  not  able  to  test  parts  of  the  code.  
  
  
     Tool   Detection  Coverage   False  Positive  Rate  
VS1   32.28%   54.46%  
VS2   24.05%   61.22%  
VS3   1.90%   0.00%  
IPT-­‐‑WS   24.05%   43.28%  
Sign-­‐‑WS   74.05%   0.00%  
Figure  7.5  –  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd  results  for  pen.  testing  and  Sign-­‐‑WS.  
The  percentages  presented  in  the  image  are  relative  to  the  vulnerabilities  reported.  
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Comparing   our   tools  with   the   commercial   scanners,  we   can   observe   that   Sign-­‐‑WS  
consistently   present   better   results,   both   in   terms   of   coverage   and   false   positives,  
largely  outperforming  any  of  the  penetration  tester,  including  the  commercial  tools.  
Sign-­‐‑WS  was   able   to   detect   117   of   a   total   of   158   vulnerabilities   (74%),   presenting  
much  higher  detection  coverage  than  any  of  the  commercial  penetration  testers.  This  
suggests   that   our   approach   is   an   effective   alternative   to   perform  detection   of   SQL  
Injection  vulnerabilities  in  web  services.  As  expected,  the  increased  visibility  on  the  
web  service  interfaces,  provided  by  the  use  of  signed  attacks  and  increased  interface  
monitoring,  allows   the  approach   to  detect  vulnerabilities   that  otherwise  would  not  
be  possible  to  detect.  In  other  words,  while  the  scanners  are  limited  to  the  user  point  
of   view,   Sign-­‐‑WS   takes   advantage   of   the   information   added   by   monitoring   other  
interfaces.    
The  second  observation  is  the  fact  that  the  tool  did  not  report  false  positives.  In  the  
case  of  two  of  the  commercial  penetration  testers  (VS1  and  VS2),  more  than  54%  of  
the  vulnerabilities  reported  are,  in  fact,  false  positive  alarms  (for  VS3  the  number  of  
false   positives   is   0,   but   the   tool   only   detects   3   vulnerabilities).   This   increases   the  
confidence   in   the   vulnerabilities   detected   by   Sign-­‐‑WS   in   future   campaigns.   As  
mentioned   before,   the   rare   scenario  where   false   positives  would  manifest   is  when  
tokens   similar   to   the   signatures   (both   normal   and   reversed)   are   used   in   the  
construction  of  application’s  queries.  That   is  not   the  case   in   this  set  of  services  and  
also  in  the  large  majority  of  applications  (anyway,  the  tool  user  is  able  to  configure  
the   signature  model,  which  may   allow  avoiding  matching   similar   keywords).   This  
way,  we  do  believe  that  these  results  can  be  generally  reproduced  in  real  world  web  
services.    
The  differences  between  the  performance  of  Sign-­‐‑WS  justify  the  use  of  this  tool  in  the  
PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud   benchmark   (see   Section   6.3)   for   helping   the   user   in   the  
characterization  of  the  workload.  In  fact,  although  the  tool  is  not  able  to  detect  all  the  
existing   vulnerabilities,   the   capacity   to   detect   a   much   higher   number   of  
vulnerabilities  than  all  penetration  testers,  together  with  the  precision  presented  (no  
false   positive   reported)  makes   it   good   enough   to   produce   the   baseline   results   for  
penetration  testing  evaluation.  Next  section  will  discuss  this  in  detail.  
The  tool  based  on  improved  penetration  testing  (IPT-­‐‑WS)  presents  better  results  than  
two  of  the  commercial  tools  (VS2  and  VS3),  but  presents  a  lower  coverage  than  VS1  
(≈24%  against   ≈32%).  However,   in   terms  of   false  positives   IPT-­‐‑WS  performs  better  
than  VS1  (≈43%  and  ≈54%,  respectively).  A  detailed  analysis  of  the  results  and  of  the  
web   services   under   testing   showed   that   IPT-­‐‑WS   is   better   than   VS1   on   the  
identification   of   false   positives   (i.e.   the   detection   rules   it   implements   are   more  
precise),   but   is   less   effective   on   exercising   the   target   services   (the  workload   is   less  
effective).  
Figure  7.6   illustrates   the   intersection  of   the  vulnerabilities  detected  by   the  different  
tools.  As  before,   the  areas  of   the   circles  are   roughly  proportional   to   the  number  of  
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vulnerabilities  detected  by  the  respective  tool,  whose  name  is  indicated  close  to  the  
circle.   The   same   does   not   happen   with   the   intersection   areas,   as   it   would   be  
impossible  to  represent  it  graphically.  
  
Figure  7.6  –  Intersection  of  vulnerabilities  detected.  
The  circles  areas  are  proportional  to  the  number  of  vulnerabilities  represented.  The  cloud  
represents  the  vulnerabilities  that  no  tool  was  able  to  detect.  
As  we  can  see,   there  are  67  vulnerabilities   that  are  detected  only  by  Sign-­‐‑WS.  This  
represents  more  than  55%  of  the  total  number  vulnerabilities  reported,  emphasizing  
the   advantage   of   tools   with   extra   information   when   compared   with   penetration  
testing  tools.  Additionally,  only  3  vulnerabilities  were  detected  by  all  the  penetration  
testing  tools,  but  this  number  is  limited  by  the  low  coverage  of  VS3.    
Regarding  the  penetration  testers,  VS1  presented  the  higher  detection  coverage,  as  it  
is   able   to   identify   all   the   vulnerabilities   detected   by   IPT-­‐‑WS   and   VS2,   plus   13  
vulnerabilities.   VS1   was   also   able   to   identify   one   vulnerability   that   no   other   tool  
detected.  Although  none  of  the  tested  tools  was  able  to  exploit  this  vulnerability,  VS1  
uses  heuristics  to  identify  vulnerabilities  that  are  in  most  cases  very  liberal,  reporting  
vulnerabilities  from  little  evidences  that  in  many  cases  result  in  false  positives,  but  in  
this   case   resulted   in   a   really   existing   vulnerability.   This   is   an   indication   that,  
although   Sign-­‐‑WS   achieves   very   good   coverage,   we   may   need   to   improve   the  
attackload  generation  technique  (e.g.  by  including  some  features  available  in  VS1).  
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The  final  remark   is  relative   to   the  40  vulnerabilities   that  were  not  detected.  After  a  
manual  analysis  of  the  services,  we  concluded  that  many  of  those  are  vulnerabilities  
located  in  places  in  the  code  hard  to  reach  via  black-­‐‑box  testing,  and  the  workloads  
used  are  not  yet  complete  enough  to  be  able  to  execute  those  code  paths.  There  are  
also   situations   where   a   vulnerability   is   preceded   by   another   very   similar  
vulnerability   and   so,   the   second   can   only   be   detected   after   fixing   the   first.   The  
solution   for   the   first   case   is   to   develop   new   and   better   ways   for   generating   the  
workload  and  attackload.  Regarding  the  second  case,  we  need  to  apply  an  iterative  
process  with  alternate  cycles  of  vulnerability  detection  and  correction.    
 Results	  for	  Tools	  that	  Report	  Vulnerable	  SQL	  Queries	  7.2.3
Figure   7.7   shows   the   number   of   vulnerable   SQL   queries   identified   by   the   static  
analyzers   and   by   the   RAD-­‐‑WS   tool.   Columns   1,   2,   and   3   show   the   results   for   the  
third   party   static   code   analyzers   and   the   last   bar   in   the   graph   presents   the   total  
number  of  vulnerable  queries  in  the  workload  code.    
As   shown,   in   general,   RAD-­‐‑WS   presents   better   results   than   the   static   analyzers  
(although   it  has   true  positives   rate   lower   than  SA2).   In   fact,  RAD-­‐‑WS  presents   the  
best   F-­‐‑Measure   value   of   all   the   tools   benchmarked,   detecting   almost   80%   of   the  
existing   vulnerabilities,   while   avoiding   false   positives,   which   constitutes   a   recall  
value  only   lower   than  SA2  while   achieving  maximum  precision.  Considering  only  
the  static  analyzers,  SA2  detected  the  higher  number  of  vulnerabilities,  with  100%  of  
true  positives  (an  excellent  result),  but  identified  49  false  positives,  which  represents  
≈36%   of   the   vulnerabilities   pointed.   The   high   rate   of   false   positives   is,   in   fact,   a  
problem   shared   by   SA3,   which   reported   more   than   ≈67%   of   false   positives.   The  
reason  is  that  these  tools  detect  certain  patterns  that  usually  indicate  vulnerabilities,  
but   many   times   they   detect   vulnerabilities   that   do   not   exist,   due   to   intrinsic  
limitations  of  the  static  profile  of  the  code  analysis.  
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Tool   Detection  Coverage   False  Positives  Rate  
RAD-­‐‑WS   79.31%   0%  
SA1   55.17%   7.69%  
SA2   100%   36.03%  
SA3   14.94%   67.50%  
  
Figure  7.7  –  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd  results  for  static  analysis  and  RAD-­‐‑WS.  
The  true  vulnerabilities  are  the  vulnerabilities  identified  by  the  review  team.  The  percentages  
depicted  are  relative  to  the  total  of  vulnerabilities  reported  by  the  tool.  
Figure   7.8   illustrates   the   intersection   of   vulnerable   lines   detected   by   the   different  
tools.   As   we   can   see,   SA2   detects   all   the   vulnerabilities   found   by   the   other   tools  
(excluding  the  false  positives)  plus  9.  Our  anomaly  detector  detects  a  large  number  
of  the  vulnerabilities  detected  by  the  static  code  analyzers.  Finally,  only  11  out  of  87  




Figure  7.8  –  Intersections  for  static  analysis  and  RAD-­‐‑WS.  
The  circles  areas  are  proportional  to  the  number  of  vulnerabilities  represented.  All  the  
vulnerabilities  were  reported  by  at  least  one  tool,  with  11  reported  by  all  tools.    
 Properties	  Discussion	  7.2.4
The  representativeness  of  the  workload  greatly  influences  the  representativeness  of  
the   benchmark.   As   mentioned   before,   we   are   aware   of   the   limitations   of   the  
benchmark  workload  code,  as   it  may  not  be   representative  of  all   the  SQL  Injection  
vulnerability  patterns  found  in  web  services.  Our  thesis  is  that  the  workload  should  
be   good   enough   to   allow   the   comparison   of   vulnerability   detection   tools.   In   fact,  
what   is   important   is   that   the   benchmark   results   accurately   portray   the   tools  
effectiveness   in   a   relative   manner.   Comparing   the   benchmarking   results   with   the  
effectiveness   of   the   tools   under   benchmarking   in   different   scenarios   allows   us   to  
check   if   the   benchmark   accurately   portrays   the   effectiveness   of   vulnerability  
detection   tools   in   a   relative   manner.   This   way,   we   used   the   tools   to   detect  
vulnerabilities  in  a  small  set  of  third-­‐‑party  web  services.  
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Eight  web  services  implementing  28  operations  were  considered  in  the  experimental  
evaluation  (see  Table  7.7).  To  avoid  selecting  services  that  fit  the  characteristics  of  the  
benchmark  workload   (and   thus  get  biased   results)  we  adopted   the   services   from  a  
previous   study   (see   (Antunes   et   al.   2009b)).   Four   of   these   services   implement   a  
subset   of   the   web   services   specified   by   the   standard   TPC-­‐‑App   performance  
benchmark  (Transaction  Processing  Performance  Council  2008),  which  has  also  been  
used   to   define   the   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   benchmark.   However,   these   versions   where  
implemented  by  a  different  developer,  inclusively  using  different  technologies  (thus  
resulting  in  different  web  services).  The  remaining  four  services  have  been  adapted  
from  code  publicly  available  on  the  Internet.  These  height  services  use  a  database  to  
store  data  and  SQL  commands  to  manage  it.    
Table  7.7  characterizes   the  web  services   (the  source  code  can  be   found  at   (Antunes  
2013)),  including  the  number  of  operations  per  service  (#Op),  the  total  lines  of  code  
(LoC)  per  service,  the  average  number  of  lines  of  code  per  operation  (LoC/Op),  and  
the   average   cyclomatic   complexity   (Lyu   1996)   of   the   operations   (Avg.   C.).   These  
indicators   were   calculated   using   SourceMonitor   (Campwood   Software   2008).   To  
perform   a   correct   evaluation  we   extensively   reviewed   the   source   code   looking   for  
vulnerabilities.  The  table  also  includes  the  characterization  of  the  services  in  terms  of  
the  vulnerabilities  existing  in  the  code:    61  vulnerable  parameters  and  28  vulnerable  
queries  were  identified  (false  positives  were  eliminated  by  cross-­‐‑checking  the  results  
from  different  experts).  
Table  7.7  –  Third-­‐‑party  web  services  characterization.    
For  each  service  it  is  presented  the  vulnerabilities  reported,  the  number  of  lines  of  code,  the  
average  complexity  of  the  code,  the  number  of  vulnerable  inputs  and  lines.  









   ProductDetail   1   105   105.0   6.0   0   0  
NewProducts   1   136   136.0   6.0   1   1  
NewCustomer   1   184   184.0   9.0   15   2  






e   JamesSmith   5   270   54.0   6.0   20   5  
PhoneDir   5   132   26.4   2.8   6   4  
Bank   5   175   35.0   3.4   4   3  
Bank3   6   377   62.8   9.0   13   12  
Total   25   1476   59.0   6.8   61   28  
As  expected,  the  measures  are  not  equal  to  the  ones  reported  by  the  benchmark.  This  
is  normal  as  this  new  set  of  services  has  different  code  characteristics  and  different  
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SQL   Injection  vulnerabilities;   in   fact,  what   is   important   is   the   ranking  of   the   tools,  
which   is   presented   in   Table   7.8   (tools   in   the   same   cell   are   ranked   in   the   same  
position).  
Table  7.8  –  Results  for  third-­‐‑party  web  services.  
The  measures  are  calculated  using  the  same  rules  as  in  the  benchmark.  
Tool   True  Pos.   False  P.   F-­‐‑Measure   Precision   Recall  
VS1   31   5   0.639   0.861   0.508  
VS2   22   1   0.524   0.957   0.361  
VS3   6   0   0.179   1.000   0.098  
IPT-­‐‑WS   28   0   0.629   1.000   0.459  
Sign-­‐‑WS   61   0   1.000   1.000   1.000  
SA1   23   7   0.793   0.767   0.821  
SA2   28   10   0.849   0.737   1.000  
SA3   11   4   0.512   0.733   0.393  
RAD-­‐‑WS   28   0   1.000   0.100   1.000  
Comparing  this  ranking  with  the  one  proposed  using  the  benchmark  measures  (see  
Table   7.6)  we   can  observe   the   following:   1)   the   ranking  based  on   the  F-­‐‑Measure   is  
precisely   the   same;   2)   the   ranking  based  on  precision  differs   for  VS2  and  VS1   (the  
services  used  for  the  validation  are  simpler  services  and  represent  a  lower  challenge  
to  the  scanners,  resulting  in  higher  values  of  precision  for  all  scanners,  leading  to  this  
minor   change   in   the   ranking);   and  3)   the   ranking  based  on   recall   is   the   same.  This  
suggests   that   the   tools’   ranking   derived   from   the   benchmarking   campaign  
adequately   portrays   the   relative   effectiveness   of   the   tools.   However,   to   prove   the  
property   and   improve   the   benchmark   representativeness,   more   vulnerable   web  
services  need  to  be  added  to  the  workload.  
Table  7.9  –  Ranking  based  on  third-­‐‑party  services.  
The  tools  can  be  ranked  according  to  the  three  metrics  used.  
   Criteria   1st   2nd   3rd   4rd   5th  
Inputs  
F-­‐‑Measure   Sign-­‐‑WS   VS1   IPT-­‐‑WS   VS2   VS3  
Precision   Sign-­‐‑WS   VS3/IPT-­‐‑WS   VS2   VS1  
Recall   Sign-­‐‑WS   VS1   IPT-­‐‑WS   VS2   VS3  
   Criteria   1st   2nd   3rd   4th  
Queries  
F-­‐‑Measure   RAD-­‐‑WS   SA2   SA1   SA3  
Precision   RAD-­‐‑WS   SA1   SA2   SA3  
Recall   SA2/RAD-­‐‑WS   SA1   SA3  
Regarding  portability,   the  benchmark   seems   to  be  quite  portable.   In   fact,  we  were  
able  to  successfully  benchmark  four  penetration  testers,   three  static  code  analyzers,  
one   anomaly   detector,   and   one   tool   based   on   attack   signatures   and   interface  
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monitoring.   It   is   important   to  emphasize   that   these   tools  are  provided  by  different  
entities  and  have  very  different  functional  characteristics.  The  benchmark  is  portable  
because   it   is   not   based   on   the   implementation   details   of   any   specific   tool   (e.g.   the  
workload  follows  the  adequate  standards  and  is  generic  enough  to  be  tested  by  any  
tool).  
The   proposed   benchmark   must   report   similar   results   when   used   more   than   once  
over  the  same  tool.  To  check  repeatability  we  executed  the  benchmark  for  VS1  and  
SA2  (the  penetration  tester  and  the  static  code  analyzer  with  the  higher  F-­‐‑Measure)  
two  more   times.  Table   7.10  presents   the   results  of   the   three   executions.  As  we   can  
see,   the   results   for   the   SA2   are   always   the   same.   This  was   expected   as   static   code  
analyzers  analyze  the  code  in  a  deterministic  manner,  which  removes  variance  from  
the   results.   On   the   other   hand,   some   small   variations   can   be   observed   for   VS1.  
However,  these  variations  are  always  under  0.01,  which  suggests  that  the  benchmark  
is  quite  repeatable.  
The   benchmark   does   not   require   any   changes   to   the   benchmarked   tools,   which  
guarantees   the  non-­‐‑intrusiveness   property.   This   is   possible   because   the  measures  
portray   tools   effectiveness   from   the   point-­‐‑of-­‐‑view   of   the   service   they   provide   (i.e.  
vulnerabilities  reported)  and  not  based  on  the  internal  behavior.  
Table  7.10  –  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd  repeatability  results.  
The  repetition  of  the  benchmark  execution  leads  to  slightly  different,  but  equivalent,  results  
due  to  the  non-­‐‑deterministic  characteristics  of  the  workload  
  
VS1   SA2  
Run  0   Run  1   Run  2   Run  0   Run  1   Run  2  
F-­‐‑Measure   0.378   0.381   0.378   0.78   0.78   0.78  
Precision   0.455   0.452   0.455   0.64   0.64   0.64  
Recall   0.323   0.329   0.323   1.00   1.00   1.00  
The   proposed   benchmark   is   quite   simple   to   use   (in   part,   because   most   steps   are  
automatic).  In  fact,  we  have  been  able  to  run  it  for  all  the  tools  in  about  6  man-­‐‑days,  
which  correspond  approximately  to  an  average  of  0.60  man-­‐‑days  per  benchmarking  
experiment.   Running   the   benchmark   only   requires   executing   the   tools   and  
comparing   the   reported   vulnerabilities   with   the   ones   that   effectively   exist.   As  
different   tools   report   vulnerabilities   in   different   formats   (e.g.   XML   file,   text   file,  
GUI),  to  automate  the  vulnerability  comparison  step,  we  need  to  convert  the  output  
of  the  tools  to  a  common  format.  Although  possible,  we  decided  not  to  do  it  in  this  
work  (it  is  just  a  technical  issue  with  no  scientific  relevance).  
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7.3 Case	  Study	  #3:	  Using	  PTBenchWS-­‐ud	  to	  Benchmark	  
Penetration	  Testing	  Tools	  	  
Similarly   to   the   previous   case,   using   the   PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud   to   benchmark   a   set   of  
vulnerability   detection   tools   is   basically   a   straightforward   process   that   consists   in  
following  the  defined  steps  (see  Section  6.1.3).  However,  as  this  benchmark  is  based  
in   a   user   defined   workload,   it   is   also   necessary   to   select   and   characterize   the  
workload   to   be   used,   as   specified   in   Phase   1:   Preparation.   Also   according   to   the  
preparation  phase,  it  is  necessary  to  select  the  tools  under  benchmarking.  
As   shown   in   Table   7.11,   we   used   the   same   four   penetration   testing   tools  
benchmarked   in   the   previews   case   study,   including   three  well-­‐‑known   commercial  
tools   (introduced  in  Section  2.3.1,  namely:  HP  WebInspect  (HP  2008),   IBM  Rational  
AppScan  (IBM  2008),  and  Acunetix  Web  Vulnerability  Scanner  (Acunetix  2008a).  The  
last   penetration   tester   considered   is   the   improved   penetration   tester   presented   in  
Section  4.1.    
To   demonstrate   the   benchmarking   approach   we   considered   the   same   set   of   web  
services   included   in   the   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   (see   Section   6.2),   which   include   both  
vulnerable  and  non-­‐‑vulnerable  versions  of   the   services.  This   allows   comparing   the  
results  of  both  benchmarking  campaigns.  However,  it  is  important  to  observe  that  no  
knowledge   about   the   existing  vulnerabilities   is   assumed.  This  way,   to   characterize  
the   workload   (Phase   1.   Preparation)   we   used   the   attack   signatures   and   interface  
monitoring  approach,   as  proposed   in   the  PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud   specification   (see  Section  
6.3).    
The  penetration  testing  tools  under  benchmarking  were  run  over  the  workload  code  
(Phase  2.  Execution).  Again,  when  allowed  by  the  testing  tool,  information  about  the  
domain   of   each   web   service   input   parameter   or   an   exemplar   invocation   per  
operation  was  provided.  The  vulnerabilities  reported  were  manually  confirmed  and  
compared  with  the  ones   identified  by  the  Sign-­‐‑WS  tool   in  the  preparation  phase  to  
calculate  the  benchmark  metrics  and  rank  the  tools  (Phase  3.  Comparison).  
Table  7.11  –  Tools  under  benchmarking.    
The  third  party  penetration  testing  are  referred  to  throughout  the  section  by  using  the  codes  
VS1,  VS2,  VS3.  
Provider   Tool   Technique  
HP   WebInspect  
Penetration  testing  /  
Identify  vulnerable  inputs  
IBM   Rational  AppScan  
Acunetix   Web  Vulnerability  Scanner  
Univ.  Coimbra   IPT-­‐‑WS  (see  Section  4.1)  
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 Characterization	  of	  the	  workload	  7.3.1
The  vulnerabilities  detected  by   the  Sign-­‐‑WS   tool  have  been  manually  confirmed   to  
guarantee   the   absence   of   false   positives   (as   discussed   in   Section   7.2.2).   The   tool  
indeed   reported   0   false   positives,   but   the   coverage   was   only   of   74.05%   (117   true  
positives  out  of  158  true  vulnerabilities).  Table  7.12  shows  the  distribution  of  the  117  
vulnerabilities   reported   by   the   Sign-­‐‑WS   tool   (the   Versions   column   represents   the  
number  of  different  version  of  each  service,  as  explained  in  Section  6.2).  As  we  will  
see   later,  although  not  all   the   true  vulnerabilities  are   included   in   the  calculation  of  
the  metrics,   the  ones  reported  by  Sign-­‐‑WS  are  enough  for  a  good  estimation  of   the  
tools  effectiveness.  
Table  7.12  –  Workload  vulnerabilities  as  reported  by  Sign-­‐‑WS.  
For  each  service  it  is  presented  the  number  of  versions  existing  and  the  total  number  of  
vulnerabilities  considered  for  this  benchmarking  campaign.  
Source   Service  Name   Versions   Reported  Inputs  
TPC-­‐‑App  
ProductDetail   2   0  
NewProducts   2   1  
NewCustomer   6   35  
ChangePaymentMethod   2   2  
TPC-­‐‑C  
Delivery   9   2  
NewOrder   7   6  
OrderStatus   7   13  
Payment   13   17  
StockLevel   4   4  
TPC-­‐‑W  
AdminUpdate   2   2  
CreateNewCustomer   6   27  
CreateShoppingCart   2   0  
DoAuthorSearch   2   1  
DoSubjectSearch   2   1  
DoTitleSearch   2   1  
GetBestSellers   2   1  
GetCustomer   2   1  
GetMostRecentOrder   2   1  
GetNewProducts   2   1  
GetPassword   2   1  
GetUsername   2   0  
Total   80   117  
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 Benchmarking	  results	  7.3.2
Table   7.13   presents   the   benchmark   metrics   for   each   tool,   considering   the  
characterization  presented   in   the  previous  subsection   (i.e.  using  as  base  set   the  117  
vulnerabilities  reported  by  the  Sign-­‐‑WS  tool).  As  we  can  see,  VS1  is  the  tool  with  the  
highest  F-­‐‑Measure,  closely  followed  by  IPT-­‐‑WS.  VS2  presents  very  poor  F-­‐‑Measure  
results.  Regarding  precision,  VS3  is  the  best  as  it  reported  no  false  positives,  and  IPT-­‐‑
WS   presents   the   best   results.   Finally,   in   terms   of   recall,   VS1   has   the   best   results,  
while   VS2   and   IPT-­‐‑WS   performed   equally.   The   recall   of   VS3   is   very   low   as   it  
detected  only  3  vulnerabilities.  
Table  7.13  –  PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud  benchmarking  results.  
Overall  results  after  executing  the  tools  over  the  workload  web  services.  
Tool   F-­‐‑Measure   Precision   Recall  
VS1   0.437   0.446   0.427  
VS2   0.353   0.388   0.325  
VS3   0.050   1.000   0.026  
IPT-­‐‑WS   0.413   0.567   0.325  
The   results   presented   in   Table   7.13   were   used   to   rank   the   tools   according   to   the  
different   criteria:   F-­‐‑Measure,   Precision,   and   recall.   Table   7.14   shows   the   proposed  
ranking.  As   it   is  possible   to  observe,  VS1   leads   the   ranking   in   terms  of   both   recall  
and   F-­‐‑Measure   values,   while   VS3   has   the   best   precision   value   (again,   the   tool  
reported  only  three  vulnerabilities  and  none  of  them  were  false  positives).  Our  tool,  
IPT-­‐‑WS,  ranks  second  in  all  the  three  metrics.  
Figure  7.9  shows  details  on  the  vulnerabilities  reported  by  the  tools   (the   last  bar   in  
the   graph  presents   the   number   of   vulnerabilities   detected   by   the   Sign-­‐‑WS   tool).  A  
key   observation   is   that   all   the   tools   detected   less   than   43%   of   the   vulnerabilities  
reported  by  Sign-­‐‑WS,  which  makes  the  base  set  of  vulnerabilities  a  good  reference.  
Another   important   aspect   is   that   VS1   reported   a   true   vulnerability   that   was   not  
reported  by  Sign-­‐‑WS,  but  this  was  the  only  case.  We  will  discuss  later  the  impact  of  
this   in   the   metrics   calculation,   when   compared   to   the   benchmark   based   on   a  
predefined  workload.  
Table  7.14  –  PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud  tools  ranking.  
The  tools  ranked  according  to  each  one  of  the  three  metrics  depending  on  the  objectives  of  the  
benchmark  user.  
Criteria   1st   2nd   3rd   4th  
F-­‐‑Measure   VS1   IPT-­‐‑WS   VS2   VS3  
Precision   VS3   IPT-­‐‑WS   VS1   VS2  
Recall   VS1   VS2/IPT-­‐‑WS   VS3  
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Tool   Coverage   False  Positives  Rate  
VS1   42.74%   55.36%  
VS2   32.48%   61.22%  
VS3   2.56%   0.00%  
IPT-­‐‑WS   32.48%   43.28%  
  
Figure  7.9  –  PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud  results  for  the  penetration  testing.  
The  percentages  presented  in  the  image  are  relative  to  the  vulnerabilities  reported.  
 Comparison	  with	  the	  VDBenchWS-­‐pd	  benchmark	  7.3.3
A  key  aspect  is  to  compare  the  results  of  the  present  benchmark  with  the  ones  of  the  
benchmark  based  on  a  predefined  workload.  Note  that,  although  we  are  considering  
the  same  set  of  web  services,  in  the  benchmark  based  on  a  user-­‐‑defined  workload  we  
consider  only  a  subset  of  the  existing  vulnerabilities  (as  reported  by  the  Sig-­‐‑WS  tool).  
This   is   obviously   also   a  way   for   validating   the  workload   characterization   and   the  
metrics  estimation  approaches  proposed  to  support  the  benchmark.  
Table   7.15   summarizes   the  metrics   obtained   for   both   benchmarks   (it   is   a  merge   of  
Table  7.13  and  Table  7.5   for   the  case  of   the  penetration   testing   tools).  As  expected,  
the  metrics  differ   slightly  because   the  base   set  of   true  vulnerabilities   is  different   in  
the  two  cases.  The  F-­‐‑Measure  values  are  consistently  lower  in  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd.  This  
is   due   to   the   higher   values   for   recall   in   PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud,   which   are   related   to   the  
lower  number  of  true  vulnerabilities  considered  as  reference.  Finally,  precision  is  the  
same  in  both  benchmarks,  except  for  the  case  of  VS1.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  VS1  
detected  a  vulnerability  that  was  not  reported  by  the  Sign-­‐‑WS  tool,  and  thus  was  not  
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included   in   the   base   set   of   true   vulnerabilities.   This   obviously   harms   the   reported  
tool   precision,   but   as   the   coverage   of   the   Sig-­‐‑WS   is   very   high,   the   impact   is  
minimum.   In   fact,   it   does   not   affect   the   relative   results   and   the   tools’   ranking   is  
precisely  the  same  for  both  benchmarks  (see  Table  7.6  and  Table  7.14).  
Table  7.15  –  Results  for  both  benchmarks.  
Using  these  values  it  is  possible  to  compare  the  results  for  PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud  with  the  
VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd.  
   Tool   F-­‐‑Measure   Precision   Recall  
VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd  
VS1   0.378   0.455   0.323  
VS2   0.297   0.388   0.241  
VS3   0.037   1.000   0.019  
IPT-­‐‑WS   0.338   0.567   0.241  
PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud  
VS1   0.437   0.446   0.427  
VS2   0.353   0.388   0.325  
VS3   0.050   1.000   0.026  
IPT-­‐‑WS   0.413   0.567   0.325  
 Properties	  Discussion	  7.3.4
The  representativeness  of  the  benchmark  depends  on  workload  defined  by  the  user.  
In   fact,   although   leaving   to   the   user   the   responsibility   for   defining   the   workload  
allows  obtaining  environment-­‐‑specific   results  and  prevents  “gamming”,   it  may  also  
affect   the   validity   of   the   results   if   the   web   services   and   vulnerabilities   in   the  
workload   are   not   representative   of   real   scenarios.   Obviously,   in   the   case   of   the  
experimental   evaluation   presented   in   the   previous   section,   the   representativeness  
issues   are   as   discussed   in   Section   7.2.4.   The   ranking   obtained   (equal   to   the  
benchmark  used  in  Section  7.2)  suggests  that  the  procedure  and  the  approaches  for  
characterizing   the   workload   and   estimating   the   metrics   are   quite   adequate   for  
characterizing   the   tools   under   assessment   even   when   there   is   no   previous  
knowledge  about  the  existing  vulnerabilities.    
Regarding   portability,   the   benchmark   seems   to   be   quite   portable   in   the   specified  
domain.  In  fact,  we  were  able  to  benchmark  four  penetration  testers,  from  different  
vendors   and   having   diverse   functional   characteristics.  However,   it   is   important   to  
understand  that  the  portability  is  tightly  related  to  the  services  defined  by  the  user  as  
workload.  For  example,   if   the  user  opts  by  using  services   that,  differently   from  the  
ones  used  in  this  experiment,  do  not  follow  standard  protocols  and  do  not  present  a  
standard  interface  that  every  testing  tool  is  able  to  understand  and  test,  then  it  may  
limit  the  portability  of  the  benchmark.    
In   terms   of   repeatability   we   executed   the   benchmark   for   VS1   (penetration   tester  
with  the  highest  F-­‐‑Measure)   two  more  times.  Small  variations  where  observed,  but  
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they  were  always  under  0.01,  which  suggests  that  the  benchmark  is  quite  repeatable.  
In  fact,  the  repeatability  results  are  similar  to  the  ones  discussed  in  Section  7.2.4.  
The   non-­‐‑intrusiveness   property   is   guaranteed   because   the   benchmark   does   not  
require  any  changes  to  the  benchmarked  tools.    
Although  the  proposed  benchmark  is  quite  simple  to  use  (most  steps  are  automatic),  
the   fact   that   the   user   has   to   provide   the   workload   and   characterize   the   existing  
vulnerabilities,  may   increase   its   complexity.  Obviously,   the  approach  proposed   for  
the   metrics   estimation   based   on   the   Sign-­‐‑WS   approach   makes   the   work   easier.  
Nevertheless,   by   only   detecting   injection   vulnerabilities,   the   use   of   Sign-­‐‑WS   limits  
the  use  of  the  benchmark  to  services  with  this  type  of  vulnerabilities  (manual  work  is  
required  for  the  characterization  of  workloads  having  other  types  of  vulnerabilities).    
Another  important  aspect  is  that  we  have  been  able  to  run  the  benchmark  for  all  the  
tools  in  less  than  4  man-­‐‑days,  which  corresponds  to  about  1.5  man-­‐‑days  to  select  the  
workload   and   characterize   it   using   Sign-­‐‑WS   plus   an   average   of   0.6  man-­‐‑days   per  
benchmarking  experiment.  Obviously,   in  case   the  user  applies  another  solution   for  
characterizing   the   services   (e.g.   code   review),   the   time   required   to   run   the  
benchmark   may   be   higher.   Anyway,   after   having   the   workload   characterized,  
running   the   benchmark   only   requires   executing   the   tools   and   comparing   the  
reported  vulnerabilities  with  the  ones  reported  by  the  Sign-­‐‑WS  tool.  The  problem  of  
different   formats   in   the   reports   (e.g.   XML   file,   text   file,   GUI)   also   applies,   and  
automating  the  vulnerability  comparison  step  would  require  converting  the  output  
of  the  tools  to  a  common  format.  
7.4 Case	  Study	  #4:	  Detecting	  Vulnerabilities	  in	  a	  Service-­‐
Based	  Infrastructure	  
A  simplified  service  based  infrastructure  was  developed  to  demonstrate  the  usability  
of   the   SOA-­‐‑Scanner   (the   integrated   tool   for   detecting   injection   vulnerabilities   in  
service-­‐‑based  infrastructures).  This   infrastructure  uses  a  subset  of  the   jSeduite  SOA  
(Delerce-­‐‑Mauris   et   al.   2009).   In   practice,   the   infrastructure   implements   one   of   the  
orchestrations   of   the   jSeduite   SOA   that   has   been   selected   due   to   its   proneness   to  
Injection  vulnerabilities  and  the  possibility  of  having  services  with  different  levels  of  
access.   Some   modifications   were   implemented   (e.g.   BPEL   orchestrations   were  
replaced   by   direct   Service-­‐‑to-­‐‑Service   invocations)   to   allow   demonstrating   all   the  
different  scenarios  and  functionalities  in  a  simple  infrastructure.    
Figure   7.10   depicts   the   architecture   of   the   system.  As   it   is   possible   to   observe,   the  
services  can  be  divided  in  three  different  groups:    
1. JSeduite   –   contains   services   that   implement   the   main   orchestrations   of  
jSeduite.  These  services  are  considered  under  control;  
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2. JSeduite-­‐‑WS   –   contains   the   services   used   by   those   orchestrations   and   that  
use   as   data   source   database  management   systems.   These   are   considered   as  
partially  under  control  services;  
3. JSeduite-­‐‑WS-­‐‑XML  –  contains  the  services  used  by  the  orchestrations  and  use  
as  data  source  XML-­‐‑based  resources.  These  are  services  within-­‐‑reach.  
  
  
Figure  7.10  –  Architecture  for  the  Case  study  #4.    
The  gray  area  represents  the  area  under  control.  The  numbers  represent  the  order  in  which  
the  interactions  are  discovered.  The  *   represents  the  existence  of  injection  vulnerabilities.  
The  consumer  has  available  the  service  TvShows  from  JSeduite,  which  uses  services  
from  both  of  the  JSeduite-­‐‑WS  and  JSeduite-­‐‑WS-­‐‑XML.  The  code  of  services  TvShows,  
FeedRegistry   and   FeedSearch   contains   injection   vulnerabilities.   Details   and   code   are  
available  at  (Antunes  2013).    
SOA-­‐‑Scanner  is  initially  configured  to  test  the  service  TvShows,  classified  by  the  user  
as  Under  Control,  making   the   tool   to  deploy  probes   to   the   service.   The   remaining  
services   are   automatically   discovered   and   tested.   The   SOA-­‐‑Scanner   was   able   to  
detect   automatically   the   existing   services,   resources   and   relations.   During   the  
profiling  phase,  the  interaction  with  a  DBMS  (1)  is  detected  by  a  probe  in  charge  of  
monitoring   JDBC   traffic,   while   the   interactions  with   FeedRegistry   (2),  RssReader   (3)  
and  TvHelper   (4)   services   are  detected  by   the  probe   in   charge  of  monitoring  SOAP  
traffic.  During  this  process,  the  tool  uses  a  GUI  similar  to  the  one  presented  in  Figure  
7.11  to  request  to  the  user  complementary  information  about  the  access  level  to  the  
service   (and,   consequently,   the   testing   scenario   applicable).   The   user   classifies   the  
services   according   to   the   information   presented   in   Figure   7.10.   Probes   are   then  
deployed  to  the  FeedRegistry  and  TvHelper   (partially  under  control).  As  RssReader   is  
only   within-­‐‑reach,   no   probes   are   deployed.   When   the   user   finishes   inserting   this  
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information,  the  tool  starts  profiling  the  discovered  services,  discovering  an  external  
DBMS   (5)   and   the   service   FeedSearch   (6),   which   the   user   classifies   as   within-­‐‑reach  
(again,   no   probes   deployed).   The   interaction   represented   by   (!)   is   not   detected  
because  the  services  it  uses  has  no  deployed  probes.  
  
Figure  7.11  –  GUI  for  classifying  newly  found  services.    
The  service  can  be  classified  as  belonging  to  one  of  the  three  testing  scenarios  considered.  The  
service  may  be  invoked  by  other  service  or  may  be  considered  an  entry  point  of  the  
infrastructure.  
Table   7.16   presents   the   results   obtained.   The   column   “Rev.”   shows   the   number   of  
vulnerabilities   reported   by   a   team   of   security   specialists   during   a   formal   code  
inspection   ,   with   “S”   and   “X”   representing   the   type   of   vulnerability   (respectively  
SQL  and  XPath  Injection).  As  in  Section  6.2,  the  review  team  consisted  of  3  external  
developers   with   two   or   more   years   of   experience   in   security   of   database   centric  
applications.   These   results  were   used   as   baseline   to   assess   results   reported   by   the  
SOA-­‐‑Scanner.    
Regarding  vulnerability  detection,  for  the  services  under  control  and  partially  under  
control,   the   SOA-­‐‑Scanner  was   able   to   detect   and   report   all   known   vulnerabilities,  
while  avoiding   false  positives  (due  to  the  capabilities  of  the  Sign-­‐‑WS  and  RAD-­‐‑WS  
to  eliminate  false  positives,  as  demonstrated  in  the  previous  case  studies).    
For  the  service  within-­‐‑reach,  the  existing  XPath  Injection  vulnerability  was  reported.  
However,   the   tool   also   reported  a  SQL   Injection  vulnerability   that   in   fact  does  not  
exist.  This  false  positive  is  reported  because  XPath  and  SQL  injection  vulnerabilities  
many   times   present   very   similar   behaviors,   and   because   the   IPT-­‐‑WS   tool   has   no  
knowledge  about  the  internals  of  the  application.  If  it  was  possible  to  use  one  of  the  
other   detection   techniques   (Sign-­‐‑WS   or   RAD-­‐‑WS)   to   test   this   service,   the   false  
positive   would   be   avoided,   as   the   extra   information   provided   would   allow   us   to  
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precisely   confirm   the   existence   of   the   vulnerability.   This   shows   the   advantage   of,  
when   possible,   using   the   SOA-­‐‑Scanner   tool   in   the   mode   that   can   take   more  
advantage  of  the  visibility  available.  
  
Table  7.16  –  Results  for  SOA-­‐‑Scanner  vulnerability  detection.  
For  each  service  and  respective  inputs,  the  table  lists  the  vulnerabilities  identified  by  the  
reviewers,  the  technique  used,  the  vulnerabilities  correctly  reported  and  the  false  positives  
reported.  
Service   Input   Rev.   Technique   V.   F.P.  
TvShows  






FeedRegistry   getURL.provider   1S Sign-WS 1S 
 




FeedSearch   search.token   1X PT 1X 1S 




Although   the   infrastructure  used   in   the   case   study   is  quite   simple,  we  believe   that  
the  tool  is  able  to  achieve  similar  results  in  bigger  and  more  complex  infrastructures.  
In   fact,   the   complexity   of   the   discovery,   profiling   and   a   testing   process   grows  
linearly  with  the  size  of  the  infrastructure.  This  way,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  the  
services   in   the   infrastructure   and   in   their   complexity,   increases   proportionally   the  
length  of  the  process.  Adding  more  relations  between  the  same  set  of  services  has  no  
impact  on  the  performance  of  the  tool.  
7.5 Conclusion	  
This  chapter  presented  four  case  studies  that  illustrate  the  practical  application  and  
experimental  evaluation  of  the  techniques  and  tools  proposed  in  this  thesis.    
The  first  case  study  used  well  known  web  security  scanners  to  detect  vulnerabilities  
in   publicly   available   web   services.   During   the   experiments,   it   was   possible   to  
observe   a   large   number   of   vulnerabilities,   confirming   that   many   services   are  
deployed   without   proper   security   testing.   It   was   also   possible   to   observe   that  
existing   web   security   scanners   present   very   low   effectiveness,   showing   low  
detection  coverage   in   some  cases   (this   suggests   that  many  vulnerabilities  probably  
remain   undetected),   while   reporting   a   high   number   of   false   positives   (which  
reduces   the   confidence   on   the   precision   of   the   vulnerabilities   detected).   This  
indicates  that  it  is  a  very  difficult  task  to  select  a  security  scanner  for  web  services,  
also   because   different   scanners   detect   different   types   of   vulnerabilities.   A   final  
observation   is   that   injection   vulnerabilities   are   prevalent   in   the   web   services  
tested,   as   they   represent   approximately   90%   of   the   vulnerabilities   detected,  
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particularly  due  to  SQL  Injection  vulnerabilities,  which  represent  more  than  84%  of  
all  vulnerabilities.    
The  second  case  study  used  the  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd  benchmark  to  evaluate  and  rank  a  
large   set   of   vulnerability   detection   tools.   The   results   show   that   the   proposed  
benchmark  can  be  easily  used  to  assess  and  compare  a  wide  range  of  tools.  In  fact,  
the   benchmark   measures   provided   an   easy   way   to   rank   the   tools   under  
benchmarking  according   to  different  user  criteria.  During   these  experiments   it  was  
also   possible   to   evaluate   the   detection   techniques   proposed.   The   IPT-­‐‑WS   tool  
ranked  second  among  penetration  testers  according  to  the  three  criteria,  being  able  
to   present   high   recall   value   (only   one   commercial   security   scanner   detected  more  
vulnerabilities),   while   presenting   an   high   precision   value   (only   one   other   security  
scanner   presented   an   higher   value).   The   Sign-­‐‑WS   tool   was   able   to   outperform  
penetration   testing   tools,   achieving   much   higher   recall   values   with   maximum  
precision.  Finally,   the  RAD-­‐‑WS  tool  presented  the  highest  F-­‐‑Measure  of  all   tools,  
presenting  a  recall  value  only   lower   than  one  static  code  analyzer,  while  achieving  
maximum  precision.  
The   third   case   study   used   the   PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud   benchmark   to   evaluate   four  
penetration   testers.   The   experiments   allowed   validating   this   benchmark   as   an  
alternative  to  the  previous  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd,  being  able  to  overcome  the  limitation  
related   to   the   possibility   of   “gaming”   faced   by   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd.   The   benchmark  
results   were   compared   with   the   ones   from   the   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   benchmark   and  
similar  rankings  were  obtained  for  both  cases,  showing  that  that  the  procedure  and  
the   approaches   for   characterizing   the   user-­‐‑defined   workload   and   estimating   the  
metrics  are  effective.  
A  key  aspect   is   that   benchmarking  properties  were  discussed   in  detail   for   the   two  
benchmarks.   The   results   and   discussion   show   that   the   proposed   benchmarking  
approach   can   be   applied   in   the   field   to   specify   benchmarks   for   vulnerability  
detection  tools  targeting  different  domains.  
The   final   case   study  demonstrated   the  use   of   the   SOA-­‐‑Scanner.  Although   this   is   a  
very  simple  scenario,  it  as  the  elements  necessary  to  validate  the  capabilities  of  the  
approach   to   monitor   and   discover   the   services   of   the   infrastructure   and   to   use  
different  testing  techniques  to  detect  injection  vulnerabilities  according  to  the  level  
of   access   and   information   available.   In   fact,   results   show   that   the   tool  was   able   to  
discover   all   the   services   in   the   infrastructure   and   the   combination   of   testing   tools  
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Chapter	  8	  
Conclusion	  and	  Future	  Work	  
This   thesis   proposes   methodologies   to   detect   software   vulnerabilities   in   service-­‐‑
based   infrastructures.   We   present   a   framework   that   defines   the   assumptions,   the  
concepts,   and   the   generic   approaches   that   allow   the   development   of   innovative  
techniques   and   tools.   The   framework   encompasses   a   reference   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructure,  a  generic  approach  for  designing  vulnerability  detection  tools  for  web  
services,   which   includes   the   definition   of   the   testing   procedure   and   of   the   tool  
components,   and   an   integrated   approach   based   on   continuous   monitoring   to  
automatically  discover  and  test  the  existing  services,  resources  and  interactions.    
Three   new   techniques   to   detect   vulnerabilities   in   web   services   implementing   the  
generic   design   approach,   were   proposed:   1)   an   improved   penetration   testing  
technique   to   detect   SQL   Injection   vulnerabilities   using   representative   workloads,  
effective  attackloads,  and  applies  well-­‐‑defined  rules   to   improve  detection  coverage  
while   reducing   false   positives;   2)   a   technique   that   uses   attack   signatures   and  
interface   monitoring   to   detect   injection   vulnerabilities,   overcoming   the   visibility  
limitations  of  penetration  testing;  and  3)  a  runtime  anomaly  detection  approach  able  
to  detect  SQL  Injection  and  XPath  Injection  vulnerabilities.    
We  presented  also  SOA-­‐‑Scanner,  a  tool  that  implements  the  integrated  approach  to  
detect  injection  vulnerabilities  in  service-­‐‑based  infrastructures  and  that  relies  on  the  
three   vulnerability   detection   techniques   mentioned   above   to   test   the   services  
depending  on  the  testing  scenario  applicable.    
Comparing   to   previous  works,   such   proposals   innovate   in   the   following  ways.   In  
first   place,   they   are   targeted   to   cope   with   the   specificities   of   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures.   For   example,   a   continuous   and   dynamic   discovery   and   testing  
process  is  used  to  test  the  infrastructure  and  multiple  testing  techniques  are  applied  
to  maximize  the  effectiveness  in  the  context  of  services  with  different  levels  of  access.  
Finally,   the   proposed   approaches   put   a   strong   emphasis   on   extensibility   and  
modularity  allowing   to  easily  define  new  testing   tools  and  also   improving  existing  
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tools   by   upgrading   the   existing   the   modules   (e.g.   if   a   more   efficient   workload  
emulator   is  developed,   it   is  very  simple  to  replace  the  old  one  by  the  new  one  in  a  
tool  that  uses  it).    
This   thesis   also   presented   a   generic   approach   for   designing   benchmarks   for  
vulnerability   detection   tools   for   services,   which   specifies   the   requirements   for   the  
benchmark  components  and  the  steps  needed  to  implement  concrete  benchmarks.  It  
has  been  used  to  define  two  concrete  benchmarks:  1)  VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd,  a  benchmark  
based   on   a   predefined   workload   targeting   tools   able   to   detect   SQL   Injection  
vulnerabilities  in  web  services,  and  2)  PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud,  a  benchmark  based  on  a  user-­‐‑
provided   targeting   penetration   testing   tools   for   the   detection   of   injection  
vulnerabilities   in   web   services.   The   second   benchmark   overcomes   the   “gaming”  
problem  faced  by  the  first,  by  allowing  the  benchmark  user  to  specify  the  workload.  
Four   case   studies   were   devised   to   demonstrate   and   validate   the   proposed  
approaches  and  techniques.  In  the  first  we  used  several  well  known  commercial  web  
security   scanners   to   detect   vulnerabilities   in   publicly   available  web   services.   From  
this  we  drawn  three  main  conclusions:  1)  many  services  are  deployed  with  security  
vulnerabilities;   2)   it   is   a   very   difficult   task   to   select   a   security   scanner   for   web  
services,   as  different   scanners   report  different  vulnerabilities   and  present  very   low  
effectiveness   regarding  detection  coverage  and   false  positive   rates;   and  3)   injection  
vulnerabilities  are  prevalent  in  the  web  services  tested.  
Two   other   case   studies   consisted   of   using   the   benchmarks   proposed   to   conduct  
campaigns   with   the   objective   evaluating   the   proposed   tools   for   vulnerability  
detection   and,   at   the   same   time,   validating   the   benchmarks.   During   these  
benchmarking   campaigns   it   was   possible   to   observe   that   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   can   be  
easily  used  to  assess  and  compare  a  very  wide  range  of  tools.  Also,  PTBenchWS-­‐‑ud  
benchmark   has   shown   to   be   an   alternative   to   the   VDBenchWS-­‐‑pd   to   benchmark  
penetration  testers,  being  able  to  overcome  the  limitation  related  to  the  possibility  of  
“gaming”   while   ranking   effectively   the   benchmarked   tools.   The   benchmarking  
properties  were  discussed  in  detail   for  the  two  benchmarks  and  the  results  suggest  
that  the  proposed  benchmarking  approach  can  effectively  be  applied  in  the  field  to  
specify  benchmarks  for  vulnerability  detection  tools  targeting  different  domains.  
Regarding   the  evaluation  of  our  detection   tools,   it  was  possible   to  observe   that   the  
IPT-­‐‑WS  tool  ranked  second  among  all   the  penetration  testers  assessed  according  to  
the  three  criteria  defined  by  the  benchmarks.  The  second  observation  is  that  Sign-­‐‑WS  
tool  was  able  to  outperform  penetration  testing  tools,  achieving  much  higher  recall  
values   with   maximum   precision.   And   finally,   the   RAD-­‐‑WS   tool   presented   the  
highest  F-­‐‑Measure  of   all   tools,  presenting  a   recall  value  only   lower   than  one   static  
code  analyzer,  while  achieving  maximum  precision.  
In  the  last  case  study  we  demonstrated  the  use  of  the  SOA-­‐‑Scanner.  Although  a  very  
simple   scenario,   it   contains   services  with   different   levels   of   access,   it   has   different  
types  of  vulnerabilities   and   it  uses  different   types  of   resources,   thus  providing   the  
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elements   necessary   to   demonstrate   all   the   capabilities   of   the   tool.   During   the  
experiments   it   was   possible   to   observe   that   the   tool   was   able   to   discover   all   the  
services   in   the   infrastructure   and   the   combination   of   the   testing   tools   allowed  
detecting  all  the  existing  vulnerabilities.  
Future	  work	  
Several   research   topics   are   currently   in   progress   as   a   continuation   of   the   work  
presented  in  this  thesis.  
1. Implement   the   SOA-­‐‑Scanner   as   a   product   that   can   easily   be   used   by  
developing  teams:  the  tool  is  currently  in  a  prototype  status.  Concluding  the  
implementation  of   the  tool   in  such  way  that   it  would  be  easy  to  use  by  any  
person  would  help  widespreading  its  utilization.  We  believe  that  the  tool  will  
be   a   key   contribution   towards   improving   the   security   of   the   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures  deployed.  Additionally,  we  are  also  considering  adding  new  
features  to  the  tool,  some  of  which  are  described  in  the  following  points.  
2. Extend   the   techniques   for   other   types   of   services:   although   some   of   the  
proposed   techniques   target   primarily   SOAP   web   services,   most   of   the  
concepts  can  be  transposed  to  other  technologies  (e.g.  RESTful  web  services).  
However,  there  is  an  important  part  of  the  work,  currently  in  progress,  that  is  
to   understand   the   differences   between   technologies   and   the   impact   these  
differences  may  have  in  the  tools.  We  are  currently  conducting  an  field  study  
to   get   knowledge   about   the   characteristics   of   RESTful   web   services   in   the  
wild.      
3. Extend   the   techniques   to  other   types  of  vulnerabilities:   although   injection  
vulnerabilities  rank  at  the  top  of  the  most  dangerous  vulnerabilities,  there  are  
others.   A   key   part   of   this   work   will   be   to   gather   web   services   with   these  
vulnerabilities  to  be  used  as  case  study  to  evaluate  the  researched  techniques.  
4. Extend  the  techniques  to  detect  second  order  vulnerabilities:  second-­‐‑order  
injection   happens  when   the  malicious   code   is   injected   successfully   but   not  
executed  immediately.  Instead  it  is  stored  by  the  application  in  some  resource  
to  be  retrieved  and  executed  eventually,  when  that  resource   is  accessed  (W.  
G.   Halfond,   Viegas,   and   Orso   2006).   The   SOA-­‐‑Scanner   tool   has   the  
characteristics  necessary  to  detect  this  kind  of  vulnerabilities:  it  monitors  the  
interfaces  between  the  web  services  and  external  resources  or  services.  With  
the   appropriate   modifications,   we   intend   to   make   the   tool   to   attack   these  
interfaces  and  detect  this  kind  of  vulnerabilities.    
5. Runtime   Verification   and   Validation   (V&V)   of   service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures:   the   traditional   lifecycle   in   V&V   assumes   a   structured   and  
highly   documented   software   or   system   development   process   that   allows  
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gathering  the  required  quality  evidences,  and  presumes  that  the  system  does  
not   evolve   after   deployment   (i.e.   the   structure   is   stable   over   time).   This  
represents   a   serious   problem,   as   there   are   no   V&V   methods,   tools   and  
processes   that   can   cope   with   the   dynamic   nature   of   service   based  
infrastructures,   as   well   as   with   many   other   prominent   features   of   these  
systems.   Complying   with   nowadays   organizations’   requirements   demands  
for   deployment   and   maintenance   of   trustworthy   dynamic   service-­‐‑based  
software  systems,  which  naturally  results   in   the  superposition  of   the  design  
and   runtime  phases,   thus   imposing   the  need   for   a  V&V  paradigm  shift.  To  
overcome  this  problem  new  V&V  approaches  that  can  be  applied  ate  runtime  
are   necessary.   Similarly   to   the   SOA-­‐‑Scanner,   runtime   V&V   should   take  
advantage  of  monitoring  services  and  infrastructures,  which  will  support  the  
runtime  assessment  of  the  system  through  the  collection  of  measurements  for  
quantitative  analysis  of  security  and  trustworthiness.    
6. Using   vulnerability   injection   to   develop   benchmarks   for   vulnerability  
detection   tools:   in   the   same   way   fault   injection   has   become   an   attractive  
approach  to  validate  specific  fault  handling  and  fault  detection  mechanisms,  
vulnerability   injection   is   a   powerful   tool   that   can   be   used   to   evaluate   the  
effectiveness   of   vulnerability   prevention   and   detection   tools   and  
methodologies.  By  using  a  realistic  vulnerability  injection  technique  it  will  be  
very  easy   to  create  new  workloads  based  on  any  set  of  web  services,  as   the  
vulnerabilities   injected   would   be   known.   Obviously,   the   main   challenge   is  
related  to  how  realistic  the  injection  vulnerabilities  can  be.  
The  work  presented  in  this  thesis  has  largely  contributed  to  gain  a  broad  experience  
on  services  security  testing.  In  addition,  this  work  provided  us  an  excellent  standard  
environment   for   the   evaluation   and   comparison   of   alternative   vulnerability  
detection  tools  based  on  their  effectiveness.  This  way,  several  topics  can  be  foreseen  
as  a  continuation  of  the  present  work:  
1. Use   collaborative   testing   for   the   detection   of   vulnerabilities   in   services:  
using  this  kind  of  collaboration  it  is  possible  to  increase  the  level  of  access  to  
some   of   some   services   of   the   infrastructure,   depending   on   the   existing  
collaboration   agreements.   Obviously,   besides   the   negotiation   of   the  
collaboration   agreement,   it   is   necessary   to   configure   the   tools   in   such   a  
decentralized   way   that   all   the   parts   of   the   collaboration   would   have   an  
instance  running  that  could  transmit  information  to  the  others.    
2. Use   static   code   analysis   to   improve   vulnerability   detection:   as  
demonstrated  by  the  effectiveness  of  RAD-­‐‑WS  combining  different  tools  can  
be  a  very  profitable  option.  Although  there  are  dynamic  analysis  techniques  
that  combine  static  code  analysis  with  the  execution  of  tests,  there  is  room  to  
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research  automated  tools  to  perform  this  task  in  the  context  of  service-­‐‑based  
infrastructures.  
3. Research   vulnerability   removal   techniques:   more   than   just   detecting  
vulnerabilities   it   is   important   to  automatically   remove   them,  which  consists  
of  modifying   the  source  code  or  byte  code  of   the  application   in  order   to   fix  
security   flaws  without  modifying  or  harming  the   functional  behavior  of   the  
web   service.   This   is   of   utmost   importance   as,   usually,   developers   are   not  
specialized   in   security   aspects   and   the   vulnerability   patterns   are   repeated  
several  times,  even  in  different  applications.  
4. Research   attack   detection   approaches:   attack   detection   is   an   alternative   to  
mitigate  vulnerabilities  when  vulnerability  removal  is  not  possible.  It  consists  
of   introduce  capabilities   that,  at   runtime,  detect  and  stop  attacks   (this   is   the  
reasoning   behind   intrusion   detection   systems,   runtime   anomaly   detection  
systems,  etc.).  The  idea  here  is  to  propose  tools  that  can  be  integrated  into  the  
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